History of the Republican Party in New Mexico, 1867-1952 / by Hoover, Herbert,
This dissertation has been 
microfilmed exactly as received 66-5979
HOOVER, H erbert T heodore, 1930-  
HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN 
NEW MEXICO, 1867-1952.
The U n iversity  of Oklahom a, P h .D ., 1966 
H istory , general
I
I
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan -a
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
OlADOATE COLLBŒ
HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN NEV/ MEXICO, 1867-1952
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in  p a r t ia l  fu lfillm e n t o f  the  requirements fo r  the







HISTORT OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN NEW MEXICO, 1867-1952
APPROVED BY
r é Â â .




The primary ob jec tive  o f th is  study i s  to  tra c e  th e  h is to iy  o f 
th e  Republican p a rty  in  New Mexico from i t s  beginnings in  th e  I860* s to  
1952» The reader w ill  seek in  vain fo r  a d e ta iled  account o f eadi p a rty  
convention, a summary o f every campaign, o r  even the  mention o f  a l l  the  
Republican lead ers  whose con tribu tions to  p a rtisa n  h is to ry  m erit a tten tio n . 
He w ill find  in stead  a discussion o f  th e  o rig in s  o f th e  p arty , i t s  r i s e  
to  power during t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es, i t s  decline  a f te r  statehood in  I 9I I  
and some o f  th e  reasons fo r  i t s  re lega tion  to  a secondary ro le  in  public  
a f f a i r s  in  recen t tim es.
While th e  research was tak ing  shape, personnel in  charge o f 
manuscripts a t  the  U niversity  o f New Mexico and the  U niversity  o f  
Oklahoma l ib r a r ie s  offered  inestim able assistance  by providing d irec tio n  
in to  the  papers o f  Thomas B. Catron, A lbert B. F a ll and P atrick  J . Hurley. 
Also, ex-Governor Edwin L. Mechem, E arl S tu ll  and James E. N e le i^ ,  a l l  
o f  Las Cruces, ware exceedingly generous in  affording time fo r  personal 
in terview s which helped c la r ify  some o f  th e  curren t problems o f  th e  New 
Mexican Republican p arty .
Professor W. Eugene Hollon, chairman o f  the  committee, has con­
tr ib u te d  generously in  behalf o f t h i s  th e s is , giving r ig id  c r i t ic ia n  and 
kind encouragement. Many o f  i t s  m erits  are  the  product o f  h is  e f fo r t ,  
\d iile  re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  i t s  fa u l ts  r e s ts  so le ly  with th e  author. Other
i i i
members o f the  committee •(dio have o ffered  c r i t ic ia n  and help are  Professors 
Max Moorhead and Prison Gooch and Dean John E zell. Mrs. Donna B iel ski 
typed th e  prelim inary and f in a l  d ra f ts  o f  th e  m anuscript.
F inally , my -wife, Karolyn, has been a constant con tribu to r and 
frien d ly  c r i t i c .  Her understanding and w illingness to  s a c r if ic e  have been 
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SPANISH TRADITION IN NBf USKICAN FOUTICS SINGS 1848
CHAPTER I
Nhy p e< ^e  vote as they do I s  th e  re s u l t  o f  th e  Mnd o f envlnm - 
ment In  #± 6h  thoy l iv e ,  the  nay they  make th e i r  living» th e i r  
ra c ia l  inheritance  • • • t h e i r  educational attainm ents, t h e i r  
re lig io u s  a ff i l ia tio n s»  t h e i r  leadercthip, and vhat John S tuart 
ffi.ll once ca lle d  th e i r  * temg)erament,  " ̂
Hay Allen B U lington has observed th a t  idien Anglo America clashed 
uLth Spanish America in  th e  Southwest "the outcome was never in  doubt." 
Anglo-American f ro n t ie r  technique "emgAiasized th e  ro le  o f  th e  ind iv idua l 
in  Hie subjugation o f nature» " v h ile  Sjpanish-American f ro n t ie r  po licy  
subordinated th e  in te r e s t  of th e  ind iv idua l to  th a t  o f th e  s ta te .  The 
success o f those given fre e  reign  to  e x p lo it th e  new land fo r  personal 
gain was in ev itab le . And "the c o n flic t  ended with the  triumphant American 
frontiersm en p lan ting  th e i r  |l a g —and t h e i r  crops—on th e  blue P a c if ic 's  
Wiores» the  conquered continent behind thenu"^
B U ling ton 's  observation i s  a refresh ing  addition  to  th e  usual 
explanations fo r  th e  outcome o f th e  Mexican War. At the  same tim e i t  f a i l s  
to  account fo r  the  f a c t  th a t  the  conquest o f th e  Southwest was a  new eagperi- 
enoe fo r  Americans» and th a t  th e i r  triumph in  1848 was an incomplete one.
"̂ Thomas C. Poroieilly (e d .) :  Boekv Pop t̂;^<^a (ALbnquarquex
U niversity  o f New Mexico Press; 1940), p . ZLÔ.
^ e  Far Western F ro n tie r  (Now York: Harper and Row, Torehbook;
1962), p . 1.
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vG.ih th e  exception o f Frenchmen in  th e  Ohio Valley, the  f ro n t ie r  had p r ^  
v iously  engulfed few non-Aiglo-Saxons, o ther than Indians -sdio u ltim ate ly  
had to  accept p o l i t i c a l  domination. But m U ita iy  conquest and occupation 
o f the  Southwest created  new problems. Spaniards and Mexicans had been in  
possession o f New Mexico fo r  two and co&.half cen tu rie s . Their descendants, 
p lus th e  Pueblo Indians o f the  upper Rio Grande, outnumbered Yankee immi­
grants by more than six ty fo ld  a t  th e  time o f  the  Treaty o f  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo. ̂  As a re s u l t ,  two d is t in c t  p o l i t ic a l  systems would e x is t th e re  
a f te r  1848; one based on D an ish , th e  o th er on Anglo-Saxon tra d itio n s .
Understandably, th e  change in  sovereigns meant l i t t l e  more to  the  
"natives" o f New Mexico than the  re lu c ta n t acceptance o f a new f la g .^
With strength  o f  numbers and pride  in  th e i r  h e ritag e , they  showed no sign 
o f t o ta l  submission. In stead , th%r continued to  a&iere to  p o l i t ic a l  ru le s  
based upon th e i r  own tr a d i t io n s .^
The importance o f th e  "natives"?—o r Spanish-Americans~in New 
Mexican p o l i t i c s  has gradually  diminished since 1848 because o f the  changing 
complexion o f  th e  population. Indeed, in  le s s  than a century Anglos 
gained numerical su p erio rity .
During th e  f i r s t  seventeen years a f te r  th e  conquest m igration to  
New Mexico was slow and sporadic. The population o f  th e  t e r r i to r y  did
3Rath Laugh lin B aiter: "Where Americans Are * Anglos*."  The North
American Review. CGXXVUI (November, 1929), p . 568.
^*ln New Mexican p o l i t ic a l  h is to ry  th e  word "native" usua lly  denotes 
any person with a Spanish, Mexican o r  Indian name, excluding nonvoting 
Indians. I t  i s  used interchangeably with "Sjpanish-American, " "HiQ>a%a.o," 
"H i^ano-Indian" and "Mexican" even th o u ^  th e i r  denotations are by d e f i­
n itio n  more sp e c ific .
^Santa Fe Daily New Meodcan. January 19, 1883, p. 2.
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increase  by an estim ated f i f t y  percen t, b a t i t  vas no t id iclly  th e  re s u lt
o f Anglo p en e tra tio n .^  Wmld-be immigrants in  th e  East vers discouraged
u n t i l  a fber th e  d u i l  War because o f th e  possession o f th e  b e st lands o f 
th e  te r r i to x y  by "native" fam ilies , absence o f adequate tran sp o rta tio n  
f a c i l i t i e s ,  fe a r  o f  h o s t i le  Ihd ians, f i t t i n g  in  Eev Mexico between 
Confederate and Union forces and g rea te r  attraoti<m s elsewhere.
From 1866 to  1880 Anglos began to  a rr iv e  more reg u la rly . This 
wave o f  immigrants d id  no t immediately a l t e r  t e r r i t o r i a l  soc ie ty . For 
many returned  to  th e  East during th e  same period  because o f  the  capricious 
behavior o f  th e  Indians. And o thers vho reenained were sca tte red  so as to  
hard ly  make t h e i r  presence f e l t .  Some took to  th e  mountains in  search of 
precious m etals. Texas Cattlemen moved in to  th e  Pecos Valley to  enjoy
lu c ra tiv e  beef markets a t  United S ta tes Any posts  and Indian agencies.®
N evertheless, by the  end o f th e  1870's enou^  Anglos had entered New HOxLco 
to  th rea ten  th e  ex is tin g  so c io -p o lit ic a l  o rder.
Then around 1880, they  began to  a rr iv e  in  s u ff ic ie n t numbers to
®Populadon s t a t i s t i c s  fo r  these  e a rly  years are  confused. Goxw 
tem poraries o p tim is tic a lly  estim ated an increase  o f &t l e a s t  f i f t y  percent 
from 1850 to  I870 d esp ite  th e  lo s s  o f  some 23,000 people to  irlao n a  and 
Colorado in  the  I8 6 0 's .  Anglo iarndgirants aocounted fo r  some o f  th i s  iu .  
crease. N atural population grovUi accounted fo r  seme. But a lso , a sub­
s ta n t ia l  number o f "natives" vho had f le d  during th e  Mexican War returned 
upon learn ing  th a t  t h e i r  p roperly  r W t s  had been secured by th e  Treaty o f  
Guadalupe Bidalgo.
^M esllla News. June 13, 18y4, p . 1; Tha New Miexioaa. May 22,
I874 , p . 1; Eanta Fe Gaxette.  Jhne 4, 1864, p . I t  Marlon Bargant "New 
Mexico's l ig h t  f o r  Statehood 1895-1912#" New Mexico H is to ric a l Review. HV 
(January, 1939), p . 5*
Am* 13, 1874, p . 2; The Daily New Mexiean. May 22, 
1674, p . 1; Santa Fe Qmsette. June 4, 1864, p . 1; Charles F. Ooans 
H istory o f New Mexico (Chicago* American fiL storlcal Society, Inc.; 1923),
I ,  p® 391*
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a ffe c t a d ra s tic  change in  the  -whole society . This rapid  in f lu x  o f immi­
grants resu lted  from several developments; th e  advent o f the  ra ilro ad s , 
diminishment o f Indian depredations, new economic opportun ities and the  
closing o f o th er f ro n tie rs . And once i t  began i t  soon swelled to  flood 
proportions, growing stead ily  u n t i l  around I 9IO. People came fo r  commer­
c ia l  reasons, c a t t le - ra is in g , mining and i r r ig a te d  farming—giving consid­
erable d iv e rs ity  -to New Mexican l i f e .  Old towns expanded and new ones 
sprang up, and lawyers, teachers, doctors and o ther p ro fessional groups 
re^onded to  th e  demand fo r  t h e i r  serv ices. ̂
This inrush continued in te rm itte n tly  a f te r  statehood. By 1930 
the  number o f Anglos had increased  by more -than 3t500 percent since 18%, 
Tdiile -that o f th e  "natives** had increased by a mere 150' percen t. KLnally, 
ty  the  19%  census Anglos had gained numerical su p e rio rity .
Obviously, p o l i t i c a l  power sh ifted  from one race to  the  o th er as 
th e  Anglos gradually  increased th e i r  proportionate numbers. These changes 
did not n ecessarily  occur a t th e  same ra te , however, due to  the  en-thusiaan 
wi-th Wiioh "natives" have p a rtic ip a te d  in  S e c tio n s . There are  no availab le  
s t a t i s t i c s  d istingu ish ing  "native" from Anglo vo ters  a f te r  I 906, when -the 
fonner cast approximately tw o-lh irds o f th e  v o t e .^  So i t  i s  impossible
P ro jects Adm inistration, Wbrkers o f  th e  W riters ' Program in  
the  S ta te  o f New Mexico: New Mexico: A Guide to  th e  Oolorfui S ta te  (New
York: Hastings House; 19% ). p p . 77-78: Santa Fe Daily New M«Klean.
September 2, 1885, P» 4; Santa Fe New Mexican. January 15, 1912, p . 4.
^^Bmest Barksdale Fincher: "Spanish-Americans as a P o li t ic a l
Factor in  New Mexico, 1912-1950" (doctoral d is se r ta tio n . New York Univer­
s ity ; 1950) ,  pp. 9, 17.
^ P e rso n a l in terv iew  with E arl S tu ll , former s ta te  Hcuse member and 
now Revenue Commissioner from Las Cruces, June 19, 1965; Santa Fe New 
Mexican. November 24, I 9O8 , p. 4.
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to  t o l l  exactly  itnglos began to  dominate e lec tio n s.
But i t  can be assumed th a t  Jtnglos became prédominait a t  th e  p o lls  
by 1943. The atomie age b x o u ^ t a group o f immigrants to  New Mexico 160 
exerted an exbraordinaxy Influence upon i t s  p o l i t ie s .  Hot only d id  they  
increase th e  already prédominent JInglo m ajority , they a lso  demonstrated 
more enthusiasm and studied concern fo r  p o l i t ic s  than th e  immigrants idio 
had arrived  before them. As one oon ten^razy  puts i t ,  t h i s  educated group 
abhorred any a tte o ^ t a t  "counting th e  votes o f sheep and dead men, " they  
attacked p rac tices  vhich had allowed p o li t ic ia n s  to  "get away with murder," 
and they  q u i^ d y  "Anglicized" th e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  th e  s ta te .
Their ia^ ac t became e ^ e c ia l ly  apparent in  1950* In  th e  general 
e lec tion  o f ^ a t  year a l l  bu t one "native" candidate fo r  an ing)ortant o ff ic e  
went down to  de fea t. "Native" nominees have been a t  th e  merqr o f  th e  Anglo 
e lec to ra te  ever since. The only reason Spanish"Americans have survived 
as an in f lu e n tia l  voting bloc a t  a l l  i s  t h e i r  concentration along th e  Bio 
Grande and i t s  northern  tr ib u ta r ie s .^ ^
But p r io r  to  Nbrld War H  "native" vo ters were in  th e  m ajority . 
Their p o l i t ic a l  p reco n c^ tio n s were o f  g rea te r  importance than th e  ones 
held ty  Anglos. Thus a review o f  the  na tu re  and isg>ortance o f  p o l i t i c a l  
forces vhidh guided th e  B .q)anic people a t  the  time o f th e  conquest must 
precede any atteBg>t to  describe  th e  evolution o f p a r tie s—th e  p o l i t i c a l  
system introduced by Anglos.
^ A lb e r t  Rosenfeldt "New Mexico Cashes D i," Hamer* s MmjpaKina. 
CCVm (January, 1954), pp. 33-34,
^^Santa Fe Daily New Meadcan. !farch 2, 1887, p . 2; Finchert 
"Qpanish-Amerioans as a f ô U l ie a l  Factor in  New Mexico," pp. 20,243, 269; 
Donnelly* Bedcv pp. 231-32.
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The n a tu re  o f  Htspanlc in fluence upon New Heodoan p o l i t ic s  i s  a 
top ic  upon vbich th e re  i s  considerable controversy* But fo r  i l lu s tra tio n *  
ecsisting stu d ies  adequately deÇne fou r fo rces th a t  emanated d ire c tly  
o r  in d ire c tly  ou t o f  th e  Spanish c o lw ia l  p a s t -whidi have been leading 
déterm inants in  "native" p o l i t ic a l  behavior since th e  American oonqueet. 
These a re  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  ra c ia l  t i e s ,  th e  Roman Catholic Church* action  
groups created  to  serve Spanish-American in te re s ts*  and th e  patron system* 
The average New Mexican eoqplains th a t  th e  p r in c ip le  determinant 
governing th e  p o l i t i c a l  behavior o f  "natives" down through th e  years has 
been th e  ra c ia l  bond* Thqr no t only look alike* they  a lso  ea t alike* dress 
a lik e , ta lk  a lik e  and vote alike* There i s  abundant evidence to  support 
th is  view* For examg)le* "native" candidates always have had th e  edge in  
c en tra l and northern  counties* regard less o f  qua lifica tions*  Also* ce rta in  
ru les  adhered to  by p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  whenever p o ss ib le  a t t e s t  to  th e  impor­
tance o f race* The two major p a r t ie s  always have t r i e d  to  balance t h e i r  
t ic k e ts  between Aiglos and "natives" in  approximate proportion to  th e  
numerical s treng th s o f  th e  two groups* They have t r ie d  to  avoid ra c ia l  
clashes by seldom running candidates o f  one race against candidates o f th e  
other* These ru le s  guided th e  se lec tio n  o f  nominees as recen tly  as 1948*
In  n ine con tests fo r  se a ts  in  th e  s ta te  senate th a t  year* f iv e  AmgLo- 
Bepublicans ran against f iv e  Amglo-Democrats * while fou r "native"- Bepublim 
cans ran g a i n s t  four "native"-Democrats*^^
The power o f  th e  Ghnrdi a lso  exerted g rea t in fluence  upon "native"
^^M ncher: "% )ani^A m ericans as a P o l i t ic a l  Factor in  New Nhxico, "
p. 181; The New York Times. June 11, 1950, VI, p . 4; i l l o i a  Romero 
(com piler/; S ta te  o f  New Mexico O ff ic ia l Returns o f  th e  1948 E lections 
(Santa Fe; The Rjrdal Press; 19^ )*  p* 14Ô*
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p o l i t ic s ,  and fo r  th a t  m atter, upon every aspect o f  l i f e  in  th e  te r r i to r y  
fo r  th ree  o r  fou r decades a f te r  l848. As one prominent Hew Mexican put 
i t ;  "The peons were in  e ffe c t owned hy th e  landholders" and "the land­
holders were dominated hy th e  Church* The overwhelming power o f the  
Church c le a r ly  m anifested i t s e l f  in  the  public  ca ree r o f  Jose Manuel 
(Padre) Gallegos. A noteworthy clergyman and p o l i t ic a l- f ig u re  in  New 
Mexico before 1848, Gallegos was one o f  th e  most outstanding pub lic  leaders 
in  th e  t e r r i to r y  a f te r  th e  American conquest. He was e lected  to  th e  o ff ic e  
o f Delegate to  Congress in  1853. 3B59 and 3871* And he was almost unsujv 
passed as a  v o te -g e tte r  u n t i l  he v io la ted  th e  oath o f  celebacy by h is  
m arriage in  186?. From th a t  time on h is  popu larity  waned rap id ly . He 
managed to  win a  sea t in  Congress in  1871 because o f  a  serious defection  
in  th e  opposition party . But idien he ran a fourth  tim e in  1873 be was 
defeated dec is ive ly  by Stephen B. Elkins and soon passed in to  obliv ion.
There i s  no apparent disagreement th a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  demise o f  GaH%os
lé
resu lted  d ire c tly  from c le r ic a l  opposition  a f te r  1867.
The o rig in s  and in fluence  o f action  groups are  more d i f f ic u l t  to  
determine, fo r  they  d id  no t e x is t in  1848.  They appear to  have grown up
^%arvgy Fergussont "Out Where Bureaucracy Begins," The Nation* 
c m  (Ju ly , 1925) ,  p . 112.
l 6u»mMy A pril 2?, 1875. P* 2; M«T§oan Be-
view and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31. 1884, p . 4; Tha Pa-ilw New Mteic,a&. 
Sepimabw 23, 1875, p . 1 . The r i s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  a ffec ted  th e  p o l i ­
t i c a l  demise o f  such men as Gallegos, as w il l  become apparent in  A l t e r s  
U  and TTT. However, p a r t ie s  d id  not d iscard  good v o te -g e tte rs  without 
cause. And th a t  cause in  Gallegos» case was obviously h is  flo u tin g  th e  
F aith .
17The tendency o f ^natives" to  s tppo rt action  groups can be eoc- 
plained in  numerous ways: fam ily bonds, th e  re la tio n sh ip  between group
action  and th e  so c ia l o rganisation  o f  Sjpanish haciendas and towns, and th e
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in  th e  l a t e  n ineteenth  oentuxy to  defend "native" i n t ^ ^ s t s  against ihiglo 
enexoacbment* The extent o f  th e i r  in fluence i s  esp ec ia lly  d i f f ic u l t  to  
appraise because i t  i s  no t always possib le  to  d is tin g u ish  between th e  
e ffe c ts  o f  ra c ia l  t i e s  and action  groups in  a given e lec tio n . A d is tin c tio n  
d id  e x is t, however. For the  fo m e r was more a personal phenomenon, lâ iile  
th e  l a t t e r  a ffec ted  la rg e , organised groups o f % anish-M ericans.
Notwithstanding these  d i f f ic u l t i e s ,  action  groups greatüy in f lu ­
enced "native" p o l i t ic s  by th e  tu rn  o f  th e  tw entieth  century. Some were 
o f purely  p o l i t i c a l  na tu re , sudi as th e  Association fo r  th e  Mvaneement o f 
Spanish Americans. Some were p rim arily  f ra te rn a l ,  l ik e  th e  
Americana. Othem even took the  form o f  lo c a l t e r r o r i s t  groups, such as 
th e  l a t e  n ineteenth-century  "White Caps" o f  San lQ.guel C ounty .^  But a l l  
con tro lled  su b s ta n tia l blocs o f  Spanish-American vo ters .
The fou rth , and by f a r  th e  most im portant in fluence rpon "native" 
vo ters, was th e  patron qystem. Nearly a l l  w rite rs  on New Mexican p o l i t ic a l  
h is to ry  have discussed th e  oatrones. But th o u ^  they have been th e  most 
discussed, they have a lso  probably been th e  le a s t  understood fo rce  in  New 
Mexican p o l i t ic s .  Indeed, th is  w rite r  could no t fin d  a s ing le  study idiioh 
c le a rly  explains th e i r  o rig in s  and powers o r  the  extent o f  t h e i r  in^Luence.
To understand th e  patron nystem, i t  i s  necessary to  begin with 
th e  in s t i tu t io n  from lAich i t  o r ig in a lly  emanated—th e  f ro n t ie r  po licy  o f
propensity  o f 8pani<&-Americans to  p lace  th e  good o f  th e  ecmmnnity above 
th e  freedom o f  th e  ind iv idua l. So although action  groups f i r s t  appeared 
in  th e  m id - te r r i to r ia l  years, they were nevertheless in d ire c tly  re la te d  
to  Spanish co lon ia l h a b its .
^ F in o h er: "%)anieh-Americans as a  P o l i t ic a l  Factor in  New México, "
p. 99; Miguel Antonio Otero t Mr L ife  on th e  F ro n tie r 1882-1897 (Albuquexw . 
quo? The U nivsrsiiy  o f  New Mexico Press; 1939), pp.
9
colonial Spanish Juexica. As B illing ton  po in ts  o a t, f ro n tie r s  in  D anish  
America expanded not fo r  th e  b e n e fit o f  ind iv ldaa ls— as in  Anglo America^- 
b a t mainly fo r  th e  aggrandissaeat o f th e  s ta te .  This was accomplished 
onder th e  r ig id  con tro l o f  Spanish law. One o f  th e  c h ie f instrum ents o f  
f ro n tie r  developaent was th e  tmeblo (o r town), a t e r r i t o r i a l  o n i t  ooaqparable 
to  an American county. To fo s te r  f ro n t ie r  expansion, th e  Spanish King h ^ d  
oat grants o f  land as indaoeaent to  in d iv ld aa ls  w illin g  to  e s tab lish  new 
paeblos on th e  fringes o f  Spanish-oocupied dominions. Eispamic law re ­
garding these  land  grants varied  somewhat, depending upon whether a  s i a ^ e  
p ro p rie to r o r  ooiqiany o f  p ro p rie to rs  engaged in  th e  endeavor. Bat in  e i th e r  
case a person could acquire t i t l e  to  a  su b s ta n tia l p lo t  by p a rtic ip a tin g  
in  th e  establishm ent o f  a town. In  th is  way th e  King extended h is  dmmain 
and served th e  in te re s t  o f th e  s ta te .  Yet, o r ig in a l founders and th e i r  
h e irs  also p ro f ite d  by achieving a high place in  th e  sodo-economic 
s tru c tu re  o f  th e i r  respective  communities. So th e  c rea tio n  o f  a small 
landed a ris to c racy  accompanied th e  establishm ent o f  each oaeblo. even 
th o u ^  Spain subordinated th e  in te r e s t  o f  th e  ind iv idua l to  th a t  o f  the  
s ta te .
O riginal g rantees, and th e i r  leg itim ate  descendants, were given 
much more than land fo r  th e i r  serv ice  to  th e  s ta te .  They also  received 
th e  t i t l e  hidalgo and a l l  o f  th e  honors and p riv ileg e s  o f  men o f  th e  same 
rank in  S^ain i t s e l f .  Together with o th e r ind iv idua ls known as vecinos 
(c it iz e n s ) , they  obtained a  guarantee o f  th e  perpetual enjoyment o f
^^0. G arfie ld  Jones: "Local Government in  th e  Spanish Oolonies
as Provided by th e  Bacopilacion de Leyes de Los Beynos de la s  lo d ia s ,"
The Southwestern H is to rica l Quartezlv.  XIX (Ju ly , 1915), p . 66; Frank 
Vilson Blaekma r t Spanish ÿ is tltaM o n s o f  th e  Southwest (BalMmore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1S51), p . 161.
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sp ec ia l consideration in  th e  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  public  o ff ic e , idiether i t  be 
th ro n g  e le c tio n , d ire c t  sa le  o r  auction . Thus, th e i r  in fluence over la rg e  
com m nities v&b assured. Fbr th e  ju r is d ic t io n  o f  th e  pueblo included a l l  
th a t  Anglo-AmeriGms so zaa lly  a sso c ia te  <dth th ree  u n its  o f  lo c a l govern­
ment; th e  m unicipality , tounA ip  a id  county. They also  acquired specia l 
powers with far-reach ing  so c ia l, économie and p o l i t ic a l  i a ^ r ta n c e  such as 
the  au th o rity  to  regu la te  th e  p rice s  o f  food and drink . ̂
In  re tu rn  fo r  th is  oap itu lac i6n . pueblo founders assumed maiy 
re sp cm sib ilitie s . They were eoqpected to  a ttend  fa i th fh lly  to  public  admin­
is t r a t io n .  I t  was t h e i r  duty to  provide each fam ily subsequently moving 
to  th e  town with a sp ec ific  number o f  liv es to ck  and fowl. They had to  
provide a p r ie s t ,  a  church and a l l  necessary e c c le s ia s tic a l  accessories.
To guarantee th e i r  in te n tio n  to  l iv e  up to  th e  con trac t they  also 
had to  post a  bond. V iolation o f  any p a r t  o f  th e  agreement resu lted  in  
th e  lo s s  o f  both the  bond and th e  e n tire  cap itu lacion .  Moreover, to  make 
sure these  lead ers  d id  not abuse t h e i r  o f f i c ia l  p o sts , i^ie King subjected 
them to  th e  res id en c ia—a review o f  an o f f i c i a l 's  adm inistration  a t  th e  
end o f  h is  term in  o ff ic e .
Accordingly, on each Sgpanish co lon ia l f ro n t ie r  th e re  appeared a 
patemalisWLc, landed, t i t l e d ,  p o l i t i c a l ly  preponderant a ris to c racy . I f  
these  public  benefactors cong)lied with Spanish law, they enjoyed perpetual 
s ta tu s  and extensive ind iv idua l l ib e r ty —even more than th e  o f f ic ia l s  o f  
larger^  u n its  o f  co lon ial adm in istration . The Crown lim ited  th e  économie
^ Jo n e s ; " lo ca l Government in  th e  Spanish Colonies," pp. 66-71,
81.
7 ^  Blackmar; Spanieh In s t i tu t io n s  o f  th e  Southwest, p . I 6 l .
2*1
^ Jo n e s ; "Local Government in  th e  Spanish Oolcmies," pp. 66- 67,
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and so c ia l a c t iv i t ie s  o f  the  l a t t e r  and want to  g rea t lengths to  assure 
th e i r  detachment from lo c a l t i e s  and support* They could no t m any w ithin 
th e i r  respective  ju r isd ic tio n s , fo r  example, o r  appoint close re la tiv e s  to  
office* Moreover, th e  Ring pexnitted  th e  ^L ite a t  th e  lo c a l  le v e l g rea t 
freedom* For by g3.ving then patronage, so c ia l p riv ileg e s  and economic 
advantages, he obviously intended th a t  they entrench them sel.^s and exp lo it 
th e  lower class*
The v ast m a jo z i^  o f  inhab itan ts  o f  Spanish pueblos—those who 
s e t t le d  a f te r  th e  o r ig in a l founders—had a completely d if fe re n t kind o f 
existence* Spanish law d e lib e ra te ly  destroyed the  p rin c ip le s  o f  equality  
in  land sdlotment, t i t l e ,  p riv ileg e  and e l ig ib i l i ty  fo r  office* As a 
consequence i t  discouraged c la ss  mobility* And l a te  a r r iv a ls  idio had 
l i t t l e  chance to  get estab lished , had p ra c tic a lly  no hope o f  advancement* 
%mbolic o f  t h e i r  ro le  was a law d istingu ish ing  between th e i r  land grants 
and these  given to  the  f i r s t  se ttle rs*  One was ca lled  tiie  c ab a U e^ a , th e  
o th e r th e  peenta* One went to  gentlemen, th e  o ther to  fo o t-so ld ie rs  and 
labo rers—th e  p e o n s *
A d iv is ion  o f  s o c ie ^  s im ila r to  th a t  on th e  pueblo also  ex isted  
on th e  enccaaienda—an in s t i tu t io n  designed to  solve th e  lab o r problem in  
co lon ia l Spanish America without reducing Indians to  re a l slavery# An 
encomendero possessed th e  r i ^ t  to  use  Indian lab o r in  re tu rn  fo r  ch ris­
tia n iz in g , c iv il iz in g  and p ro tec ting  th e  Indians under h is  sway* Long 
before th e  end o f  th e  co lon ial period th e  eneomienda became le g a lly  defunct. 
But th is  a lte re d  th e  qystem very l i t t l e ,  because meanifliile many o f  th e
22Jones{ "Ihcal jSovemment in  th e  Spanish Colonies,** pp* 88=89* 
^^Ibid». p . 69.
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pxlTlleges o f  th e  epcomeodero vere tran sfe rred  to  lo c a l  o f f ic ia ls  vho 
collaborated %ith Indian cadcnies and continued to  exp lo it the  aborigines. ̂  
% e Mflin d ifference  between th e  m eblo and th e  eneomienda. i t  seems, was 
th a t  in  the  case o f  th e  foxner th e  underpriyileged were Spaniards, id iile  
in  th e  case o f  th e  l a t t e r  they  were Hidlans. For in  both instances society  
divided in to  two c lasses—th e  rlco s  and th e  pobres; th e  few with p riv ileg es  
and th e  many with p ra c tic a lly  no pziv ileges a t  a l l ;  th e  few who sold  and 
th e  many ihio bought; th e  few wdio commanded and th e  many wdio obeyed; th e  
few idio loafed  and the  many who worked.
I t  was a socie ty  based upon tra d itio n s  such as th ese  th a t  Jusn 
de OSate estab lished  lb  Hew ÜtexLco in  159B. (Æate him self was an adelantado. 
d t h  re sp o n s ib ili t ie s  and p riv ileg e s  akin to  those o f  th e  hidalgo and 
encomendero. He provided a con^lement o f  two hundred m ilita ry  co lo n is ts , 
liv estock  and necessary a g ric u ltu ra l inqplements. Di re tu rn  he received a 
t i t l e ,  grant o f  land, and th e  r i ^ t  to  use Indian labo r. likew ise , OSate*s 
so ld ie rs  obtained land, sp ec ia l p riv ileg e s , and p o l i t ic a l  power which 
enabled them to  dominate Indian and Spanish s e t t l e r  a lik e .
This Thole so c ia l, economic and p o l i t ic a l  arrangement based on 
Spanish f ro n t ie r  po licy  and sheep cu ltu re  came to  be known as th e  natron 
system. I t  ex isted  in  Hew Mexico a t  the  time o f  th e  Mexican War and
^^COLarence H. Haring; The Soanihh Baplre in  fc e rie a  (Hew York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Hbrld, In c .,  Harhdngiar Book; 19^3)t PP« 66-6?.
^%lackmar; Spnu|<Bh In s t i tu t io n s  o f th e  Southwest, p . 224»
Charles F le tcher Lnmmis: The land o f  Poeo Tiemoo (Hew York:
Charles S cribner's  Sons; 1906), pp. 15-10; W. P. A.; Hew Mexiep. p . 84;
John T. B ussellt "Hew Mexicot A ProÙLem o f  ParA chialim  in  T ra n ^ iio n ,"
The American P o l i t ic a l  Science Review. ZXX (A pril, 19)6), p . 285; Harvey 
Fergusson: "Out Where Bureaucracy Begins-" p. 112. When OSate brought
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seems to  have readhed i t s  h i p e s t  po in t o f  development aronnd th e  tu rn  o f 
the  n ineteenth  centaxy. At th a t  time one man oened teo  m illio n  head o f  s 
sheep Tâiidh required  th e  care o f  2,700 tenders* The f i r s t  Goveznor o f  
New Hesdco under Meodcan ru le , Francisco Xavier Chaves, had approximately 
a m illion  sheep, with a proportionate  number o f  t«supers* Land gran ts 
issued  by th e  Republic o f  Mexico may have encroached upon th e  power o f 
oatrones l ik e  th ese  to  a lim ited  degree, but no t enough to  d ise s ta b lish  
them as m asters o f  lo c a l soc ie ty  before th e  United S ta tes acquired th e  
t e n i to z y  in  1 8 4 8 .^
Raising th e  Aneiican flag  likew ise  changed th e  ex is tin g  order 
veiy l i t t l e  because th e  Tjreaty o f  Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed tlie  property  
r i ^ t s  o f  th e  oatrones* As befo re , " los Ricos rode horses b rid led  with 
s i lv e r ,  lo s  pobres were lucky to  have a burrow. • • .  Los lic o s  owned vast 
Hocks o f  sheep, lo s  pobres managed to  forage two scraggly goats* The 
only re a l change th a t  occurred was the  peon 's acqu isition  o f  th e  x l ^ t  to  
vote* This conQ>licated th e  choice o f  p o l i t i c a l  leaders very l i t t l e ,  fo r  
'die peon liv e d  in  a world completely a lie n  to  concepts o f  popular govern- 
ment*^^ Probably th e  only immediate re s u lt  o f  extending him th e  franch ise  
was th a t  a f te r  1848 th e  peon began to  receive proceeds from th e  sa le
merino sheep to  New Mexico he added to  land a second b as is  fo r  wealth, mark 
o f  affluence and implement o f  power* And ty  using th e  o a rtid a rio —a kind 
o f  sharecropping system wherety sheep-owners permanently indebted sheep- 
tenders and t h e i r  descendent s— sheep-owners in s t i tu te d  debt peonage in  
New Ifexico*
^Lommist The Land o f  Poco Tiemoo, p* 12; Harvey Fergusson* "Out 
Where Bureaucracy B e ^ s .4  p . U2*
^Ooan* A Hiatory o f  New Mexico. I ,  p* 359î Rnth Laughlin Barker* 
Caballeros (New York* D* Appl«ton and Co*; 1931), p* 300*
^^Baxker* "Where Americans a re  'A ng lo s ',"  p* 570*
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o f  pablio  o f f ic e r  t
Even th e  f i r s t  steady in f lu x  o f  An^os following th e  C iv il War 
did no t th rea ten  th e  natron* e power. In  fa c t ,  i t  tended to  re in fo rce  the  
system. Among th e  immigrants a rriv ing  p r io r  to  1880 were men o f  wealth— 
mainly cattlemen and lawyers—idio saw in  New Mexico an opportunity to  
create  feudal e s ta te s  o f  th e i r  own. They acquired land hy any means 
availab le , b o o ^ t  sheep and c a t t le ,  and employed peons. Consequently a 
group o f  Anglo oatrones grew up beside ex is tin g  "native" oatrones. This 
m attered l i t t l e  to  th e  peon, fo r  as long as he had food, sh e lte r  and 
clothing he accepted h is  l o t .  U n til awakened to  th e  power o f  th e  b a llo t  
by th e  p ress in  th e  l a te  1870*8 and th e  flood o f  Anglo immigrants a f te r  
1880, peons continued to  vote as th e i r  oatrones d irec ted  them to  v o te .^  
Such were th e  main forces governing th e  S^ani^Am erieau* s poli*  
t i c a l  behavior fo r  severa l decades following th e  American conquest o f  New 
Mexico. When a "native" went to  th e  p o lls  he was acutely  cognizant o f  th e  
in te re s ts  o f  h is  race, the  d ic ta te s  o f  th e  church, caamanniiy needs, and— 
most o f  a l l —o f th e  commands o f  h is  oatr8n .
Serious problems a r is e  in  atteng>ting to  apply these  same forces 
as so le  determinants o f  n a tiv e  p o l i t ic a l  behavior in  th e  tw entieth  century. 
They d id  not disappear abruptly  with th e  rap id  in f lu x  o f Anglos a f te r  1880. 
Nor did a l l  o f  them disappear e n tire ly  as Anglos b%an to  contro l e lec tions 
a f te r  World War H .  As previously  mentioned, p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  gave d e a r  
recognition to  r a d a l  t i e s  as l a t e  as 1948. But ju s t  as i t  i s  possib le  to  
d ia rac te rlze  th ese  forces o f  t ra d i t io n  as leading p o l i t ic a l  determinants
^ F in c h e r: "Spanish-Americans as a P o l i t ic a l  Factor in  New Mexico, "
pp. 133-32.
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in  th e  p o l i t ic a l  behavior o f "native" vo ters In  the  nineteenth  century, 
so i s  i t  easy to  i l l u s t r a t e  th e i r  decline as ch ie f fa c to rs  in  p o l i t ic s  
around th e  tu m  o f the  1900’ s.
The ec lip se  o f  r a c ia l  t i e s  as a force in  p o l i t ic s  became evident 
as early  as I 9OO. In  the  e lec tion  o f  a Delegate to  Congress th a t  year, 
Bernard S. Rodey defeated Octaviano S. Larrazolo by a su b s tan tia l -margin. 
Rodey "won so lid  support from northern  and c en tra l counties where most 
vo ters were "natives, " while Larrazolo *s main strength  came from eastern 
counties th e re  these  same groups were scarce. ̂ 1 This example does not 
in v a lid a te  the  view th a t  every Anglo nominee since 1900 has had to  recog­
n ize  in  h is  fa i lu re  th e  r e s u lt  o f  an opponent's ra c ia l  and language t i e s .  
But i t  does reveal t. e very c ru c ia l fa c t  th a t  new forces had appeared hy 
the  tu m  o f the  century th ic h  sometimes superseded ra c ia l  t i e s  as a guide 
fo r  "native" voting behavior.
The power o f th e  Church in  p o l i t i c s  waned even more sharply during 
th e  nineteenth century. One reason was the  appointment o f Archbishop John 
B. Lamy to  the  New Mexican v ic a r ia te  in  I 85O. Although Lamy brought much 
needed reform to  th e  Church in  th e  te r r i to ry ,  he weakened i t s  p res tig e  
ihen he provoked a strugg le  among clergymen by attem pting to  replace estab­
lish ed  "natives" with imported French and C astilian  l^an id i p r ie s ts .  He 
also attacked clergymen l ik e  Gallegos fo r  th e i r  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s  and 
s o u ^ t  to  force them back in to  th e  p u lp it  where they belonged. A second 
reason was the  a c tiv ity  o f  American P ro testan ts , espec ia lly  a f te r  the
^^The C hieftain (Socorro), November I 7 , 1900, p. 2,
3^Paul Theil: "New Mexico's B ilingual P o li t ic s  and Factional
D isputes," Southern Observer. H  (February, 195^), p. 23,
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cosdng o f  th e  ra ilro a d s . jRlso, about th e  same tim e the  Mormons* inftum 
enoe began to  be f e l t  in  p a rts  o f v e s tem  New Mexico.
Certain organized groups w ithin the  Catholic Church p e rs is ted  in  
activeOy p a rtic ip a tin g  in  p o l i t ic s .  The most notatCLe was Los Hermanos 
Peoiteotes (The Peniten t B rothers). Lamy condemned th is  whole group fo r  
reasons un rela ted  to  p o l i t i c s ,  but th e  Brothers were not e a s ily  discouraged. 
Their organization had roo ts in  th e  middle ages and came to  New ItexLco 
with th e  party  o f  OSate. Although th e i r  main purpose was doing penance by 
s ^ f - to r tu r e ,  during th e  l a t t e r  p a rt  o f  the  n ineteenth  century they divided 
in to  p a rtisa n  groups and commanded su b s ta n tia l followings in  th e  northern 
counties through the  Morada Bemocrata and the  Morada Henublieana. At 
about th e  tu m  o f  th e  century th e i r  membership amounted to  several thousand, 
and they continued to  exert some influence in  p o l i t ie s  as l a te  as th e  
1920*8.33
But th e  Brothers were the  exception ra th e r  than th e  ru le . A fter 
Gallegos, no clergyman ever ran fo r  high puhlie  o ff ic e  in  New Mexico, ünd 
by 1900 no one any longer ta lk ed  about "blind obedience to  e c c le s ia s tic  
au tho rity , "3^ o r  regarded th e  Church as a dynamic force in  p o l i t ie s .
The decline  o f  th e  importance o f "native" action  groups i s  as 
d i f f ic u l t  to  assess as t h e i r  o rig in s and in fluence . I t  i s  c e rta in  th a t  
ty  th e  1930*8 ac tion  groups with purely  "native" ob jec tives had been
3%arv9y Fergusson: "Out Where Bureaucracy Begins," p; 112, and
BLo Grande (New Tozk: A lfred A Bhppf; 1933)» P* 237; Coan: A H istory o f  
New Mexico. I ,  pp. 362.63; Barker: jgabeüüLeros, pp. 216-lB; Ixmmis: The 
Land o f  Poco Tiempo. p . 83; Otero: Mv l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r  188& ^97. 
p. 46; Warren A# Beck: New Mexico: A H istory o f  Four Centuries (Norman: 
U niversity  o f  Oklahoma Press; 1962), 214.16.
3^Santa Fe Daily New Mexican. Ju ly  9* 1882, p . 2.
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supplanted by such organizations as the  Taxpayers* Association, th e  C attle  
Growers’ Association and th e  Chamber o f Commerce, a l l  representing  special 
in te r e s ts  and serving goals common to  members o f both r a c e s . 3^ in  fa c t, 
th ere  i s  no evidence th a t  purely  "native" organizations had much impact 
a f te r  statehood. Çy th a t  tim e Spanish-Americans had begun to  voice th e i r  
needs th ro u ^  campaign platform s and reform candidates.
Finally,, and most im portant o f a l l ,  th e  patrén  ^stem  disappeared 
about the  time o f  statehood. The a sse rtio n  th a t  th i s  ^ stem  no longer 
e x is ts  in  New Mexico co n trad ic ts  sm e recent w riting  on th e  state* s h is to ry , 
but i t  i s  nevertheless tru e . The reason fo r  d isc r^ a n c y  o f  opinion l i e s  
in  the  fa c t th a t  many w rite rs  have not traced  th e  patr6n system to  i t s  
o rig in s , and consequently have fa ile d  to  understand the  ro le  o f the  patr6n . 
The re su lt  has been a mistaken confusion o f  th e  patr6n with th e  tw entieth- 
century p o l i t ic a l  "boss."
Harvey Fergusson, # o  understood early  tw entieth-century  New 
Mexican p o l i t ic s  as w all as any one could, recognized th e  d ifference . He 
wrote in  19^5 th a t  "u n til  th e  past few years New Mexico has been dominated 
by a p o l i t ic a l  machine idiich i s  probably the  o ld es t in  America. . . .  I t  
was founded upon complete con tro l o f  th e  peon c la ss  o f Mexicans by the  
landowning a ris to c racy  and by the  church.
Yet, as recen tly  as 1950 Ernest Fincher discussed patrones as 
though no change had occurred ■ehatsoever. He ckrefuU y characterized  
Solomon Luna, Octaviano A. Larrazolo, Bronson Cutting and Dennis Chavez as
^ ^ n n e l l y :  Rocky Mountain P o l i t ic s , p. 242. 
^"O ut Mhere Bureaucracy Begins," p . 112,
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the leading patrones of the  tw entieth  centniy . Lana, "a man o f g reat 
wealth and varied interests,** was the  most in f lu e n tia l  pa tt6n  about the  
time of statehood. Contenting him self with being the  **power behind the 
throne, ** he chose candidates, determined po licy  and "delivered** the  vote 
of Hispanic-Americans. The same w rite r  m aintains th a t  Lana's successor 
was "Idle b r i l l i a n t  and ambitious 0. A. Larrazolo, famed as an o ra to r  and 
equally famous as the  avowed champion o f  the  Spanish-speaking" people.
His ro le  was described as being tdioUy in  th e  enhancement of th e  "acute 
group consciousness" o f the  New Mexican people.
Next came Bronson Cutting, idio was characterized  as the  most 
powerful o f a l l  tw entieth  century patrones. Thou^ Cutting was "neildisr 
C atholic, native-born  nor Spanish in  ex trac tio n , " he nevertheless supposedly 
con tro lled  th e  "natives" because o f h is  genuine n irfng  fo r  them and h is  
s e n s i t iv i ty  to  th e i r  needs. His main ro le  was said  to  be "delivering" the  
%>anish-American vote. F ina lly , Fincher characterized  Chavez as th e  " la s t  
o f th e  patrones.  " His ro le  was presumably to  chau^ion th e  in te r e s ts  of 
the  %)anish-speaking population ty  g e ttin g  them jobs, obtaining a n ti­
d iscrim ination  le g is la t io n  and by giving them aggressive leadersh ip . All 
four succeeded as patrones. he added, by playing upon "ignorance, economic 
disadvantage and p o l i t ic a l  adolescence." Fincher p red ic ted  th a t  Chavez 
would be th e  l a s t  o f the  patrones. since the  "inqproved educational and 
economic s ta tu s"  o f  the  "natives" had f in a l ly  mads h is  type an anachronism. ̂
This re f le c ts  a mistaken view o f the  patrSn system he ld  Tpy many 
w rite rs  o f New Mexican h is to ry . A reader o f Fincher* s study gets th e
37«i^anish-Americans as a Political Factor in New Mexico," pp.
158-61.
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impression th a t  anyone from anyidiere, belonging to  any race o r church vàio 
was w illing  to  take advantage o f ignorance, poverty and p o l i t ic a l  naivete  
could be a pa trén» He needed only to  possess one of several combinations 
o f p K o e n sitie s . He could be a man o f b r i l l ia n c e  and ambition with a 
f la re  fo r  o ra to iy  and a d e sire  to  lead  th e  %>anish-Americans. He could be 
one idio merely lik e d  the  "natives" and f e l t  a s e n s it iv i ty  to  th e i r  needs. 
Or, he could simply be w illing  to  lead  than and get than jobs and race- 
o rien ted  le g is la tio n . Accordingly, h is  re a l re sp o n s ib ili t ie s  were p ra c ti­
c a lly  nonexistent. For in  th e  opinion o f Fincher a patrdn needed only to  
p lay upon ignorance to  earn an ac tive  ro le  in  p o l i t ic s .
The previous discussion p f  th e  o rig in s  of th e  patr6n systan w ill 
perhaps bear out th i s  w r i te r 's  view th a t  n ineteenth-century  Spanish and 
most Anglo patrones would not have recognized thanselves in  Fincher* s 
charac teriza tions. The average patr6n o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es dominated peon 
vo ters in  a lim ited  region w ithin th e  t e r r i to r y  through power and p res tig e  
based upon th e  possession o f land, liv esto ck  and an i l lu s t r io u s  f amily 
h e ritag e . He u su a lly  came from a l in e  which had resided in  New Mexico fo r 
several generations, un less he was one o f th e  newly arrived  Anglo patrones. 
Furthermore, he was flu en t in  the  %)anish language, almost invarir.bly Epman 
Catholic, and a man o f considerable knowledge who was capable of advising 
h is  peons in  a l l  m atters o f  lo c a l in te r e s t .  Most o f those who want to  him 
fo r  advice worked fo r  him, and he assumed g reat personal re sp o n sib ility  
fo r th e i r  p ra c tic a l needs. Fbr h is  aims were pa te rnal as well as personal. 
Only occasionally  did he seek high o ff ic e  fo r  him self. Instead , he in flu ­
enced the  se lec tion  o f candidates, th e  determ ination o f po licy  and the  per­
petuation  o f s tab le , conservative government to  p ro tec t not only h is  own
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in te re s ts , but the  whole ex isting  system.
Out o f th e  four men described Fincher the  only one who even 
remotely f i t s  a proper charac te riza tion  of th e  n ineteenth  century natron 
was Solomon Lana. Though he f i t s  th e  descrip tion  p e rfe c tly ,  ̂  each o f the  
others lacked basic  t r a i t s  to  qua lify . Larrazolo wras an unpropertied 
Mexican immigrant, p ra c tic a lly  unknown idxen he f i r s t  ran fo r o ff ic e  in  
New Mexico. Bronson Cutting was an Aaglo immigrant, known p rin c ip a lly  fo r  
the  progressive id e a ls  expressed in  th e  New Mexican fo r  two decades a f te r  
statehood. I t  i s  tru e  th a t  h is  id e a ls  appealed to  low^income "n a tiv e s ," 
but even so Cutting d id  no t become a lead er o f Spanish» Americans u n t i l  a f te r  
World War I .  His popu larity  then resu lted  mainly from a re jec tio n  o f the  
"Americanization” movement in  the  American Legion.
Dennis Qiavez was more l ik e  th e  n ineteenth  century natr&i than 
any o ther leading tw entieth-century  boss. But he too was d if fe re n t. He 
gained public s ta tu s  ty  slowly working h is  way up in  s ta te  p o l i t ie s .
Thus, while ra c ia l  t i e s ,  th e  Church, action  groups and the  patr6n 
system were prime determinants in  "native* p o l i t ic a l  behavior fo r  several 
decades following th e  American conquest, a l l  gradually  receded from promin­
ence in  New Mexican p o l i t ic s  during and sh o rtly  a f te r  t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es.
In  addition to  reasons already given th e re  were o ther important causes.
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  Anglo enoroadlment caused th e  re d is tr ib u tio n  of land . Some
^ F o r  In n a 's  ro le  in  New Mexican p o l i t ic s  see Ema Fergusson:
New Mexico: A Pageant o f  Three Peonies (New York: Alfred A. Shppf, Inc . ;
195L). P. 317 and Santa Fe New Mexican.  August 19, 1908, p . 2. Lana's 
career ended with h is  tra g ic  death in  1912. Santa Fe New Mexican. August
30, 1912, p. 1. '
^^P atric ia  Cadigan Armstrong: A P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting 
Throntdi His Papers. 1910-1927 (Albuquerque: Division o f Government Research, 
U niversity o f  New Mexico; 1959). pp. 3 ^ 3 5 .
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new a rr iv a ls  acquired land homesteading in  areas th e re to fo re  used but 
not owned by haceodados. Some acquired land  1:  ̂ contesting  o ld  S p a n i^  
and Mexican land g ran ts. Some acquired land th ro u ^  purchase. these  
means they gradually  broke an inqportant b a s is  fo r  t r a d i t io n a l  power. For 
the  twenty fam ilies holding th e  l io n 's  share o f  good land in  g rea t haciendas 
as l a t e  as 1880 saw i t  gradually  s l ip  from th e i r  con tro l. % th  i t  went 
th e i r  g rea t sheep flocks, p re s tig e  and p o l i t ic a l  in fluence.
Secondly, along with an Anglo nuevo rico  came investment in  
industry , mining and m ercantile  p u rsu its , -vAaieh l i f t e d  th e  b a s is  fo r  
wealth. A rico  a f te r  1880 could be a man with money to  spend, as w ^  as 
one holding land and liv e sto ck . Thus, as th e  b asis  fo r  wealth changed, so 
d id  th e  b a s is  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power. ̂  Also, th e  d iv e rs if ic a tio n  o f th e  
economy and in troduction  o f  public  education provided new opportun ities 
fo r  "native" peons. Persons iftiose ancestors had been in  debt s e r  itu d e  
fo r  generations l e f t  t h e i r  t r a d i t io n a l  haaes to  seek a b e t te r  l i f e  in  the  
towns and c i t i e s .  And each time a peon l e f t  a hacienda, th e  power , o f 
some patr& i and perhaps some clergyman diminished. ̂  Furthermore, with 
educationaand An^o influence came the  re a liz a tio n  o f  th e  power o f  th e  
b a llo t ,  and a weakening o f  m ystical t i e s  to  th e  Roman Church. "Natives" 
who th ere to fo re  voted according to  ccmmands from the  t r a d i t io n a lly  e l i t e  
came to  regard th e  b a llo t  as a  symbol o f  equality  and a means o f  achieving 
so c ia l and eeonomio ju s t ic e .  Ry 1911 th e  population o f  New Mexico was
^Coan: A H istory o f New Mexico. I ,  pp. 390, 462-83.
^ S a n ta  Fe Daily New Mexican. A pril 22, 1883. p. 2; Coan: A 
E ls to rr  o f New Mexico. I .  p p . 449-61. “
^Coan: A H istory o f New Mexico. I ,  pp. 484-90.
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43divided about equally  between P ro testan t and Catholic churches.
Further examples are  unnecessary, fo r  the  sign ificance  o f the 
a rr iv a l o f an e n tire ly  new cu ltu re  upon th e  New Mexican scene i s  obvious.
The inqportant po in t i s  th a t  tr a d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c s  lo s t  some force  with the  
a rr iv a l  o f  each Immigrant and each Mglo-Saxon in s t i tu t io n .  Gradually 
old leaders found they could no longer "deliver" th e  vote on th e  b asis  of 
race, re lig io n , community in te r e s ts  and personallsmo. For t h e i r  former 
peons slowly had became cognizant o f th e  advantages o f re p re sa ita tiv e  
government.
The in troduction  o f  th is  new concept in to  New Mexican "native" 
society  was o f course the  province o f p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s .  Understandably, 
th e i r  emergence was slow and chaotic . Yet th jy  were su f f ic ie n tly  developed 
by th e  tw entieth  century to  f i l l  th e  gap l e f t  by th e  ec lip se  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  
p o l i t ic s .  Even today p a rtisa n  p o lit ic ia n s  continue to  grapple with vestiges 
o f "native" tra d i tio n s . But fo r  a l l  p ra c tic a l  purposes, p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
moved to  th e  cen ter o f  New Mexican p o l i t ic s  during th e  l a s t  few years o f 
the  t e r r i t o r i a l  period.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. February 21, 1911, p. 4.
CHAPTER H
THE EMERGENCE OF POUTICAL PARTIES IN NEW MEXICO, 1848-1910
The most important sing le  detexminant o f e lec tio n s o f New Mexico, 
since statehood date , has been the  influence exerted by r iv a l  
pa rty  o rganizations.^
That p a rtie s  emerged to  dominate th e  p o l i t ic a l  conduct o f "native" 
New Mexicans before statehood i s  remarkable, fo r  they  had to  take roo t in  
a society  %here th ere  was p ra c tic a lly  no precedent fo r  p a rtisan  l i f e .^  
There had been l i t t l e  popular p a rtic ip a tio n  in  Spanish co lon ial p o l i t ic s  
in  th e  New World a f te r  I 600, since ty  th a t  tim e é lec tiv e  o ffice s  had 
become e ith e r  sa leab le  o r  hered ita ry  in  a l l  bu t remote f ro n t ie r  pueblos. ̂  
Nor d id  re a l p a r tie s  appear in  th e  Republic o f Mexico p r io r  to  1S48. 
P o li t ic s  during the  various adm inistrations o f Santa Anna was l i t t l e  more 
than an angry contest between eaudili.os and rad ica l l e f t i s t s .  Furthermore, 
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  in  t e r r i t o r i a l  New Mexico during th e  f i r s t  two decades of 
American occupation was s t i l l  th e  p riv a te  p e rq u is ite  o f  the  oatrones. But 
f in a l ly  permanent Republican and Democratic organizations began participam  
tin g  in  e lec tio n s in  I 869, flowered almost m iraculously in  th e  th ree
^Donnelly? Rockv Mountain P o l i t ic s , p. 237.
^Information regarding th e  in e r ta n c e  o f  p a r t ie s  in  New Mexican 
p o l i t ic s  p r io r  to  statehood can be found in  th e  Santa Fe New MexLean. 
S^tem ber 21, 1908, p. 2, November 12, 1908, p . 4, November 24, I 9O8 , p . 4 
and February 27, 1929, p . 4,
f a r i n g :  TheSSpanish Bnpire in  America, pp. 152-53»
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succeeding decades, and completely overshadowed a l l  o th er p o l i t ic a l  d e te r- 
minants before 1911*^
Hiough p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  d id  not begin p a rtic ip a tin g  in  e lections 
u n t i l  IB69 in  New Mexico, th e  groundwork had been la id  several years 
before. Voters had already been introduced to  popular e lec tio n s and had 
been schooled in  th e  meaning o f  p a rtisa n  l i f e .  Hence th e  founders of 
each p a rty  had only to  claim nominal leadersh ip  o f  one o f  two la rg e  factions.
Two developmaits were responsible fo r  th is .  One was th e  b ienn ia l 
separation o f voters in to  groups supporting candidates fo r  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
le g is la tu re  and Congress. During th e  1850<s these  loose aggregations were 
known as th e  * American" and "Mexican" p a r t ie s . In  th e  ea rly  1860*s they 
usua lly  took th e  names o f  current congressional nominees, c a llin g  themselves 
th e  "Chavez," "Gallegos" o r "Perea" p a r t ie s .^  Except th a t  thqy haphazardly 
p a rtic ip a te d  in  campaigns, none o f th ese  groups resembled organized p o li­
t i c a l  p a r t ie s . There i s  no evidence e ith e r  o f  th e i r  estab lish ing  operative 
macMnezy, o r  o f  th e i r  tak ing  an ac tiv e  ro le  in  p o l i t ic s  between e lec tio n s. 
But they did d iv ide the  vo ters in to  fac tio n s  every two years and accustom 
them to  cooperative p o l i t ic a l  action .
The second development was th e  C iv il War. I t  influenced th e  estab­
lishment o f p a r t ie s  by drawing th e  above mentioned groups in to  two per- 
manent p o l i t ic a l  caoqps and schooling them in  p a rtisa n  l i f e .  The War
^Barker: "Where Americans Are 'Anglos*," p . 5?0.
% iguel Antonio Otero: Mv l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r 186^1882 (New 
York: The Press o f  th e  Pioneers; 1935j .  o . 282: The New Mexican. September 
29, I 865, p . 2; Santa Fe G azette. Mby 28, 1864, p. 2, September 3, 1864, 
p. 2, September 10, 1864, p . 2; Santa Fe WeékLv Gazette. September 22,
IB66, p . 2; Weekly New Mexican Saview and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31» 1884, 
p. 4.
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probably would have e ffec ted  lo c a l p o l i t ic s  very l i t t l e  had New Mexico's 
lo y a lty  to  th e  Union not been in  question. But to  th e  f i r s t  Republican 
adffliniabration in  Washington, i t s  defection  to  th e  Confederacy sem ed 
imminent. Determined to  prevent th is ,  Abraham Idncoln chose t e r r i t o r i a l  
o f f ic ia ls  according to  how thgy m i^ t  e ffe c t New Mexico's lo y a lty  to  the  
North, giving l i t t l e  a tte n tio n  to  such th ings as p e rso n a lity  ^ d  previous 
p a rty  membership. The re s u l t  was the  appointment o f  an uncompromising 
Democratic governor and an impetuous Radical Republican t e r r i t o r i a l  secre> 
ta ry . VB.thin approximately a year o f t h e i r  tak ing  o f f ic e , an in ev itab le  
quarre l developed between th e  two men. Each formed h is  own adm inistrative  
clique, a l l ie d  him self w ith several ambitious oatrones to  b u ild  up a 
popular following and endeavored to  take  perscmal charge o f  th e  te r r i to r y .
When th e  oatrones entered th e  feud, th e i r  peons n a tu ra lly  became involved.
Thus, ty  1865 n early  a l l  New Mexican vo ters had unw itting ly  fa lle n  in to  
one o r  th e  o th er o f  two camps, each o f which was nominally headed ty  a 
highly  p a rtisa n  o f f ic ia l .^
P o li t ic a l ly  minded Anglos a rriv ing  a f te r  th e  War quicKly envisaged 
the  opportunity to  found a tw o-party i^stem. All th a t  was re a l ly  needed 
was th e  d ra ftin g  o f  p a rty  ch arte rs  and th e  announcemmt o f t h e i r  ex istence. 
So small groups o f Democrats and Republicans met, declared  th e  formation 
o f organized p a r t ie s  and estab lished  c en tra l committees.^ Each committee
^Much o f  th e  m ateria l upon which th is  chapter i s  based i s  also
used as b a s is  fo r  th e  more sp e c if ic  s tu d ies  in  Republican h is to ry  in
succeeding chapters. The genesis o f p a r t ie s  during and a f te r  th e  C iv il 
War w ill  be discussed in  more d e ta i l  in  Chapter UH.
^Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock . Ju ly  5I ,  1884,
p. 4, .
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then claimed leadersh ip  o f  one o f th e  fac tio n s emex^ing from th e  War* and 
each in  tu m  se lec ted  a leading "native" patron to  run fo r  the  o ff ic e  o f 
Delegate in  I 869.
From appearances, p a rty  founders might have congratulated them, 
selves on immediate success a f te r  th i s  f i r s t  e lec tio n . The Republicans 
von by a su b s ta n tia l m ajority , but Idie A iture doubtless looked b rig h t to
O
both camps.” With war-time antagonisms s t i l l  fresh  and p a r t ie s  so new 
th a t  in te rn a l feuds had no t y e t developed, both Democratic and Republican 
ranks held  f lm .
Numerous problems had to  be solved before p a r t ie s  could claim 
general acceptance, however, fo r  p a rtisa n  p o l i t ic s  was s t i l l  only an idea 
in  th e  minds o f  the  founders. Mere establishm ent o f  cm itra l committees 
and the  d isp lay  o f  p a rty  ro s te rs  were not tantamount to  permanency. Fore­
most was th e  problem o f personallsmo. Although each p a rty  claimed the  
support of thousands o f  vo ters , few were aware o f  th e i r  own memberships.
As long as p a r t ie s  had no lo c a l  machinery through which to  work they conm 
tinned to  d ^ en d  cranplttely upon "native" patrones fo r  support. Peons 
voted fo r  party  t id c e ts  only because th ^ r  were d irec ted  to  do so.
Consequently, th e  f i r s t  severa l nominating conventions and 
e lec tions were no t p a rty  functions in  th e  s t r i c t  sense. They were mere 
occasions fo r  ambitious patrones to  v ie  fo r  power. Every attem pt a t  
forming a lo g ic a l p a rtisa n  t ic k e t  met with confusion imposed by personal 
in te re s ts  and tr a d i t io n a l  I c ^ a l t ie s .  An exanç)le o f  th is  occurred in  I 875, 
^ e n  the  Democratic nominating convention attempted to  run Republican 
Mariano S. Otero fo r  Delegate to  congress. The period ic  nomination o f  an
®Ibld.
27
Anglo candidat©—such as Stephen Benton Elkins— should have o ffse t  the  
influence o f  pmrsmnali fimo somevhat* But i t  d id  no t, because men l ik e  
Elkins were as in te re s te d  in  self-aggrandizement as were the  oatrones. 
and devoted l i t t l e  e f fo r t  to  promoting th e  in te re s ts  o f  p a r t ie s . 9
Hope o f  undermining th e  influence o f oersonaliamo was f u t i l e  a t 
f i r s t .  For one th ing , communications were inadequate. The development o f  
territoiy-w id©  organization suffered because d ^ eg a tio n s  from remote 
counties frequently  fa ile d  to  a rriv e  in  time fo r  conventions. The estab­
lishment o f p rec in c t and county organizations likew ise was hampered because 
nearly  one-sixth  o f i±a e lig ib le  vo ters o f  New Mexico were iso la ted .
Another problem was the  p rac tic e  o f holding e lec tions during the  
harvest season. This hindered popular p a rtic ip a tio n  both in  p a rty  conven­
tio n s  and e lec tio n s. Lawlessness and Indian depredations also  deterred  
party  growth. Not only did violence in  th e  1870 *s d is t r a c t  New Mexican 
res id en ts , i t  also discouraged would-be immigrants in  o ther p a rts  of th e  
United S tates—\dio proved im portant to  party  development.^®
These and o th er prohLems continued to  f ru s tra te  pa rty  operations 
fo r  a decade o r  more. As l a te  as 1875 partisansh ip  s t i l l  exerted l i t t l e  
influence on e lec tions. There was no p a rty  d is tin c tio n  drawn on the  county 
and le g is la t iv e  t ic k e ts  o f  such inq)ortant northern and western counties as
New Mexican. June 18, 1875, P* 1; Weekly New Mexican. 
October 19, 1878, p. 2.
New Mexican. July  l 6 , 1873» P» 1 and Ju ly  2, 1875, P« 1; 
We^djT New Meaiean. Nby 22, 1874, p . 1; a News. March 7, 1874, p . 2.
August 1 , 1874, p . 1 and November 14, 18?4, p. 2; Barker: Caballeros, 
pp. 72 . 76; Calvin Horns New Mexico* s Troubled Years: The o f  Early
T e r r i to r ia l  Governors (Albuqnarque: Horn and Wallace; 19o3), P* 173;
Otero: l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r . 1864.1882. p. 62; W. P. A»: New Mexico.
p. 77.
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Colfax, Bio Arriba, San M gael and Socorro. Local e lec tio n  re s u lts  in  aU  
o f  th e  southexn counties d^ended mainly npon personal in te re s ts  and p ra . 
jud ices. People a l l  over the  te r r i to r y  voted fo r  congressional nominees 
on th e  b asis  o f personal lo y a lt ie s  ra ttie r than party  d ic ta te s . There was 
not even an accurate p a rtisa n  d iv is io n  in  the  t e r r i t o r i a l  l e g i s l a tu r e .^
As long as these  conditions ex isted , p a r t ie s  would continue to  
play a secondary ro le . Meanwhile, Anglo leaders were no t id le .  They 
were already tak ing  remedial steps which would provoke general in te re s t  
in  p a rtisa n  p o l i t ic s  and free  p a r tie s  from complete d^endence upon th e  
ac tive  patrones.
One such s t ^  was the  establishm ent o f  lo c a l pa rty  machinery. 
Throughout th e  l a te  1870 *s and early  1880*s p o l i t ic a l ly  minded Anglos strove 
to  introduce p a r t ie s  in to  iso la te d  towns and haciendas. Both Democrats 
and Republicans p a rtic ip a te d , but the  l a t t e r  excelled much because o f  the  
reg ionally  famous "Santa Fe Ring." Led by some o f  th e  b e s t-p o litic ia n s  
in  New Mexico and supported by men o f wealth, th e  Ring gradually  spread 
i t s  influence over the  counties on the  Upper Rio Grande, so by about 1885
a t  le a s t  one section  o f  th e  te r r i to r y  had become thoroughly accustomed to
partisansh ip .^^
Another development was th e  popularization  o f  p a r t ie s  by lo ca l 
newspapers. Poor as th^y were in  p o l i t ic a l  commentary, partisan-minded 
New Mexican ed ito rs  o f th e  1870* s woriced d ilig e n tly  to  call, a tten tio n  to
■̂ ^ e  Daily New Mexican. May 15, 1875^9 ' 1 and September 13» 1875.
p. 1; Weékly New Mexican. September 14, 1875, P* 2.
^ ^ e r o  b r ie f ly  summarized th e  ro le  o f  th e  Santa Fe l in g  during the  
1870» s in  Mv L ife  on the  F ro n tie r  1882-1897. p . 83. Chapter IF  w ill  deal 
with the  Ring in  more d e ta i l .
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p a r t ie s . Thoy urged oppressed "natives'* to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  conventions as 
a means o f  w resting power from the  ex is tin g  aristocracy* Various ed ito rs  
likew ise I n i t ia te d  the  f i r s t  movement to  educate ü ie  e le c to ra te  on th e  
power o f th e  b a llo t—when used purposefully  th ro n g  p a rtisa n  ac tion . Their 
p e rs is te n t comments doubtless had as much to  do with popular in te r e s t  in  
p a r t ie s  in  th e  communities they reached as any sing le  fa c to r .
There were o th er changes i6 id i  a lso  made p a rtic ip a tio n  in  p o l i t i c s  
e as ie r . Di 18?6 e lec tio n  day was moved from the  harvest season to  Novem­
ber, ih ich  encouraged p a rtic ip a tio n  in  p o l i t ic s  by farmers. Another was 
the  establishm ent o f m all rou tes. This contributed to  Idie coordination o f 
p a rty  a c t iv i t ie s ,
Due to  these  dev&Lopments— and doubtless because o f slow but 
steady Anglo immigration during th e  lB 70 's—p o l i t ic a l  confusion charac ter, 
i s t i c  o f th e  f i r s t  h a lf  o f  th e  decade began to  d issçpear. Personalifsno 
gradually lo s t  some o f i t s  fo rce  as p a rty  machinery moved in to  iso la te d  
communities. Regular p a rty  t ic k e ts  supplanted the  natronmd ic ta te d  "c itizen s"  
and "peoples" t ic k e ts  in  a l l  but such sparse ly  populated counties as 
Colfax:. By 1878 th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re  had divided along p a rtisa n  
l in e s  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e.^^ P a rtie s  achieved a degree o f  permanency, and 
th e i r  general acceptance could be discerned a l l  over th e  te r r i to r y .
^^vfeeiOy New Mexican. August 15, 1871, p. 2 and July  13, 1875, p .
2; The Daily Hew Mexican. Ju ly  9, 1873, p. 1 and various issu es 1870-1880.
I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  p r io r  to  and during th e  l870*s eacdi ed itio n  o f  lead ­
ing New Btexiean newspegpers was p rin ted  both in  ThgliSh and %)anish.
^^ e s i l l a  News. March 28, 1874, p . 2 and December 5, I 876, p . 1.
^ ^ eekly Hifw Mexlean. Dsccnber 7 , I878 , p . 2; Daily New Mexican. 
September 18. 1880. p. 4î Santa Fe Daily New MeodLoan. November 4, 18^2,
p . 2.
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These achievements in  th e  organization and popularization  o f 
p a rtie s  during th e  1870*s were e sp ec ia lly  s ig n if ic a n t and tim aly . For 
Tdien Anglos began pouring in to  New Mexico during th e  next decade, operative 
lo ca l p o l i t ic a l  machinery was a t  hand. And with skeleton organizations 
already in  ex istence, i t  was possib le  fo r  p a r tie s  to  mature n a tu ra lly  
along with o th er fac e ts  o f  soc ie ty . Ju s t as mining and c a tt le - ra is in g  
a lte red  iihe economy, and education and P ro testan tian  influenced so c ia l and 
re lig io u s  l i f e ,  so d id  p a r t ie s  gradually  move toward the  fo re fro n t in  
p o l i t ic a l  l i f e .  Immigrants began to  swell pa rty  ranks, and increased 
patronage made p a r t ie s  more a t t r a c t iv e . At the  same time new spaper pub­
lic iz e d  th e i r  ex istence, and improved communications made them more 
e ffec tiv e .
Indeed, th e  u ltim ate  t r iu m ^  o f p a r tie s  was assured with the  
advent o f  th e  ra ilro a d s . In  each e le c t ia i  a f te r  1880 th e  number o f  vo ters 
unaffected by non-partisan  forces increased and p a r t ie s  gradually  over­
came the  re s tra in in g  influence o f  personal tsma. I t  would have been only 
a m atter o f tim e before they  would have triunqphed as p a r t  o f  th e  n a tu ra l 
change th a t  came over New Mexico in  th e  l a te  n ineteenth  and early  twen­
t ie th  century.
As th i s  gradual change occurred, a more revolutionary tra n s fo r­
mation took p lace in  t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t ic s ,  however. In  a span o f  approxi­
mately twenty years p a r t ie s  replaced oatrones as th e  ch ie f ob jec ts o f 
p o l i t ic a l  lo y a lty . Nhat had been two f r a i l ,  loosely  organized associations 
in  1880 became two powerDil, smooth-operating machines by I 9OO. The 
Democratic p a rty  took shape under th e  leadersh ip  o f  Governor William T. 
Thornton (1893-97) and congressional Delegates Antonio Joaepb. (188^9^)
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and Harvey B. Fergusson (1896-98). The Republican p a rty  emerged even 
stronger under the  guidance o f Thomas Benton.. Catron and Governor Miguel 
Antonio Otero H  (1897-1906).. The l a t t e r  organisation g i ^  so powerAil 
th a t  during O tero 's adm inistration "even the  appointment o f notary  public 
vas considered in  some lo c a l i t ie s  a g rea t favor" and a mark o f  both so c ia l 
and p o l i t ic a l  d is tin c tio n , 1900 vo ters flodced to  p a rty  banners as 
though no o ther lo y a ltie s  had ever ex isted .
The gradual waning o f S pan i^  influence and the  increase  o f 
An^o immigration—both previously discussed—afford  a p a r t ia l  eaqplanation 
fo r pa rty  development a f te r  1880. But by themselves they do no t account 
fo r  a sudden and "wholesale re jec tio n  o f  t ra d i t io n a l  p o l i t ic a l  h a b its . While 
the  power o f  patrones was slowly dying, th e re  i s  no reason why they should 
not have continued to  exert stnm g p o l i t ic a l  influence w ell in to  the  
tw entieth  century—u n less , o f course, t h e i r  prerogatives were challenged 
in  some way not ye t considered. P rio r to  1900 immigration was no t so 
rapid , patronage, so abundant, newspapers so p le n tifu l  nor communications 
so improved as to  cause "native" vo ters to  tu m  against o ld  lo y a lt ie s  fo r  
organizations with which they had been bare ly  fam ilia r  two decades p re ­
viously. There had to  be o'Uier reasons.
These included the  nature  o f l a t e  n ineteenth  century Hew Mexican 
p a r t ie s  and the  techniques used by th e i r  leaders in  winning th e  lo y a lty  
o f th e  "native" e lec to ra te . Immigrant p o lit ic ia n s  displayed g rea t idsdom
^^Ralph Baerson Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mtoiee H istory 
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press; 19H-17V. I I .  p . Santa Fe New 
Meadcan. April 10, 1903, p. 2. A ll dates appearing In  parentheses a fte r , 
th e  names o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  o f f ic ia ls  in  th is  study in d ic a te  tenure  o f  o ff ic e  
and can be confirmed in  L. Bradford Prince: A Ckmeise BigU>iv o f  New 
Mexico (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Tordi Press; 1912) , pp. z é ^ é é .
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in  shaping th e i r  organizations. Bather than estab lish ing  p a r t ie s  as 
they ex isted  in  th e  r e s t  o f th e  United S tates and endeavoring to  ad just 
New Itexican socie ty  to  then, they adjusted to  th e  ex is ting  so c io -p o lit ic a l  
se ttin g .
From th e  t in e  p a r t ie s  were founded, th e  e sse n tia l obstacle  to  
th e i r  r is e  to  predominence was the  existence o f two p o l i t ic a l  systems in  
the  same society . I t  w ill  be reca lled  th a t  th e  estab lished , tra d itio n a l  
^stem  had a t f i r s t  been a boon because "native” patrones had "delivered” 
the  vote idien p a r t ie s  had no means o f doing so. But once p a r t ie s  took 
roo t, these entrenched leaders a t  the  same t in e  became prime v o te -g e tte rs  
and ch ief competitors fo r  p a r t ie s . And as long as th e  patron eystem. conm 
tim e d  as a major p o l i t ic a l  force , p a r tie s  could not dominate p o l i t ie s  by 
th e i r  own l i ^ t .
Reducing patrones to  a secondary ro le  was a ta sk  whidi Anglo 
party  p o lit ic ia n s  d id  not have th e  power to  perform on a broad sca le  in  
the hinateenth century. But idiat "üiey did do was to  develop th e i r  organi­
zations in  sudi a way as to  compete with patrones. use then where fea s ib le , 
and then take over th e i r  constituencies idien they f e l l .  Though Anglo 
party  leaders m i^ t  not always have planned so d e lib e ra te ly , th e i r  actions 
followed th is  course.
The d istinguish ing  d ia ra c te r is t ie  o f New Mexican p a r t ie s  in  the  
nineteenth century was th e  e n t a s i s  given to  lo c a l organization and a 
corresponding absence o f strong c en tra l leadersh ip , from th e  t in e  they 
became p o l i t ic a l ly  s ig n ifican t—in  the  l a t e  1870 ' s—ultim ate  p a rtisa n  
au thority  rested  unquestionably in  the  hands o f th e  co llec tiv e  leadership
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o f  a l l  p rec inc ts  and c o u n t i e s , t h e  ro le  o f th e  fed e ra l government not­
withstanding.^® Central committees served only to  arrange conventions 
and to  appease d isa ffec ted  lo c a l  le a d e rs . There was no d isc ip lin e  fo r  th e  
d efec to r and no means o f  co n tro llin g  lo c a l t r o u b l e m a k e r s . " g h e  estab­
lishm ent o f strong cen tra l leadersh ip  and p a rty  u n if ic a tio n , which would 
have been obtrusive i f  not inqpossible in  th e  nineteenth  century, d id  not
^^DonSelly; Rocky. Mountain P o l i t ic s , pp. 239-40; Daily New_.Meqdj- 
can. October 1, 1$80, p . % and October 8, 1880, p . 2.
l®Most New Mexican h is to r ia n s  have f e l t  th a t  p re s id e n tia l appoin­
tee s  dominated p a rtisa n  p o l i t ie s  and th a t  t e r r i t o r i a l  New Mexico was 
th ere fo re  u sua lly  Republican because a l l  p residen ts between i860 and 
statehood were Republicans e x c ^ t  Grover Cleveland. That view does not 
stand up under close examination, however. In  th e  f i r s t  p lace, p re s i­
d e n tia l appointments accounted fo r  only a sm all percentage o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  
patronage. The P resident appointed th e  h i ^  o f f ic ia ls —th e  Governor, th e  
Secretary, fed e ra l judges and a marshal—and severa l l e s s e r  o f f ic e rs . And 
he o ften  in d ire c tly  e ffec ted  th e  se lec tio n  o f o th er o f f ic ia l s ,  nominated 
by th e  Governor. But f in a l  approval fo r  a l l  but d ire c t  p re s id e n tia l 
appointments came from th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Council, and unless the  Council 
approved a governor’ s appointees, t e r r i t o r i a l  o ff ic e s  remained in  th e  
hands o f o ff ic e rs  appointed by th e  previous adm in istration . This i s  th a t  
happened during d e v ^ a n d ’s f i r s t  adm in istration , when a Republican Coun­
c i l  re jec ted  most o f  th e  nominations made by Democrat Edmund G. Ross 
(Chapter 17).
The President sometimes even bent to  th e  wishes o f  a m inority  o f  
lo c a l p a rty  o f f ic ia ls  regarding th e  governorship then p a rty  u n ity  was in  
danger. I t  was mainly fe a r  o f  th e  d is in te g ra tio n  o f  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Re­
publican p a rty  th a t  caused Theodore Roosevelt to  f i r e  Governor Otero in  
1906 and Governor Herbert J .  Hagerman in  190? (Chapter 71).
The a sse rtio n  lh a t  p re s id e n tia l  appointees dominated p o l i t ic s  a lso  
ignores th e  p a rtisa n  power o f  th e  Delegate to  Congress. Not only was he 
in f lu e n tia l  because he was th e  t e r r i to r y ’s b e s t fund r a i s e r  and advocate 
o f  statehood in  Washington, l a  th e  Republican p a rty , a t  l e a s t ,  he  a lso  
con tro lled  t e r r i t o r i a l  p a rty  machinery fo r  two years following h is  nomina­
tio n . f o r  by custom he named th e  Chairman o f  th e  C entral Committee.
Miguel Antonio Otero t Mv Nine Years as Governor o f  th e  T e rrito ry  o f  New 
Mexico. 1897-1906 (Albuquer^es U niversity  o f  New Mexico Press; 1940),
p. 229.
Thus p a rty  p o l i t ic s  was a c tu a lly  con tro lled  ty  county lead e rs .
They were r e ^ n s i b l e  fo r  th e  e lec tio n  o f  Councilors. The m ajo rity  o f  
them se lec ted  congressional nominees. And a m inority , i f  w ell organized, 
could force th e  f i r in g  o f  a t e r r i t o r i a l  governor. This can be confirmed 
by reading th e  New Mexican through any decade between 1B70-1910.
^9santa Fe New Mexican. November 28, 1908, p . 4.
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come t in t i l  the  tw entieth .
The evolution o f  th e  Eepublican p a rty  serves as th e  b e s t exm p '.e  
because i t s  development preceded th a t  o f  the  Democratic p a rty  by a t  1' a s t 
a decade. I t s  emergence m i^ t  be likened to  bu ild ing  a pyramid. Pracinot 
o rganizations, e sp ec ia lly  those estab lished  ty  th e  Santa Fe Ring in  th e  
la te  1870*s 'and  ea rly  ISSO's, were i t s  cornerstones. County orgaM zations, 
appearing as p rec in c t leaders began to  cooperate in  th e  ISSO's, weze i t s  
slopes. And th e  apex was not shaped u n t i l  O tero 's  adm in istration , idxen 
th e  "Goveinor's Ring" f in a l ly  drew a l l  lower blocks to g e th er in to  one.
This o rder o f  establishm ent was a key to  th e  success o f  th e  Repub­
lic an  p a rty  because i t  was completely responsive to  lo c a l  needs and d e s ire s . 
As a re s u l t .  Republicans su ffered  from in te m it te n t  upheavals fo r  want o f 
a capstone—o r u n i f ie r —fo r  th ree  decades. Between I 869 and 1900 they 
experienced four major and severa l minor in tra -p a r ty  wars. But from th e  
la te  1670 ' s  t h e i r  p a rty  was availab le  and acceptable to  th e  average "native" 
vo ter.
An^o leaders in  both p a r t ie s  also  endeavored to  make p a rtic ip a tio n  
in  p a rtisa n  p o l i t ic s  a  so c ia l h i g h l i ^ t  from th e  "native" viewpoint. Every 
patrty function was a gala  occasion in  th e  b est Spanish-American tr a d itio n . 
Local r a l l i e s  were accompanied w ith much r i tu a l ,  d ining, and dancing.
Whole fam ilies attended and a te , drank and l is te n e d  through hours o f 
o ratory  d e liv e r» ! in  lo f ty  phrases. Thus every campaign became a so c ia l 
oasis in  an otherw ise a rid  existence fo r  most peons and th e i r  fam ilies .
Along with making p a r t ie s  unobtrusively  av a ilab le , and giving
20S. Qnar Barken "La P o l i t ic s ,"  New co Q uarterly . IF  
1934) ,  pp. 6-10; Findxer: "Spanish-Americans as a  P o l i t ic a l  Factor in  Hew
MiSLco," p . 133; Harvey Fergusson: ♦Bio Grande, p . U 6.
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p a rtisan  p o l i t ic s  specia l so c ia l significance» Anglo p o lit ic ia n s  d id  one 
more th ing . Unable to  overcome the  n a tiv e  natron system, th%r included i t  
in  th e  operation o f p a rty  p o l i t ic s .  And by doing so they  perm itted en­
trenched leaders to  achieve vhat t h ^  could not do fo r  themselves. The 
patrones destroyed th e i r  ova system as a p o l i t ic a l  force independent o f 
p a r tie s .
For want o f leaders , and doubtless to  make p a r t ie s  more acceptable, 
patrones were allowed to  head most p rec in c t and county organizations. Also, 
with few exceptions the l a t e  n ineteenth-century  congressional nominees o f 
both p a r t ie s  were patrones. In  sho rt, during th e  1880* s and ea rly  lB90*s 
lo c a l organizations and leading places on p a rty  t ic k e ts  were handed over 
to  them. Bat u n t i l  1900, when p a r t ie s  had nearly  overshadowed th e  p a trro  
system as th e  dominant force in  p o l i t ic s ,  d id  Anglos themselves begin to  
supplant "native" patrones in  these  cap ac itie s .
By accepting nominations and p o sitio n s as lo c a l p a rtisa n  leaders , 
patrones placed themselves in  a vulnerable p o sitio n . For as p o l i t ic a l  
leaders with power based upon tr a d itio n , they could not have but abnegated 
personal p rerogatives ty  leading th e i r  various followings in to  a p a rty .
What they were doing, in  fa c t, was asking th e i r  peons to  jo in  them in  
serving another m aster. Thus, they t a c i t l y  renounced th e i r  exclusive
^H arvey Fergusson; "Out Where Bureaucracy Begins," p . 112;
Fincher: "Spanish-Americans as a P o li t ic a l  Factor in  New Mexico, " p . 133*
That p a r t ie s  used patrones. then disgarded them a f te r  they lo s t  t h e i r  use­
fu lness i s  re f le c ted  in  th e  cAianging na tu re  o f congressional candidates.
In  1880, when p a r tie s  needed patrones. th e  Republican and Democratic nomi­
nees fo r  Delegate were Tranqnilino Luna and Miguel A. Otero, I —both members 
o f o ld , in f lu e n tia l  fam ilies. In  1900, a f te r  patrones had become r e l ia n t  
upon p a r tie s , ü ie  candidates were Ootaviano A. Larrazolo and Bernard S. 
Bodey—both immigrants and p a rtisa n  p o li t ic ia n s .  We«kiv New Meriean.
August 9, 1880, p . 1; Santa Fe D a i^  New Mexican. NovenJber 3. 1862. p . 2; 
Otero: My l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r. 1664-1882. pasrim and My Nine Tears as
Governor, pp. 135-36; Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory , 
n ,  p . 5^3.    — A ,
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possession o f p o l i t ic a l  au tho rity  in  t h e i r  owi communities. For in  th e  
party , th e i r  power was subject to  challenge ty  asp iran ts  with no t r a d i­
tio n a l b asis  fo r  au tho rity . In  th e  p a rty , m erdiants, mining barons, lawyers 
and anyone ^ s e  with friends and money became an equal and a p o te n tia l 
p o l i t ic a l  adversary.
Moreover, once a natron  became a p a rtisa n  leader, he had to  stqp 
down from h is  t ra d i t io n a l  pedesta l and ascend th e  " p o lit ic a l  stump" with 
a l l  o f  h is  challengers. Suddenly h is  peons became h is  m asters. To com­
pete  with o ther candidates he had to  o f fe r  something tan g ib le  to  a t t r a c t  
votes—the same votes which a few years before he had undisputably con­
tro l le d . The lingering  forces o f  t r a d i t io n  tem porarily allowed some
oatrones—such as J . Francisco Chavez o f  Valencia County—to  both "deliver"
22
th e  vote and head a p rec inct o r  county p a rtisa n  organization . But th e  
in ev itab le  e ffe c t was to  make th e  natron  over in to  ju s t  another p o l i t i c a l  
boss.
Once th is  happened, th e  natron  became subordinate to  th e  p a rty , 
ra th e r  than v ice  versa. Pedro Perea serves as an example o f  idiat happened 
to  oatrones vâio s o u ^ t  to  use p a r t ie s  fo r  self-aggrandisanent. A member 
o f  a powerful fam ily which came to  New Mexico in  1693 as so ld ie rs  o f  
Captain General d eg o  de Vargas, Perea became one o f  the more in f lu e n tia l  
oatrones o f  the  la te  n ineteenth  century. Yet once in  th e  p a rty  he became 
i t s  servant. The Bepublicans used him in  1898 to  defeat th e  popular Demo­
c ra tic  incumbent. Delegate Harvey Fergusson. But a f te r  winning th e  sea t 
in  Congress, Perea was not even considered fo r  renomination in  1900.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican Reiview. September 1 , 1884, p . 2.
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That year both Catron and Otero decided to  support Bodey^^ and to  send 
Perea in to  p o l i t i c a l  obliv ion .
Even Catron, lead er o f  Anglo patrones and th e  one -viho was more
responsible fo r  founding lo c a l Republican machinery in  th e  l a t e  n ineteenth
century than any o th er ind iv idua l, f e l l  in to  th e  tra p . Ry th e  tu rn  o f the
century h is  personal influence was no longer adequate to  su s ta in  him in
power against th e  w il l  o f  th e  p a rty . Between I 896 and 1902 he was reduced
to  a mere county p o li t ic ia n  by severa l defeats from th e  Otero Ring. "When
th e  Regular Republicans o f Santa Fe County turned against him between
1904 and I 906, he kept h is  p o l i t ic a l  caree r a liv e  only by jo in ing  th e  
24Democrats.
Wien th e  patron system had accordingly become a soc ie ty  o f  p a r t i ­
san bosses, th e  b a t t le  fo r  p a rty  predominance in  New Mexican p o l i t ic s  was 
nearly  won. For a l l  p ra c tic a l purposes th is  had occurred ty  1900. Only 
once th e re a f te r  did  a patron personally  attem pt to  challenge th e  leader­
ship o f  a p a rty . In  1904 Frank Subbell, a B ern a lillo  County p a tr ro  o f 
longstanding, attempted to  use h is  personal influence to  defy th e  au tho rity  
o f  Otero* s machine. A fter Hubbell fa i le d , no patron ever again played 
a prominent ro le  in  p o l i t ic s ,  except as a p o l i t i c a l  boss cooperating fh lly  
l i t h  o ther p a rtisa n  p o lit ic ia n s .
Thus, th r o u ^  most o f  th e  l a s t  t e r r i t o r i a l  decade both p a r t ie s
^^Santa Fe New Mexloan. January 12, 1906, p. 2; Santa Fe Daily New 
Mexican. November 3t 1882, p . 2; The Las Yeeas Dai l y  Qntie. October 12, 
1898, p . 2; Tha (Socorro), October 13» 1900, p . 2; Otero: gg
Nine Tears as Governor, pp. 135-38.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. June 5» 1906, p. 2.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. October 10, 1906, p. 2 and September I 6 , 
1911, p . 4.
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regarded patrones as. harmless anachronisms and concentrated upon resolving 
fac tio n a l d ifferences in  th e i r  ranks. The R ^uh licans, uhose lo c a l organi­
zations were th e  strongest, in ev itab ly  suffered  from th e  g rea tes t in te rn a l 
s t r i f e .  Only a f te r  several heated c o n flic ts  betweaa loaders, and th e  
f i r in g  o f  two t e r r i t o r i a l  governors, d id  they achieve s ta b i l i ty .  On the  
o ther hand the  Democrats, with le s s  lo c a l machinery to  bring under cen tra l 
leadersh ip , concentrated mainly upon strengthening th e i r  county and p r ^  
c in c t operations, and bu ild ing  up a following.
By th e  time o f  the  C onstitu tional Convention o f  19IO both p a r tie s  
were u n ifie d  and about equal in  s treng th . A fter e x is tin g  only approxi­
mately four decades they  had—fo r a l l  p ra c tic a l  purposes—supplanted the  
forces o f t r a d i t io n  in  New Mexican p o l i t ic s  and were ready to  compete with 
each o th er in  th e  establishm ent o f th e  new s ta te  government.
The Republican p a rty , ^drose h is to ry  i s  examined in  the  succeeding 
chapters, was by f a r  the  stronger o f th e  two major p a r t ie s  u n t i l  th e  l a s t  
few years o f th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  period . Factors already mentioned were 
p a r t ly  responsible fo r  th is ,  such as th e  emphasis Republican leaders 
placed upon lo c a l organization. But to  understand c le a r ly  th e i r  preeminence, 
i t  i s  necessary to  begin with a more carefu l analysis o f th e  genesis o f 
th e  two p a r t ie s .  For l ik e  Republicans in  th e  r e s t  o f  the  United S ta tes, 
those o f New Mexico b en e fltted  g rea tly  from the  p o l i t ic s  o f  th e  d v i l  War.
CHAPTER i n
GENESIS OP THE REPDBLICAN PARTY IN NEW MEXICO, 18^-1875
In  the  w inter o f  th a t  year J lS 6 ^  th e  w rite r  in v ited  a few w ell 
known republicans to  a conference and th e  re s u lt  was th e  fomam 
tio n  o f  th e  republican association  o f  th e  te r r i to r y  o f  New Mexico, 
idiich became qu ite  a  pbwer in  p o l i t ic s  and was the  f i r s t  movement 
toward the  organization o f  the  p a rty .^
This i s  how Colonel William Breeden remembered th e  b ir th  o f 
Republicanism in  New Mexico—a f te r  nearly  two decades. Inasmuch as 
Breeden provided what l i t t l e  cen tra l leadersh ip  th e  p a rty  had u n t i l  the  
m i(i.l880's, he was i t s  " fa th er. " A fter c a llin g  the  conference in  186? he 
became Chairman of th e  Central Committee. While serving in  th a t  capacity 
he did  more than anyone e lse  to  hold th e  p a rty  together by v ir tu e  o f h is  
being the  only leading Republican o f f ic ia l  tdio remained s u ff ic ie n tly  a loof 
from quarrels w ithin i t s  ranks. For example, in  I 87I  he played a key ro le  
in  preventing lo c a l p a rty  leaders from complstoly destroying th e  organi­
zation . He also  was instrum ental in  reun iting  th e  leaders in  1873, and 
subsequently keeping an u n e a ^  peace fo r  n early  a decade. Then f in a l ly  
he re lin q u i^ e d  the  chairmanship in  1886 in  the  in te re s t  o f  harmony within
p
the ranks.
^Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31, 1884,
p. 4.
^Santa Fe D aily New Mexican. November 30, 1882, p . 2; Santa Fe 
New Mexican Review. January 7, 188^, p . 2. W iliam  Breeden was th e  leading 
public figu re  in  New Mexico fo r  two decades following th e  C iv il War. A fter
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Since Breeden knetr more about th e  beginnings o f  th e  p a rty  than 
any o f h is  contemporaries, h is  comments must be regarded among th e  most 
au th o rita tiv e  ever w ritten . But th a t  th e  genesis o f  R^niblicanism in  
Hew Mexico was not as simple as he im plied has already been noted. The 
reader w ill  re c a l l  th a t  a groundwork had been la id  by th e  b ien n ia l formation 
of fac tions and th e  establishm ent o f unorganized p a r tie s  through th e i r  
a llian ce  with adm inistrative  cliques during th e  C iv il War. So -shen Breeden 
and h is  friends met in  186? > they  did no t c rea te  a new party . Bather, 
they simply took charge o f what had already ex is ted  fo r  severa l years, 
gave i t  th e  Republican lab e l and provided i t  with permanent c e n tra l leader­
ship.
The C olonel's fa i lu re  to  r ^ a t e  th ese  fa c ts  in  1884- stemmed 
mainly from h is  current concern fo r  the  p a r ty 's  w elfare. A la rg e  bloc o f 
quarrelsome Republicans was th reaten ing  to  b o lt  and allow th e  Democrats 
to  gain contro l o f  e le c tiv e  o ff ic e s . To prevent th is ,  Breeden published 
an a r t ic le  describ ing th e  p a r ty 's  achievements since 186?, hoping thereby 
to  re s to re  harmony w ithin th e  ranks.
Thus, oeunissions in  h is  w ritings are  explainable, bu t by fa il in g  
to  include th e  s to ry  o f th e  p o l i t ic a l  embroil which preceded th e  conference
arriv ing  in  1866 as Assessor o f  Ih te m a l Revenue, he became th e  most 
capable p a rtisa n  o f f ic e r  and one o f  th e  leading  public  o f f ic ia l s  o f  h is  
time. Not only d id  he serve as Republican Central Committee chairman fo r  
more than two decades and represen t th e  pairty a t  na tio n a l Republican con. 
vantions on severa l occasions. He was also  appointed Attorney General 
fiv e  tim es, e lec ted  to  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Council tw ice (serving both times 
as Chairman o f the  Jud ic ia ry  Committee), served as d e r k  o f  th e  Supreme 
Court o f  New Mexico fo r  th ree  years and was a le a d e r o f  the  New Mexico bar 
a l l  through th e  1870's and 1880's . His success in  th e  p a rty  was due p a r t ly  
to  the  fa c t th a t  he arrived  a f te r  the  C iv il War upheaval had ended and 
s ta r te d  fresh  with n e ith e r  enemies nor friends» But more im portant, he 
was unique among p o lit ic ia n s  o f  New MeodLoo a t  th a t  time fo r  h is  in te g r i ty  
and unblemished character.
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in  1867, Breeden glossed over two im portant aspects o f h is  p a r ty 's  h is ­
to ry . F i r s t  o f  a l l  he fa i le d  to  r e la te  i t s  tru e  o rig in s . Secondly, he 
ignored completely an iaqportant underlying cause fo r  i t s  s treng th . Doubt­
le s s  t e r r i t o r i a l  New Mexico would never have been so decidedly Republican 
as i t  was, had the  p a r ty 's  genesis involved nothing more than an incon­
spicuous meeting o f a few ind iv idua ls  in  186? as i t s  "fa ther" suggested. 
Indeed, due to  previous developments, th e  Republicans had every advantage 
over the  Democrats from the time the  two p a r t ie s  nominated th e i r  f i r s t  
candidates in  1869* A f u l l  understanding o f  th e  d isp a r ity  ex is tin g  between 
•tdiem a t  th a t  tim e can be derived by beginning with events in  th e  pre-war 
period.
At th e  time o f th e  American conquest a c it iz e n s ' convention had 
p e titio n e d  Congress to  prevent the  in troduction  o f  slavery  in to  th e  t e r r i ­
to ry . Again in  1850, a t  th e  f i r s t  C onstitu tional Convention, New Mexicans 
resolved to  banid i i t  fo rever. Then during th e  ensuing decade, while no 
fu r th e r  statem ent o f  opposition to  slavery  in  New Mexico was made, ther% 
was also no p cb lic  expression h in tin g  th a t  i t s  in troduction  would meet 
with approval. In  o th e r words, most New Mexicans e ith e r  opposed slavery , 
o r  did not care one way o r  th e  o th er.
Those occupying the  two most im portant posts in  the  te r r i to r y  
during the  1850' s , however, were e ith e r  southerners o r New Mexicans with 
southern sympathies. James S. Calhoun (1851-52), th e  f i r s t  c iv i l  Governor 
and a Georgian, betrayed h is  views t y  asking the  t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re  
to  outlaw free  Negroes. Congressional Delegate Miguel A. Otero I  (1855-61), 
a "native" New Mexican, loudly  pro^aim ed h is  pro-southern p r o c i l iv i t ie s  
to  the  p ress . Then in  1859, Governor Abraham Rancher, from North
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Carolina, signed a so -ca lled  slave code, revealing h is  support of the 
in s t i tu t io n .
The code was in s ig n if ic a n t as a leg a l document, fo r  there  were
no more than two dozen slaves in  the te r r i to r y  a t  the  tim e. But Rancher's
signature was in te rp re ted  by many northern p o l i t ic a l  leaders as t a c i t
acceptance o f th e  southern cause by th e  whole population of New Mexico.
ünd a l l  doubt vanished in  l8 6 l lAen a c i t iz e n s ' convention met in  M esilla
to  secede, and numerous Union troops in  th e  t e r r i to r y  e ith e r  resigned o r
deserted to  jo in  th e  Confederate fo rces. Sven though Rancher denounced
the  M esilla convention and resolved to  keep New Mexico in  th e  Union, these
defections convinced both Lincoln and th e  m ajority  o f  Congress th a t  the
4■whole t e r r i to r y  was in  danger o f going over to  the  Confederacy.
I t  was with th ese  events in  mind th a t  the  President chose nominees 
fo r  t e r r i t o r i a l  o ff ice s  in  the  spring o f 1861. Not su rp ris in g ly , he d is­
regarded p e rso n a litie s  and previous p a rty  membership in  an e f fo r t  to  find
% om : New Mexico's Troubled Years, pp. 85-86; W. P. A.: New 
Ifoxico. p . 75* To remind th e  reader, l y  th e  terms o f th e  Compromise of 
1850, popular sovereignty was th e  ru le  governing slavery  in  t e r r i t o r i a l  
New Mexico.
^ o m :  New Mexico's Troubled Years, pp. 86-88; W. P. JUt New 
Mexico, p. 75. I t  i s  im possible to  say exactly  how most New Mexicans f e l t  
about th e  C iv il War. The w rite rs  o f th e  W. P. A. wrote th e  following: "The
controversy between th e  North and South leading to  th e  C iv il War was not 
o f v i t a l  in te r e s t  in  New Mexico, nor was th e  question o f Negro slavery an 
outstanding issu e . New Mexicans were accustomed to  n a tiv e  peon%e and to  
captive Indian slavery , but in  1861 th e re  were only twenty-one Negro slaves 
in  th e  te r r i to r y .  As a conq^iered province New Mexico had formed no strong 
attachment to  th e  Union. But as many o f th e  ea rly  pioneers and trad e rs  
over th e  Santa Fe T ra il, and many M erioan o ff ic e rs  in  th e  t e r r i to r y  were 
Southerners, th e  in c lin a tio n  was toward th e  South." This w rite r  cannot 
accept th e  view th a t  th e  In c lin a tio n  o f th e  general public  was toward th e  
Sou'th. C learly , several pre>War o f f ic ia ls  he ld  pro-souihem  views. But 
from th e  lack  o f support fo r  secession and the  unpopularity  o f Copperheads 
during th e  War, one cannot help  concluding th a t  most o f th o se  vho were 
concerned a t  a l l  favored th e  North.
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ind iv iduals làio n igh t b e s t serve the  in te re s ts  o f th e  North. In  th is  he 
succeeded, fo r  once h is  appointees were in  o ff ice  there  was never any 
danger o f the  t e r r i to r y 's  going over to  th e  Confederacy, e x c ^ t  by 
invasion from Texas. However, h is  obliviousness to  personal q u a lit ie s  
and partisansh ip  resu lted  in  a f i f t  in  the  t e r r i t o r i a l  adm inistration and 
s e t th e  stage fo r  th e  formation of two p a r t ie s .
The se lec tion  o f a governor would produce th e  fac tio n  idiich 
u ltim ate ly  became the  nucleus o f th e  Democratic Party . Rendher was 
availab le  fo r  another term, though understandably, Lincoln could not re­
appoint him. While he p e rs is te n tly  proclaimed h is  lo y a lty  to  Lincoln, h is  
southern o rig in s  and h is  acceptance of th e  slave code made him unaccep­
ta b le .  ̂  The President turned to  Henry Connelly (1861-66) in stead . There 
i s  no evidence th a t  he was anymore a staunch Union supporter than Bencher, 
but he had liv e d  in  New Mexico fo r  fo r ty  years and knew th e  ways o f the
"native" people. Moreover, he was in  a position  to  sway th e  opinions o f
6lo c a l leaders because o f h is  marriage in to  th e  powerful Perea fam ily.
Connelly nonetheless proved an unfortunate choice, fo r  he was 
never acceptable to  the  m ajority  o f th e  people o f th e  te r r i to r y .  For one 
th ing , he earned th e  r o t a t i o n  o f being a "Copperhead” from th e  time he 
took o ff ice  by v a c illa tin g  on several basic  issues o f the  War. While he 
denounced the  Confedera<^ as a  rebel organization and supported m ilita ry  
action  against i t ,  he also declared th a t  Texas and no t th e  South was th e
V incen t Q. Tregedert "Lincoln and th e  T e r r i to r i ^  Patronage:
The iscendanqr o f th e  Radicals in  th e  West, " RB-seissiopi Valiev H is to rica l 
Review, XXXV (June, 1948), p . 84; Horn: New Mexico's Troubled Tears, pp.
BO97 93.
% om : New Mexico's Troubled Years, pp. 93-94.
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rea l enemy of New Mexico, likew ise he seemed to  hedge on the  question 
of slavexy hy demanding th e  repeal o f th e  code, hu t a t  th e  same tim e he 
refused to  fre e  h is  Navajo "domestic servants" in  the  Government House.^ 
While He proclaimed h im s^ f  a lo y a l supporter o f Lincoln, he a lso  admitted 
a preference fo r  the  Democratic p a rty . These d iscrepancies made him sus­
pect from th e  s t a r t  to  those in te re s te d  in  n a tio n a l a f f a i r s .
Many New Mexican "natives" were unconcezned about th e  War, slavery  
and p o l i t ic s ,  o f  course. But the  Governor also evoked opposition from 
them by h is  obliviousness to  popular opinion in  determining po licy . P rio r 
to  the summer o f 1862 Connelly and Edward B. S. Canby, Commander o f th e  
Department o f New Ifexico, were engaged in  an hero ic  e f fo r t  to  r ^ e l  the  
invasion from Texas. But once th e  War ended fo r  New Mexico, he became 
extremely unpopular. Perhaps th e  most annoying o f h is  p o lic ie s  was th a t  
Tdiich concerned the  Indians. No one could complain th a t  i t  was in e ffe c tiv e , 
fo r  i t  was simply to  k i l l  them o r e lse  put them on reserva tions. But 
Connelly was suspected o f cooperating with Canby* s successor. General James 
S. Carleton, in  herding Indians onto th e  Bosque Redondo reserva tion  mainly 
to  c le a r  the  mountains so h is  friends in  the  eastern  s ta te s  could exp lo it 
New Mexican m inerals. The whole reservation  idea  likew ise provoked 
h o s t i l i ty  because i t  took up some o f  th e  b e st grazing lands in  the  t e r r i ­
to ry . Also, giving lands to  Arizona Apaches seemed l ik e  open defiance o f  
lo ca l in te r e s ts .  And Connelly and Carleton iro n ic a lly  received c ritic ism
^Tregeder: "Idncoln and th e  T e r r i to r ia l  Patronage, " p . 85;
Horn: New Mexico's Troubled Years, pp. 93-104. In  A Concise H istory  o f 
New Mexico, p . 264, Prince c la s s if ie d  Connelly as a Republican. This 
appears to  be w  e rro r , however.
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from various New Mexicans fo r  being too harsh with the  Indians*
S t i l l  another cause fo r  Connelly's unpopularity  was h is  close 
friendship  with th e  Commander o f the  M ilita iy  Department, idiom nearly  
everyone opposed. The p rin c ip le  reason was th a t  Carleton k ^ t  th e  t e r r i ­
to ry  under m artia l law u n t i l  1866—almost fou r years a f te r  the  withdrawal 
o f Texas-Confederate troops. He also  in v ited  c ritic ism  by s e lf is h ly  using 
m ilita ry  con trac ts  to  dominate c iv i l  a f f a i r s ,  and fo r  co llabora ting  with 
a group o f lo c a l leaders in  Santa Fe known as th e  "Metropolitan Junta o f 
New Mexico, C o llins, Watts and Company." By th e  end o f th e  War Carleton 
and th is  c o te r ie . apparently had in tim idated  o r thoroughly a lien a ted  a 
su b s tan tia l m ajority  o f th e  population .^  By assoc ia tions with th is  so- 
called  "Copperhead P arty ,"  Connelly d iared th e i r  repu ta tion  fo r  "treason" 
to  the  Union and fo r  d isregarding ind iv idua l freedom.
Thus Connelly and most o f h is  close assoc ia tes were d is lik e d  in  
New Mexico. The ih o le  fac tion—including th e  Governor's appointees, 
Carleton and th e  M etropolitan Junta, some Democratic Anglo immigrants, 
and a few se lf-seek ing  patrones and th e i r  respective  followings—gradually  
gained th e  repu ta tion  o f  being conspirators against th e  in te re s ts  o f  
both th e  New Mexican people and th e  American Union.
This stigma had a momentous e ffe c t upon p a rtisa n  a f f a i r s .  I t  did 
no t disappear e a s ily  idien Connelly d ied  and h is  fac tion  became th e  Demo­
c ra tic  p a rty . Accordingly, i t  accounted fo r  much o f th e  unpopularity  o f
®Tregeder: "Lincoln and th e  T e r r i to r ia l  Patronage," p . 85; Hoxni 
New Mexico's Troubled Tears, pp. 104-0?.
% om : New Mexico's Troubled Years, pp. 107-08; The New Mexican. 
June 30, 1865, p . 2, Ju ly  28, 1865* p. 2, August 25, 1865, p . 2 and August
24, 1867, p. 2.
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the  Democrats, and fo r  th e  corresponding success o f th e  Republican party  
during t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es. Secondly—and more important to  th e  present 
context—th a t  stigma also f a c i l i ta te d  the  fozmation o f  a la rg e r  and more 
popular C iv il War fac tio n , one -which would be taken over by the  Republican 
conference in  186?.
The Governor's leading opponent, and presumably th e  champion o f 
freedom and th e  Union, was t e r r i t o r i a l  Secretary William F. K» Am y, He 
was Connelly's opposite in  th a t  he pe rson ified  Radical Republicanism, and 
arrived  in  Hew Mexico in  1861 with a se n a to ria l mandate to  defend the  
northern cause. Lincoln had f i r s t  nominated Delegate I&guel A. Otero I ,  
doubtless fo r  the  same reasons he had nominated Connelly, but the  United 
S tates Senate re jec ted  him because he had been a pro-southern Democrat.
The President then y ielded  to  Radical pressure  and submitted Amy's name, 
whereupon the  Senate confirmed him immediately in  re tu rn  fo r  Amy's 
having le d  th e  an ti-s lav e ry  movement in  Kansas th ro u ^ o u t th e  previous 
decade.
Thus, i t  i s  unsurprising  th a t  th e  new Secretary eventually  became 
th e  leading opponent o f th e  Governor and h is  Copperhead c lique. At f i r s t  
Amy got along with Connelly and Carleton. He cooperated with the  l a t t e r  
in  the  attempt to  force  Lincoln to  f i r e  Kirby Benedict from th e  t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  Supreme Court. He also  worked with Connelly and Carleton on th e i r  
plan to  concentrate th e  Indians on the  Bosque Redondo reserve. Moreover, 
he did no t quarre l with th e i r  exp lo ita tion  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  resources by 
eastern  c a p i ta l is ts ,  since a t  the  same time he was promoting the  in te re s ts
^^Tregeder: "Lincoln and th e  T e r r i to r ia l  Patronage," pp. 83-84.
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o f lieaveixvorth merdiants and Topeka r a i l r o a d e r s .^
But a Coppeibead Democratic govenior and a Radical Republican 
secre ta iy—bo'tti o f  idiom wanted to  dominate t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t ic s — could 
not work harmoniously fo r  long. Soon th e  in ev itab le  r i f t  occurred» and 
Amy rap id ly  b u i l t  up a following ty  hu rling  accusations a t  Conni^Uy and
a l l  o f  h is  frien d s. Not only did^ he d isc re d it them in  the  te r r i to r y ,  he
12even went to  Washington to  complain to  Wi l l iam B. Seward.
Accordingly, th e  two men divided th e  voters o f  New Mexico in to  
two d is t in c t  camps by 1865 and by th a t  time th ere  was l i t t l e  question 
about the  p a rtisa n  p ro c l iv it ie s  o f each. Amy's follow ers ca lled  them­
selves th e  Adm inistration p a rty  in  reference to  th e i r  devotion to  Lincoln, 
and l ik e  th e i r  leader, they wore Republican in  most respects. In  the  
e lec tion  o f  1865 they received support from th e  Santa Fe New Me3d.ean. 
which by 1870 would be recognized as th e  o f f ic ia l  Republican organ. They 
supported Colonel J . Francisco Chavez th a t  year fo r  Delegate to  Congress, 
a oatrdn idio would be a  major power in  th e  Republican p a rty  fo r  approxi­
mately twenty years. Am^’ s fac tio n  campaigned on a ty p ic a l Republican 
p la tfo m , a ttack ing  the  opposition as th e  p a rty  o f treason and oppression.
Meanidiile, in  th e  e lec tio n  o f  I 865 Connelly's fac tion  emerged 
with c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f th e  Democratic p a rty , though a t  f i r s t  i t  ca lled  
i t s e l f  the  Union p arty  in  hopes o f  d isp e llin g  th e  stigma o f  Coppezheadism. 
I t s  leader was a Democrat, and i t s  congressional candidate, Francisco 
Perea, was a member o f  th e  fam ily in to  which Connolly had m arried. Further­
more, th is  fac tio n  received support from th e  Santa Fe Weekly Gazette.
^ -Ibid. . pp. 83-85.
^^Hbm: New Mexico's Troubled Tears, p. 109.
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which a t the  time belonged to  Democrat Charles P, Clever.
By IB65 th e  stage was se t fo r  th e  establishm ent o f  organized, 
two-party p o l i t i c s .  Though i t  would be approximately two years before 
they would be re fe rred  to  as such, i t  i s  nevertheless appropria te  to  c a l l  
Connelly's follow ers—th e  rank and f i l e  o f  th e  Union party—Democrats, 
and Amy's follow ers—those belonging to  th e  Administration party— 
Republicans. Had Republican "fa ther" William Breeden been in  New Mexico 
a t  th a t  time to  claim leadersh ip  o f th e  l a t t e r  fac tio n , he could have 
organized th e  p a rty .
Yet, th e  lapse  o f two more years placed the  Republicans in  an 
even more advantageous p o sitio n . Meanwhile th e  Democrats were s t i l l  
fa r th e r  d isc red ited . Their leadersh ip  soon changed, fo r  I 867 both 
Carleton and Connelly had passed from th e  scene. The fozmer was re lieved  
o f h is  command, while th e  l a t t e r  died in  th e  f a l l  o f  1866. But t h e i r  
Democratic following remained in ta c t  and was taken over by th e  next 
Governor, a man idio e a s ily  q u a lif ied  to  replace them as an opponent fo r  
Amy to  r id ic u le .
Robert B. M itchell (I866- 69) came to  New Mexico with an unsavory 
reputation  th a t  even surpassed C arle ton 's . While serving as a  General 
in  th e  Union forces during th e  War he bad -Uareatened to  shoot 350 o f  h is  
own cavalrymen fo r  cowardice in  th e  face o f  th e  enemy. Furthermore, he 
bore many s im ila r i t ie s  to  Connelly. An Ohio Democrat, he could be 
characterized by h is  opponents as a Copperhead, and he was fu l ly  as
^% om : NSW K ^ o o 's  Troubled Yearg. p . 125; Santa Fe Weekly
Gazette. January 14, 1865, p . 2, February IB, I 865, p . 2 and M a rc h é  
1865; % e New Mexican. June 22, IS65, p . 2, June 30, I865 , p . 2 and May
25, 1867, p . 2.
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uncompromising as h is  predecessor.^^
Ainy took f a l l  advantage of M itchell’s appointment, even though 
he served only a few months a f te r  the  new Govenior* s inauguration.
President Andrew Johnson accepted h is  resignation  as Secretaiy  and replaced 
him with General H. H. H e a t h . B u t  Heath* s a r r iv a l  in  New Mexico was 
delayed, and th e  time he got th e re  Amy had fomented a reb e llio n  
against M itchell in  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re  \4iich l e f t  p o l i t ic s  in  
a s ta te  o f chaos.
M itchell was p a r tly  responsible. Soon a f te r  taking o ff ic e  he 
l e f t  fo r  th e  East to  advertise  New Mexico’s resources, and to  complain 
in  Washington about Amy’s conduct. This gave th e  l a t t e r  an opportunity  
to  d isc re d it  him before the  people o f th e  t e r r i to r y  could judge fo r  thank, 
selves. Also, as the  incumbent Secretary, Amy became Acting Governor 
and proceeded to  s e t  up th e  hew adm inistration.
The consequence was a vigorous f ig h t  over patronage. % th  coopera­
t io n  from a strong m ajority  in  th e  Council, Amy f i l l e d  t e r r i t o r i a l  o ff ice s  
with h is  own frien d s  during th e  Governor's absence. Thus i t  appeared 
th a t  Amy would con tro l most t e r r i t o r i a l  o ff ic e s  even though he was forced 
meanwbi].e to  surrender h is  own o ff ic e  to  Heath. Upon re tu rn ing , M itchell 
h a s t i ly  declared a l l  o f  these  appointments in v a lid , however, and submitted 
a new l i s t  o f  nominees. R ealising th a t  th e  Council was frien d ly  to  Amy, 
and hoping to  defend h is  own appointment as Attorney General, Charles P.
^%om* New Mexico’s Troubled Years, pp. 107, 110, 116-17; The 
Daily Hew Merieani. September 30. là é ? . p. 1. In  A e x c i s e  H istory  o f  New 
Maxieo. p . 264. Prince c la s s if ie d  M itchell as a Republican. This appears 
to  be an e rro r , however.
^% om ; New Mexico’s Troubled Years, p. 124; Daily New Mexican. 
October 12, 1880, p . 2.
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Clever m aintained th a t  a l th o n ^  Heath had not ye t arrived  a t  the  time 
Amy made appointments, he nevertheless had been o f f ic ia l ly  In s ta lle d  in  
o ff ic e . The outgoing Secretaiy  th e re fo re  had no le g a l r ig h t to  serve as 
Acting Governor. %Lth th i s  ocmplicated and ra th e r  dubious defense, a l l  of 
M itch e ll 's  nominees declared themselves the  le g a l adm inistrators o f  the  
te r r i to r y  and estab lished  a second framework o f  governmental machinery.
So in  the  spring o f  I 867 th ere  were two adm inistrations in  New Mexico: one 
serving M itchell, the  o th e r serving Amy and the  le g is la tu re .
VQ.th t e r r i t o r i a l  a f fa i r s  a t a  s ta n d s t i l l ,  a so lu tion  to  the  
dilemma had to  come from Washington. Inasmuch as Radical Republicans 
dominated Congress a t  th e  tim e. Clever* s proposition  was re jec ted  and 
A # y 's  appointees remained in  o ff ic e . Moreover, in  response to  a memorial 
from th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re . Congress amended the  o rig in a l Organic 
Act, abolishing th e  absolute veto power o f  the  Governor. In  o ther words. 
Radicals in  Washington handed the  adm inistration o f the  t e r r i to r y  over to  
the  Republicans, made i t  po ssib le  fo r  th e  le g is la tu re  to  hold MLtch^U in  
check, and fu r th e r  d isc red ited  th e  Democrats.
Amid th is  confusion W iliam  Breeden and h is  friends o f f ic ia l ly  
founded the  Republican p a rty , a tim ely a c t indeed. Ry 186? th e  fac tion  
to  which he f e l l  h e ir  was stronger than a t  any time in  i t s  previous h is to ry . 
I t  had grown s te a d ily  over the  preceding fou r o r  five  years from d iso fe d it 
brought to  the  Democrats by ConnWly and the  so -ca lled  "Copperhead p arty . "
New Mexico's Troubled Tears, pp. U 8- I 9 .
^^Hom: New Mexico's Troubled Tears, pp. 119-20, 124, I 3O; The 
Daily New Mexican. September 30. 18?è. p. 1: Weekly New Mexican. October
18, 1860, p . 1. ------------------
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Because o f the  War the  l a t t e r  had become, as the  Democratic p a rty  in  the  
re s t  o f the coun1g% an impotent opposition. . And vhat l i t t l e  advantage 
t h ^  possessed fo r  having a member o f th e  same p a rty  in  the  Government 
House t h ^  lo s t  -«hen Congress declared Amy's nominees the  -winners o f New 
Mexican adm inistration. Iffliat fa r th e r  advantage could Breeden and h is  
friends have had?
After i t  was organized, the  Republican p a rty  b en efitted  from 
s t i l l  o ther advantages. For one th ing , though the  t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re  
did not divide sharply along p a rtisan  l in e s  u n t i l  I 878, th e  R ^ublicans 
usua lly  managed to  e le c t a su ff ic ie n t number o f  candidates to  contro l i t .  
Thus -they not only dominated le g is la t io n , but also patronage. The New 
Mexican was im portant, fo r  i t s  ed ito rs  took f u l l  advantage o f  the  only 
meaningful campaign issu e  th a t  existed  fo r  a generation by waving the  
"bloo(%r s h i r t .  " They e ffe c tiv e ly  portrayed the  Republicans as the only 
tru e  defenders o f  indi-Tidual freedom in  a society  oppressed by peonage.^
Nor should the q u a lity  o f  Republican leadership  be overlooked. 
Though more con troversia l -than Breeden, 'William Amy contributed to  holding 
the  p a rty  together during the  I8 ? 0 's . Thomas Catron, a r is in g  figu re  in  
the  p a rty  who was to  become i t s  leader before the  end o f the  centuiy, l ik e ­
wise took an in te r e s t  in  i t s  dev^opment. Not only d id  he con tribu te  h is  
genius fo r  organization, he also  brought p res tig e  to  Republican adminis­
tra t io n  p r io r  to  1875 ih i l e  holding the  o ffice s  o f D is tr ic t  Attorney, 
Attorney General and United S ta tes A tto rn ^ . S t ^ e n  E lkins, though he 
apparently was never ac tive  as a Republican o f f ic ia l ,  strengthened the
^^Daily New Mexican. August 1, 1880, p. k; WeeKlv New Mexican. 
October IS , 1880, p. 2.
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p a r ty 's  image as l ib e ra to r  o f  th e  do-wntrodden waging a vigorous campaign 
against peon^e  ^ i l e  holding the  o f f ice  o f  A tto in ^  General.
Even more ing)ortant, th e  Republicans had the  b est congressional 
candidate from the  time they began to  cooperate as an unorganized fac tio n . 
M th  p ra c tic a lly  no lo c a l organization and no p a rtisa n  d iv is io n  on county 
and le g is la t iv e  t ic k e ts ,  con tests fo r  lower o ffice»  were confused and 
patronage was s t i l l  th e  province o f ind iv idual lead ers . Consequently, fo r  
almost a decade a f te r  t h e , C iv il War success hinged mainly upon th e  a b i l i ty  
o f  e ith e r  p a rty  to  win the  race fo r  Delegate to  Congress. This could not 
be achieved th ro u ^  normal campaign e f fo r t s ,  o f  course, fo r  the  patron 
system stood between the  p a rty  and th e  v o te rs . To e le c t a nœninee fo r  
Delegate i t  was necessaay to  keep th e  most powerful combination o f  cap ri- 
cious "native" leaders working together. Success in  doing so u su a lly  
came to  the  p a rty  ih ich  placed th e  most powerful patron a t  th e  head o f i t s  
t ic k e t .  Fortunately  fo r  the  Republicans, t h ^  f e l l  h e ir  to  th e  leading 
patron o f Hew Mexico, because Amy and h is  friends had lu red  Colonel J . 
Francisco Chavez in to  th e i r  C iv il War c lique, and he eventually  proved to  
be the  best "native" v o te -g e tte r  o f  the  I 860*s and 1870's.
Chavez f i r s t  displayed th is  a t t r ib u te  in  th e  e lec tio n  o f  IB65 
winning e igh t o f ten  counties from Francisco P e r e a . I n  186? he did 
not appear so strong, but he ran under p e cu lia r  circumstances. The
New Mexican. May 6, 1873» P« 1 and September 14, I 876 , 
p . 1; Weakly New Mexican. October 4, IS70 , p . 1; T w itcheli: The Leading 
Facts o f New Mexico H istory . IX, p . 520; Oscar Doane Lambert: Stephen
Benton EUdns (P ittsb u rd i: U niversity  o f  P i t t s b u r g ;  1955) pp. 27 , 36,
39» 5L-52; Weéâ.y Hew Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  JL, 1884, 
p . 4.
^ S a n ta  Fe Weeldv Gazette. September 9» I 865» p. 2; The New Maxloan. 
September 29, 18^5* p. 2.
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M itchell-Amy feud had no t y e t reached a conclusion» so no one knew lâiich 
fac tio n  would win con tro l o f  patronage. Moreover» i t  was one of the  more 
corrupt e lec tio n s  in  New Mexican h is to ry . Consequently th e  Democratic 
nominee» Charles dever»  won a m ajority  in  the  o f f ic ia l  count and rushed 
o ff  to  Washington. Chavez was unconvinced» and took h is  case to  Congress, 
hereupon th e  Radical Republicans of the  House o f Representatives found 
evidence of corruption and forced Clever to  re linqu ish  the  se a t. Pezhaps 
th e re  should have been l i t t l e  gloating by Chavez’ supporters, fo r  both 
sides had corrupted th e  p o lls  and Congress saw only the  in fra c tio n s  com- 
mi.tted ty  D em ocrats.^
But the  Republicans could claim in  1869 th a t  t h e i r  candidate had 
won the  previous two e lec tio n s . And in  th a t  race Chavez proved fu l ly  as 
in f lu e n tia l  as they had expected. His power as a patron enabled him to  
capture B e rn a lillo , Socorro» Dona Ana and Valencia counties» and he wcm 
nearly  tw o-th irds of th e  t o t a l  vote c a s t in  th e  m t i r e  te r r i to r y .
%Lth th e  patrMi system thus working in  th e i r  favor and the  impetus 
o f . in i t ia l  v ic to ry  pressing  them on» th e  Republicans worked e n th u s ia s ti­
c a lly  during I 870. Statehood seemed a good p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  year, and as 
Republicans con tro lled  Congress, party  leaders in  the  t e r r i to r y  gained
^^ e  New Mexican. April 2?, 186?, p. 2, May 18, I 867, p . 2, May 
25, 1867, p . 2, June 1, I 867» p. 2, June 22, I 867, p . 2, October 5t I 867, 
p . 2, March I 6 , I 869, p . 2; The Daily New Ma^rfcan. March 10, 1869, P* I j  
Santa Fe Weekly Gazette. March 23» 1867, p. 2, November 2» I867, p . 2; 
Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. July 31, 1584, p . 4; 
Charles P. Clever: Address to  th e  People o f New Mexico (Santa Fe: Weekly
Gazette; 1867) ,  passim.
^^ e  New Mexican. March 16. I 869, p . 2, August 10, IS69» p. 2, 
August 17» 1869, p . 2, August 31, I 869, p . 2 .,  September 28, I 869, p. 2, 
September 26, I 87I ,  p . 1; Santa Fe Webklv Gazette. S^tsm ber 11» I869 , p.
2; Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31, 1884, p. 4.
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support -with th e  argument th a t  th e i r  follow ers, and not the  Democrats, would 
b en efit most from th e  establishm ent of the  new government. j0.so, the  New 
Mexican, now th e  o f f ic ia l  pa rty  organ, began i t s  vigorous war on personal 
p o l i t ic s .
Despite th e i r  i n i t i a l  success and enthusiasm, the  Republicans 
p ra c tic a lly  destroyed th e i r  own p a rty  before i t  became fiim ly  entrendied.
As previously s ta te d , th e  mere creation  of a Central Committee and the  
d isp lay  o f a p a rty  ro s te r  were not tantamount to  peimanency. For 
personaliaao was s t i l l  th e  deciding p o l i t ic a l  fa c to r .
The near d is in teg ra tio n  of the  pa rty  began with the  lo ss  o f the  
e lec tio n  of I 87I .  Had they been un ited , the  Republicans m i^ t  e as ily  have 
won the  congressional race, fo r  the  Democrats could find  no b e tte r  candidate 
than the  d isc red ited  old Jose Manuel (Pjadre) Gallegos. However, some o f 
the  Republican leaders of noridiem New Mexico decided to  challenge Colonel 
Chavez fo r  h is  congressional sea t Ty presenting Jose D. Sena to  oppose him 
a t  th e  nominating convention. Chavez defeated Sena and ran fo r  ree lec tio n , 
bu t th e  l a t t e r  walked out and ran as an Independent Republican, causing a 
general defection  in  San I&guel, Mora, Santa Fe and Rio Arriba counties.
As a re s u l t ,  Sena won approximately 2,500 votes, ju s t  enough to  defeat
oh
Chavez and send Gallegos to  Washington.
This e lec tion  alone was devastating to  th e  party  because i t
New Mexicaa. Februaiy 22, 1870, p . 2, March 8, I870, p . 1 
and July  12. I 870, p . 2.
^% e  D aily  Mew Mexican. March .12, 1873* P* 1, May 1, I 871, p . 2, 
July  24, I 87I ,  p . 1, September 11, I87I ,  p. 1 and September 19, IS7I ,  p.
1; Weekly New Mexican. May 23, I 87I ,  p. 2, S^tem ber 5* I 87I ,  p . 1, Sep. 
tember 26, 1871, p . 1 and S^ytember 14, IB78 , p . 2; Weekly New Mexican 
Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. July  31, 1884, p. 4.
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tem porarily a liena ted  the  m ajority  o f  the  Republicans o f four counties.
The worst was y e t to  come, however. About two months l a t e r  a feud 
developed in  th e  le g is la tu re  idiich l e f t  th e  p a rty  on th e  verge o f d is in te ­
gration .
I t  began with the  in troduction  o f  a b i l l  in to  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
le g is la tu re  in  December, I 87I ,  to  reassign  Chief Ju s tic e  Josejdi Falen 
from the  f i r s t  ju d ic ia l  d i s t r i c t  a t  Santa Fe to  th e  th ird  d i s t r i c t  a t 
M esilla. The authors were le g is la to rs  representing a group o f monied 
barons in  Santa Fe lâio f e l t  P a len 's  p a s t decisions in im ical to. th e i r  i n te r ­
e s ts , Fearing th e  formation e.f an opposition, they forced i t .  through both 
houses so rap id ly  th a t  i t  was never p rin ted , re fe rred  to  committees, o r 
even submitted fo r  d e lib e ra tio n .
Republican Governor Marsh Giddings (1871-75) stopped them with a 
veto, and the  le g is la tu re  sustained h is  action , hereupon a se rie s  o f 
in c id a r ts  tran sp ired  lAidh approached th e  absurd. Through a group o f 
p lia b le  Republican le g is la to rs  the  Santa Fe barons conspired successfu lly  
to  remove enough Republican members to  give the  Democrats a m ajority  in  
both houses. In  th i s  way they hoped to  c rea te  a le g is la tu re  'which would 
reenact the  o rig in a l b i l l  to  tra n s fe r  Palen and override th e  Governor’ s 
veto, m  re ta l ia t io n , Giddings p lo tte d  with th e  Republican Speaker o f  Idie 
House to  have four Taos Republican le g is la to r s  resto red . To prevent th is ,  
the'Democrats ca lled  the  House to  o rder and appointed a new Speaker, 
Giddings then broke up th e i r  plan l y  ordering in  federa l troops, and th e  
le g is la tu re  ceased to  Amotion,
A so lu tion  came only when th e  Democrats in  the  Council agreed to  
recognize a R ^ b l ic a n  House i f  Giddings’ frien d , th e  Republican speaker.
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■would resign . The reb e llio u s members o f the  House attem pted to  block such 
a compromise t y  p lo ttin g  to  remove Giddings. But the  scheme fa ile d , the  
le g is la tu re  resumed operations, and -the Govenior remained in  o ff ic e .
This fiasco  brought t o t a l  confusion to  Republican ranks. Aided 
to  th e  a lien a tio n  o f so -ca lled  Independent Republicans during the  previous 
e lec tio n , a t  l e a s t  two more breaches appeared. One was between Republicans 
o f  Taos County idiose r^ re s e h ta t iv e s  were tem porailly  unseated and those 
in  "the le g is la tu re  •who.^^lotted "bo unseat them. The second was between 
the  same scheming Republicans in  the  le g is la tu re  on th e  one hand, and Palen, 
Giddings and -their frien d s on th e  o ther.
The only hope o f saving "the p a rty  under th e  circumstances was to  
find  someone to  reu n ite  i t  ^ o  was both popular and unassociated with 
events leading up "to i t s  near d is in te g ra tio n . At l e a s t  t h i s  was th e  appar­
ent s tra teg y  guiding Republican preparations fo r  th e  forthooming congres­
sional e lec tion  in  1873, and they  found such a man in  Stephen E lkins. His 
previous war on pe<aiage had endeared him to  the  "poor people" o f  th e  
te r r i to iy ,  i h i l e  he had no t become involved in  any o f  -the in tra -p a r ty  feuds 
o f 1873^72.
The Democrats made th e  task  o f  Republican reu n ifica tio n  e a s ie r , 
too , by renominating Gallegos, fo r  h is  previous conduct was one th ing  about 
vhich a l l  Republicans could agree. In  an unseemly campaign they  cooperated 
in  completely d isgracing th e  o ld  Padre, harping p a r t ic u la r ly  upon h is  
excommunication from "the Catholic Church, and id iile  doing so they  drew the  
party  back to g e th er. E lkins won by more than 3,800 vo tes . Nearly a l l
Daily New Meadoan. Januaxy l6 ,  I 872, p . 1; Weéldbr New Mexican. 
October 4, I 870, p . 1; Horn: New Mexico* s Troubled Years, oo. 153-6?.
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candidates claiming Republican a ff î l ia tic x i irron th e i r  county and le g is la t iv e  
con tests. Aad th e  quarrelsome fac tio n s o f two years before were again 
a v ic to rious Republican organization—a t le a s t  outwardly u n ifie d .
The e lec tion  o f 18?5 only reaffilm ed th e  re s u lts  o f 1873» Elkins 
won another decisive  v ic to iy , even th o u ^  he d id  not bother to  re tu rn  
from Europe fo r  th e  race. I t  i s  d i f f ic u l t  to  a sce rta in  th e  s iz e  o f h is  
m ajority  due to  the  re je c tio n  o f  a bloc o f d isputed b a llo ts  from Valencia 
County. N evertheless, Elkins seems to  have got a t  l e a s t  1,500 more votes 
than h is  Democratic opponent, Pedro Valdez. iQ.so, th e  Republicans ^ e c te d  
tw o-th irds o f  th e i r  candidates to  the  le g is la tu re , as w ell as th rea -fo u rth s  
of a l l  o f  th e i r  lo c a l c a n d id a te s .^
1875 was a t  th e  same time a disappointing year fo r  th e  Republicans. 
F ir s t  o f a l l ,  Elkins missed an exce llen t opportunity to  achieve statehood 
fo r  New Mexico when h is  p a rty  was strong enough to  have dominated a con­
s t i tu t io n a l  convention. A b i l l  providing fo r  statehood p reparations did 
pass both houses in  Congress, but Elkins in d isc re e tly  revealed h is  Radical 
Republican p ro c l iv it ie s ,  a lien a tin g  several southern Congressmen. Thus, 
when th e  measure went back to  the  House fo r  considera tion .o f th e  S enate 's  
amendments i t  fa ile d , and Republicans hopes fo r  e s tab lish in g  a new s ta te  
government were thwarted.
The p a rty  also  oaçerienced a su b s ta n tia l lo ss  with th e  death o f
^ e é k l v  New Mexican. Ju ly  29, 1873, p. 1, August 19, 1873, p . 1 
and September 23, 1873, PP» 1^2; Tha Daily  New Maâloan. August 4, 1873, P»
1, August 16, I 873, p . 2, September 4, I 873, p« 1, September 15, 1873, p . 1 
and S^tem ber I 9 , 1873, p . 1; Lambert: Stephen Renton m iH ns. p . 39.
^Weekly New Mexican. June 8 , 1875, p. 1 and October 5, 1875, p. 1; 
M esilla News. September 18, 1875, p . 2; The M esilla News. October 9, 1875,
P* 1; Wedtly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31, 1884, p.
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Governor Giddings in  June, 1875* He was the  only Republican Governor 
before Miguel A. Otero H  tâio had a sa lu ta ry  e ffe c t upon i t ,  and h is  
absence was espec ia lly  f e l t  because h is  successor contributed p ra c tic a lly  
nothing. Indeed, Samuel B. A xtell (1875-78) proved every b i t  as unpopular 
as Connelly and 1-S.tcheLl. P art o f h is  d isfavor resu lted  from having been 
a Democrat and from having befriended the  Mormons v h ile  serving as Governor 
o f Utah. Moreover, he had th e  m isfortune o f  a rriv ing  a t  about th e  time
o f th e  outbreak o f the  Lincoln County War, and h is  adm inistration turned
28in to  an epoch o f  fraud, corruption and p o l i t ic a l  discord.
These setbacks notw ithstanding, th e  p arty  came in to  i t s  own by 
1875» Never again would i t s  very existence be threatened. T hereafter the  
major problem confronting Republican leaders was not th e  party* s su rv ival, 
bu t vdio would lead  i t  now th a t  i t  had become entrenched. This was the  
main theme in  th e  next chapter o f t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican a f f a i r s .  During 
th e  succeeding two decades numerous fac tio n a l leaders emerged, each o f 
idiom envisaged him self as m aster o f a l l  the  r e s t .  To determine idio would 
p rev a il they fought through a se rie s  o f  engagements u n t i l  a v ic to r  emerged, 
capable o f drawing the  p arty  together under one au tho rity . That v ic to r  
was Thomas Benton Catron, and th e  au tho rity  tdiich enforced h is  leadership  
was h is  Santa Fe Ring.
^ The Daily New M pioan. June 4, 1875, P« 1; Horn: New Mexico's 
Troubled Years, pp. 173-74.
CHAPTER IV
THE SANTA FE KENG AND THOMAS CATRON. 1873-96
187^  th e  Democratic Convention made denunciation of and 
charges against "the  ring" as a plank in  t h e i r  platform , and a 
la rg e  portion  of the  address o f th e  Democratic Central Committee 
was devoted to  the  same ob jec t. During th a t  campaign . . .  
a l l  manner o f charges were made against th a t  mysterious 
organization. 1
l ik e  th e  word patron , th e  term Santa Fe Ring has been used in  
many ways. One contemporary th o u ^ t  i t  a combination o f most l a t e  nine- 
teenth-century  New Mexican Republican lead ers . Another viewed i t  as an 
in sid ious "ring of fe a r . S t i l l  another claimed i t  d id  no t e x is t a t  a l l , ^  
and recen tly  W. E. Hutdhinson described i t  as a mabhine which, “under the  
overlordship o f  Thomas Benton Catron," seized contro l o f the  lAaole t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  Republican party . ̂
I ro n ic a lly , each o f these  would have described th e  King accurately  
a t  one time o r another during th e  period  p resen tly  considered, and i t  has 
been described appropriately  in  a dozen o ther ways o r more. But th e
^Weakly New Mexican. September l4 , I 878, p. 1.
U n id e n tif ie d  no te, Catron Papers, U niversity  o f New Mexico 
lib ra ry , box lab e lle d  P o l i t ic a l  Campaigns—New Mexico—I878- I 906.
^Weekly New Mexican. October 25, 1880, p. 1.
^Santa Fe New Mexican Review. October 7, 1884, p . 4.
^A BaruCross Man: The l i f e  and Personal W ritings o f  Eugene Manlove 
Rhodes (Norman: U niversity  o f  Oklahoma Press; 1956), p. 30.
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d e fin itio n  ^àiich b est sums up i t s  n a tu re  and sign ificance  i s  Hutchinson’ s. 
The Santa Fe Bing vas the  p o l i t i c a l  machine th ro u ^  idiich Catron created  
lo ca l p a rty  organizations in  n o rth -cen tra l New Mexico, seized o thers a f te r  
defeating r iv a l  lead ers , and u ltim a te ly  transfom ed  the  \diole p a rty  in to  
one loose ly  organized but undivided assoc iation .
Confusion on th e  te rm 's  d e fin itio n  re s u lts  mainly from i t s  having 
o rig inated  as a campaign issu e  in  1873, coined to  describe an organization 
■tàiich d id  not y e t e x is t. That year Democratic ch ie fta in s  were hard  pressed 
fo r  campaign issu e s , lliey had to  avoid reference to  th e  p a s t because i t  
nurtured reco llec tio n s  o f th e i r  Copperhead predecessors. Nor could they 
boast o f  success a t  th e  p o lls  because t h e i r  only notable v ic to ry  had been 
in  the  previous congressional race, and even th a t  resu lted  from Republican 
defections. Likewise, th e i r  cu rren t s itu a tio n  afforded no favorable cam­
paign m a te ria l. They now faced an e lec tio n  with in e ffe c tiv e  leadersh ip , 
a pa rty  \diose machineiy was undeveloped beyond th e  Central Committee, and 
a congressional nominee w ith an embarrassing record. In  o th er words, 
th e  Democrats could ssy p ra c t ic a l ly  nothing in  the  way o f  recommending 
th e i r  own organization.
Conversely, i t  w ill  be reca lled  th a t  in  1873 t h ^  faced a Repub­
lic an  p a rty  with sound leadersh ip , a p la tfo m  o f  lo f ty  pz inc lp les and an 
excellen t candidate in  Stephen E lkins. Anithe Republicans made th e  most 
o f  th e i r  advantages.. Having res to red  peace w ithin  th e  ranks, they  focused 
th e i r  a tten tio n  upon Democratic nominee Padre Gallegos, and waged a h igh ly  
e ffec tiv e  "anear campaign" against him.
Under these circumstances, about a l l  th e  Democrats could do was 
answer in  kind. Even th is  was no t e a ^  because th e re  was no Ind iv idual
6l
Republican vulnerable to  r id ic u le  and so im portant to  h is  p a rty  as 
Gallegos. E lkins, th e  obvious ta rg e t, had an unimpeachable record and a 
su b s ta n tia l personal follow ing. Republican Chaixman MLlliam Breeden's 
record also  was clean. So Democratic leaders apparently chose th e  next 
best avenue o f a ttack . Several im portant Republicans resided in  Santa 
Fe. As a group giQy d id  not compare to  Gallegos fo r  having v io la ted  
so c ia l norms, bu t a t le a s t  thoy lacked the  ind iv idua l popu larity  possessed 
by Elkins and Breeden. Vlhy not simply c rea te  a scandal about thorn?
Under th e  slogan o f  "Down with th e  Ring" Democratic leaders made 
incred ib le  a lleg a tio n s against these  Santa ^e Republicans, accusing them 
not only o f in s tig a tin g  fou l p lay  in  p o l i t ic s ,  bu t likew ise o f fo ste rin g  
a l l  o tker m isfortunes th a t  b e fa ll  soc ie ty . According to  Republican Hew 
Ifexican ed ito rs , so -ca lled  Ring leaders were charged by th e  Democrats with 
d raftin g  care less b i l l s  fo r  th e  le g is la tu re  and causing a decline in  wool 
p rice s . They presumably introduced d isease  in to  c a t t le  herds and b ro u ^ t  
about crop fa i lu re s . The Santa Fe Ring, as portrayed a t  th a t  time by 
Democratic propagandists, was a kind o f  d iab o lica l c rea tu re  th a t  engulfed 
and destroyed everything and everyone th a t  passed i t s  way.^
Having thus s e t  up th e i r  ta rg e t .  Democratic p a rty  o f f ic ia ls  and 
newspaper e d ito rs  continued attacking  i t  in  subsequent campaigns. Since 
a t  f i r s t  th ere  was no such Republican combination, they  could not sing le  
out i t s  leaders and bring sp ec ific  charges against them. This made the  
Ring a l l  th e  more e ffec tiv e  as a campaign issu e , however, because Repub­
lic an s  had l i t t l e  defense o th er than d en ia ls  o f  i t s  e:dLstence. Breeden,
^ e r f d y  New Mexican. September 14, 1878, p. 1 and October 11,
1880, p. 1.
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fo r example, claimed, to  be oinaware o f i t s  operation, o ffering  to  destroy 
i t  i f  th e  Democrats -would id m ti fy  i t s  lead ers . Mew Mexican ed ito rs  
aidcwardly brushed i t  aside as a rid icu lous fab rica tio n . ?
N evertheless, th e  idea  continued to  grow. Once the  seeds o f 
doubt had been p lanted , no amount o f den ial could idiisk away suspicions 
•that something was afoot in  Santa Fe. So a f te r  a time th e  Republicans 
were forced to  change th e i r  t a c t ic s .  Knowing th a t  -they could not erase 
the  stigma o f  -the "ethereal Ring," "they also begin rea liz in g  th a t  c ritic ism  
inadverten tly  had brought much favorable p u b lic ity . For as th e  Ring had 
been accused o f  pe rp e tra tin g  every crime committed in  the  t e r r i to iy ,  so 
had i t  been characterized  as a machine o f  over^adowing potency -viiidi 
could be c red ited  wi-th fo ste rin g  a l l  the  good fortune th a t  came to  New
Mexicans. Consequently, Republican edi-tors jo ined  th e i r  Democratic
8ad v ersa ries . in  -writing about i t  as though i t  re a lly  ex isted .
Dy -the ea rly  1880 ' s most New Mexicans believed -the Santa Fe 
Ring -to be an awesome force operating in  -the Republican party . JO.though 
there  was l i t t l e  tru-th to  th e  charges and claims th a t  convinced than, 
th a t p reco n c^ tio n  became h i ^ l y  s ig n if ic a n t. Because Republican leaders 
in  Santa Fe meamdiile had developed a . re a l  p a rtisa n  combination which 
f e l l  h e ir  to  th e  la b e l and p ro fite d  from a l l  th e  p u b lic ity .^  I t  would 
be more than a decade before th is  combination would become the  p reva iling
7th a nfliiy  New Mexican. October 23, IB76 , p . 1 and October 7,
1880, p . 2; Weeldv New Mexiean. November 7» I 876, p . 1, November 14, I 876, 
p. 1 and October 11, 1880, p . 1.
^Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal, January 22, 
IS85 , p . 1: Santa Fe New Mexioan Review. October 7 . 1884. p. 4 and i ^ r i l  
27, 1885, P« 2.
9otero: %- l i f e  on -the F ro n tie r 1882-1897, p . 84.
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and xinifÿing force in  th e  p arty . Occasionally i t  appeared to  be more 
powerful than i t  was because Republicans from r iv a l  fac tions cooperated 
with i t  from time to  time.^® But the  Santa Fe Ring as i t  ac tu a lly  emerged 
and gave substance to  th e  teim  was only one segment o f the  p a rty , 
operating ch ie fly  in  the  no rth -cen tra l counties.
Exactly what sp ec ific  year i t  came in to  existence i s  no t c lea r. 
However, th e  premise th a t  “Catron was th e  ’Ring* and th e  ’Ring' was Catron”^  
would make i t  reasonable to  conclude th a t  i t  dated roughly from between 
IS75 and 1880. That an e ffe c tiv e  Ring did not develop fo r  severa l years 
a f te r  the  Democrats coined the  te rn  seems ce rta in , fo r  during approximately 
a decade a f te r  h is  a r r iv a l in  1866 Catron put most o f  h is  energy in to  
building h is  le g a l p rac tice  and personal fortune. He was well-known 
across the  te r r i to r y  fo r  h is  serv ice  as Attorney General in  th e  l a t e  l8 6 0 's  
and fo r  h is  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  th e  f i r s t  R ^ b l ic a n  c e n tra l organization.
But he did not p lay  a la rg e  ro le  in  the  tu rbu len t p o l i t ic s  o f  the  early
1870' s .  Nor d id  he become a  lead er o f s ingu lar importance ou tside  o f
"12
Santa Fe County u n t i l  the  l a t t e r  p a rt o f  the  decade.
As fo r  i t s  membership, th e  Ring included as many minor p o lit ic ia n s
^®An u n id en tified  author waswte in  1884 th a t  up to  th a t  time Thomas 
Catron, Stephen Si.kins, Governor Lionel A, Sheldon, Govenior AxteU, 
ifilllam  Breeden, Mariano S. Otero, Colonel MUliam 1. %merson and several 
o ther leading Republicans had been members o f  th e  Santa Fe Bing. Catron 
Papers, box l a b ^ e d  P o li t ic a l  Campaigns—New Mexico—I878- I 906. In  the  
following pages i t  w ill  be seen th a t  severa l o f these  men fought each 
o ther as b i t t e r ly  a s tiey  fought th e  Democrats, however, and seldom 
cooperated su ff ic ie n tly  to  fozm a s tab le  p a rtisan  combination.
^T he  M esilla  News. November I 6 , 1878, p. 2.
^^Santa Fe Daily New Mexican. July  30, 1882, p . 2; Veeklv New 
Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. August 14, 1884, p. 3* Tw itcheli:
The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory. H ,  p. 520.
64
as Catron could con tro l a t  a given tim e. Some were fav o rite s  lâio took 
over p rec in c t and county organizations as thoy were created in  the  early  
1880's . Some were Ju s tic es  o f the Peace and County Clerks. Others 
represented various counties in  the t e r r i t o r i a l  le g is la tu re , and occasionally  
Ring henduaen acquired p o sitio n s in  a governor's cabinet o r the  t e r r i t o r i a l  
Supreme Court.
Catron ru led  a l l  o f these  o f f ic ia ls  with a heayy hand, using 
numerous means o f holding them under h is  sway. T hrou^ Ring members 
occupying o ffice s  of Ju s tic e  o f the  Peace he applied economic p ressure .
In th e i r  hands rested  th e  power to  acknowledge deeds and mortgages, and 
thereby to  govern property  ad jud ication . Catron always con tro lled  a 
ce rta in  amount o f patronage with h is  influence in  th e  le g is la tu re  and 
through numerous cohorts holding l o c a l  o f f i c e s .  ̂ 3 He in tim idated h is  
henchmen with th re a ts  of personal ru in .^ ^
New Mexican. October 7, 1880, p. 2; Weekly New Mexican. 
September 7, 1878, p . 2 and October 25, 1880, p. 2; Weekly New Iferiean 
Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. August 14, 1884, p. 3; Weekly New Mexican 
Review. November 15, 1888, p . 2; Santa Fe New Mexican Review. J ^ rH  27,
1885, p. 2; Santa Fe New Memican. September 22, 1902, p. 2 and November 4, 
1903* p. 2; The C hieftato  I Socorro h  October 26, 1894, p. 2; Otero: My 
l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r 188^1897. pp. 4, 84, 229, An exemplary Ring po lice­
man was h is to r ia n  L. Bradford Prince 160, i& ile  sezrving as O iief Ju s tic e  
o f the  Supreme Court (1879-82), con tro lled  the  d is tr ib u tio n  o f lo c a l 
o ffices  in  San Miguel County where he presided.
^^An exan^le i s  seen in  a l e t t e r  from Thomas Catron to  Pedro 
Sanches o f Taos: "I have asked you to  put up $150.00 in  m on^. .  • . 1
e ^ e c t  you to  spend amongst your ind iv idua l frien d s something besides the  
$150. 00, as you should do. I t  i s  your duty to  see th a t  th e  Republican 
p arty  succeeds in  Taos County. . . .  You say you w il l  no t be responsible 
fo r  the re s u l t .  . . .  I  hope fo r  your own sake, and your own repu ta tion , 
you w ill see th a t  the  county i s  won by th e  Republicans. . . .  /What I ,  and 
th e  Republican p arty  aske o f you i s ,  th a t  you do everything fo r  th e  t ic k e t ,  
and th a t you spend not only money, bu t also  cam eros T&ere you can make them 
o f use. I  only have the  in te r e s t  o f th e  party  a t  h e a r t , ih d le  wi% you, 
your repu ta tion , as w ell as th e  p a rty , i s  a t  s tak e ."  Catron Papers,
October 27, 1888, Personal Correspondence, H ,  p. 33.
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i£n the  sa and o ther vays he shaped th e  Bing and expanded i t s  opera­
tio n s , gradually  constructing  a machine ■whibh couLd l iv e  up to  i t s  name. 
Indeed, by the  ea rly  I8$p ' s i t  became most o f the  th ings i t  o r ig in a lly  was 
cred ited  with being. To numerous su p e rs titio u s  New Mexicans i t  became a 
kind of omnipresent force to  be obeyed and never challenged. To Bing 
members i t  was a sure means o f acquiring a fortune and p o l i t i c a l  recog­
n itio n . To Democrats i t  became a formidable foe, and to  i t s  own p a r ty 's  
fa i th fu l  i t  became the  predominant fo rce .
Building such an organization did  not come e a s ily , o f course. 
Numerous patrones and Aiglo r iv a ls  were as determined to  con tro l the  p arty  
as Catron. Had he possessed a capacity  to  appease comparable to  h is  a b i l i ty  
to  in tim id a te , he could have risen  to  power more rap id ly  than he d id . Of 
a l l  th e  r iv a l  fac tio n s in  th e  p a rty , h is  was the  b e s t organized and th e  
most thoroughly d isc ip lin ed . But th e  same personal c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th a t  
made him m aster o f ^ e  Bing also made him anathema to  o th er important 
leaders . Always jea lous o f anyone whose power approached h is  own, he 
fought with each E i^ b lic a n  governor frmn Lew Wallace (1878-81) to  MLguel
A. Otero I I  (1897-1906). He antagonized Bepublicans serving w ith him in  
the  le g is la tu re  with h is  arrogant in s is te n c e  upon dwninating le g is la t io n  
and patronage. He was constan tly  a t  odds with o ther p a rty  c h ie f ta in s  
fo r  a lleged ly  bu lly ing , ly in g , and cheating and s te a lin g  from them whenever 
i t  served h is  own purposes.
^^rfeekly New Mexican Review. October 25, 1894, p . 2 and November 
29, 1894, p . 2. '
^^Examples o f diarges b r o u ^ t  against Catron by Eepublioan and 
Democratic adversaries are  found in  th e  Weekly New Mexican Review. June 
28, 1894, p . 1 , October 18, 1894, p . 1, October 25, 1894, p . 2 and
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As a r e s u l t ,  several lin g s ex isted  in  th e  p arty  u n t i l  1892. Ex­
cept during President Cleveland’s f i r s t  adm inistration th ere  was always 
a r iv a l  Republican Governor’ s Ring, made up of federa l appointees and 
th e i r  friends.^^  There also were several powerful regional fac tio n s vhose 
leaders dared to  defy C atron's pretensions. Most notably, th e re  were 
rings headed by Colonel J .  Francisco Chavez in  western New Mexico, T:̂
W iliam  Rynerson in  th e  southern p a r t  o f the  te r r i to ry ,  and by Joseph
1.8Workman Dwyer in  th e  northeastern  counties. Only a f te r  Catron had de­
feated  the  leaders o f a l l  these  o th er rings and reduced th e i r  influence 
ly  drawing some o f th e i r  follow ers in to  h is  own machine, was he able to  
expand operations outside o f n o rth -cen tra l New Mexico on a scale  su f f i­
c ien t to  claim leadersh ip  over th e  idiole Republican organization. As
November 29, 1894, p. 2; Santa Fe Wew Mexican. October 25, 1882,
p . 2; Santa Fe New Mexicai. S^tem ber 22, 1902, p . 2, September 29, 1902, 
p . 2 and November 5» 1904, p. 2; Otero: My l i f e  on th e  F ron tie r. 1864-1882. 
pp. 142-43, 238; Dargan: "New Mexico’s F ight fo r  Statehood 1893-1912,"
New Mgsico H is to riea l Review. XIV (January, 1939), PP» 19-23*
^7\feeikly New Mexican. May 10, 1880, p . 2; Santa Fe New Itoriean 
Review. August 27, 1884, p . 2; Otero: Msr l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r 18È2-1897.
p . 242.
^^The reader i s  already fam ilia r  with Colonel J . Francisco Chavez, 
leading patron from Valencia County. William %nerson o f Las Cruces, an 
inqx)rtant cattleman and frien d  o f Catron since th e  1860’s , was th e  man \dio 
emerged to  represent th e  southern counties in  t e r r i t o r i a l  a f fa i r s  during 
th e  early  1880’s . BoUi he and Joseph Dwyer gained popu larity  fo r  t h e i r  
e ffo r ts  in  organizing c a t t le  growers during th e  early  1880’s . The l a t t e r  
came to  Colfax County from Ohio in  18?4, engaged in  ra is in g  c a t t le ,  ^ e ^  
and horses, and was instrum ental in  Republican operations in  th e
northeastern  counties as stod&*growers moved in  during th e  l a t e  1370’ s and 
early  1880’s . He apparently never con tro lled  a la rg e , e ffe c tiv e  p a rtisan  
machine, as d id  Catron, Chavez and % nerson, fo r  th e  population in  h is  
region was sparse during th e  n ineteenth  century* But u n t i l  th e  appearance 
o f Ifi.guel A* Otero I I  in  th e  in n er c ir c le  during th e  1890’s , Dwyer was con­
sidered th e  leading Republican no rtheast o f  Santa Fe* Santa Fe New MeaÜeai 
Review. March 4, 1884, p . 2 and March 7» 1884, p . 2; Santa Fe Daily New 
Mexioan. August 3, 1886, p . 2 and September 6, 1886, p . 1.
67
long as these o thers competed in  high p arty  councils, t h ^  could combine 
to  prevent him from having h is  way. Whenever they fought the  Ring, the  
p a rty ’s p o l i t ic s  became a se rie s  o f c o n flic ts  # id h  k ^ t  i t  in  a s ta te  o f 
upheaval and Democrats in  public  o ff ic e .
Numerous minor strugg les went on during th e  period , but i t  was 
la rg e ly  through two major ones th a t  Catron rose to  power. The f i r #  
spanned a t  le a s t  four years, dom inating in  1884 in  a b i t t e r  f i ^ t  between 
Catron and th e  Santa Fe Ring on the  one hand and ColoneL-Ghavez and
W iliam  Rynerson on th e  o ther. Since i t  occurred KÂLen th e  Ring was s t i l l
new and confined to  a small region, Catron d id  not have th e  power to  se ize  
contro l o f  th e  ^ o l e  Republican oiganizaticm  idien i t  ended. But i t  was 
nevertheless an important m ilepost in  h is  r i s e  to  power, fo r  i t s  elim inated 
one o f th e  leading con testan ts fo r  p a rty  co n tro i—J . Francisco Chavez.
Faint signs o f  troub le  portending danger fo r  th e  advantageous 
position  Colonel Chavez had held in  th e  p a rty  f i r s t  appeared in  th e  decline  
o f Republican m a jo ritie s  during th e  l a t e  1870’s . While in  I 876 Republican 
congressional nominee Trinidad Romero defeated Pedro Valdez by 2,000 
votes. Republican Mariano S. Otero won over Benito Baca by only 6OO two 
years l a t e r .  Otero and Baca were cousins by m arriage, so many voted in  
the  l a t t e r  e lec tion  according to  ih idh  manber o f  th e  same family o f 
patrones they p refe rred . Yet, some contemporaries saw in  th is  d o s e  race
a h in t o f  tension  and a th re a t  o f  reb e llio n  w ithin th e  ranks.
^^The D a i^  New Mexican. December 5» I 876, p . 1; Weekly New Mexican, 
^ te m b e r  12, 1876* p. 1 , November 16, I 878, p . 2 and December 7, 1878,
P« 2; Weekly New Mèocican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  31» 1884, 
p. 4; Otero: Mr l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r. 186^1882. p . 60. According to  
retu rns Romero’s m ajority  was 2,000 in  187,6* Some observers th o u ^ t  i t  
more l ik e  600, however, because of corruption in  Valencia County. But
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In  1880 the  signs became more c le a r . That year, thcm ^ the  Re­
publicans ran Tranquilino Luna, a powerful patron and frien d  o f  Chavez 
from Valencia County, thqy defeated Democratic veteran M guel A. O teroII 
only by corrupting th e  b a llo t  box wholesale. According to  Miguel A.
Otero U ,  son o f  Miguel A. Otero I ,  Chavez created a idiole new Republican 
p rec inct out o f  a small s h e ^  camp in  Valencia County, from which he 
produced nearly  1,000 votes fo r  Luna. He also  banished Democrats from th e  
p o lls  in  p a r ts  o f  western New Mexico and a lleged ly  delivered  another 
thousand votes from s ix  ra ilro a d  woricers, 160m he paid to  vote a l l  day. 
Corruption had appeared in  Valencia County during nearly  every e lec tion , 
so i t s  mere existence was no t remarkable. But th e  degree to  th ich  i t  
occurred in  1880 ind ica ted  th e  n ecessity  to  compensate fo r  a breakdown in  
party  d isc ip lin e . Republican e d ito rs  expressed concern th a t  something was
2ftgoing wrong.
The tro u b le , i t  seems, was th a t  Thomas Catron had b u i l t  up h is  
machine s u ff ic ie n tly  to  begin challenging ex is tin g  leadersh ip . Heretofore 
the  Bing had been in  the  form ative stage, dwarfed beside Chavez* t r a d i ­
tion-based empire west o f  Albuquerque. But now Catron f e l t  strong enou^  
to  withhold s u ff ic ie n t Republican support in  n o rth -cen tra l New Mexico from 
Chavez' fav o rite s  to  reveal inadequacy in  th e  o ld  C olonel's leadersh ip  
and to  d isp lay  th e  growing influence o f  th e  Santa Fe Ring.
C atron 's plan allowed no consideration fo r  th e  cu rren t success
even assuming th e  l a t t e r  was co rrec t, i f  Chavez corrupted th e  p o lls  in  
IS76, he doubtless d id  so in  IB78 too . Thus, in  e ith e r  case. Republican 
m ajo rities  were on th e  decline .
W e e k ly  New Mexiean. May 24, i860, p . 1 and Novmber 22, 1880, 
p. 3; Weekly New Méxiean Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. July  31, 1884, 
p. 4; Otero: My L ife  on th e  F ro n tie r . 1864-1882. pp. 27O-72.
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o f the  party  as a tdiole. I f  i t  wozted the  Democrats would obviously win 
th e  o ffice  o f Delegate. But th a t  th is  was nevertheless th e  course he 
was taking became obvious >àien Tranquilino Luna sought ree lec tio n  in  
1882, K .rs t, Ring henchman L. Bradford P r in c e ^  le d  a reb e llio n  a t  the  
nominating convention th a t  year. Then during the  campaign defections 
occurred in  Colfax, Taos, Rio A niba, San Miguel, Socorro and B ernalillo  
Counties—a l l  around Santa Fe. 'When th e  re tu rn s  came in , every county in  
n o rth -cen tra l New Mexico except Santa Fe gave a m ajority  to  Democratic 
nominee Francisco A. Manaanares and in  Santa Fe County Luna won by only a 
few votes.
Being fu l ly  cognizant o f th e  s itu a tio n  on the  upper Rio Grande 
p r io r  to  the e lec tio n  o f 1882, Colonel Chavez had strengthened h is  e f fo r ts  
to  compensate. He again bought and created  vo tes u n t i l  he had enou^  to  
assure Luna's e le c tio n . But t h i s  time so many vo tes were needed th a t  h is  
b e s t e f fo r ts  were o f  no a v a il. Valencia County reported a Republican 
m ajority  o f more than 4,000, though th e re  were le s s  than 2,000 e lig ib le  
v o te rs . Also, in  B ern a lillo  County th e  Republican m ajo rity  f a r  exceeded 
th e  sum o f e lig ib le  v o ters . Evidence o f  corruption was so iree fh ta b le  
th a t  ’tiien Manzanares contested th e  e lec tion  in  1883, Congress had to  give
^^L. Bradford Prince was one o f th e  most im portant figu res in  New 
Mexican t e r r i t o r i a l  h is to ry . His p o l i t i c a l  caree r began in  New York, 
idiere he associated  with Boscoe Oonkling. He was o ffered  the  governorship 
o f  the  T errito ry  o f  Idaho by P resident Rutherford B. Hayes but declined 
and Instead  accepted appointment as Chief Ju s tic e  fo r  New Mexico in  1879» 
A fter serving on th e  bench fo r  th ree  years he became a prominent lawyer. 
P resident o f th e  H is to rica l Society o f  New Mexico (an o ff ic e  he he ld  from 
3B83 to  1923)» Governor o f th e  t e r r i to r y  in  1889» a lead er in  th e  Republi­
can party  and was known fo r  h i s  compilations o f  New Mexican law, as w ell as 
numerous h is to r ic a l  p ub lica tions. Mary E lizabeth Sluga: "The P o l i t ic a l
l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron 1896-1921" (Master* s Thesis, U niversity  o f  
New Mexico; 19^1), p . 8; Anonymous: "Hon. L. Bradford P rince."  El P alaeio . 
XV (October 1, I 923) , p . I I 3.
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him the sea t.
Thus in  1882 Catron's stra tegy  fu lly  m ateria lized  and forced 
Colonel Oiavez in to  the  open fo r  a l l  to  see him as he re a lly  was. Pre­
viously, as long as he delivered m ajo ritie s  without d isgracing the  whole 
organization, most Republicans closed th e i r  ^ e s  and l e t  him have h is  way 
in  order to  win. Now, as Catron apparently had hoped, leaders over the 
te r r ito x y  tuxned against th e  old Colonel to  save face. The Central Com̂  
m ittee , the  R ^ublican  m ajority  in  the  le g is la tu re , and the  ed ito rs  of the
New Mexican a l l  issued  public  statements apparently designed to  read him
22
out of th e  p a rty .
Had th e re  been a nominating convention a t  th a t  poin t idierein
y
Catron and Oiavez could have matched streng th , i t  appears Catron could 
have won e a s ily  and congratulated him self on forcing th e  demise o f a 
p rin c ip a l adversaxy without breaking up th e  party . U nfortunately, con^ 
vention time was more than a year away, and consequently the  p a rty  would 
su ffe r a serious upheaval. For Ghavez meamâiile had tim e to  recoup h is  
forces fo r  a f in a l  stand in  defense of h is  position  in  p a rty  inner c irc le s . 
Furthermore, Catron made e rro rs idiich aided in  Chavez* recovery.
Anong o ther th ings , he quarreled with Chavez over numerous issu es 
of general concern in  the  in terim  and unquestionably forced many Republicans 
back in to  the  Colonel's camp. For example, the two men led  opposing groups 
in  a b a t t le  between r iv a l  Republican claim ants fo r  sea ts  in  the  t e r r i t o r i a l
^^Santa Fa na^iy New Mexioan. October 25, 1882, p . 2, October 27, 
1882, p . 2, November 1, 1882, p. 2, November 22, 1882, p . 2, November 29,
1882, p . 2 and December 2, 1882, p . 3; Santa Fe New Mexican Review. March
6, 1884", p . 2 and March 1884, p. 2;. Weeld.y N«w Mexlean Review and Live 
^ e k  Journal. July 31# 1%4, p. 4; (Joan: A H istory o f New Mexico, I ,  p.
422; O tero: My L ife on th e  F rcn tie r . 1864.1882. p . 273 and My l i f e  on
the  F ro n tie r 1882-1897. pp. 232- 33.
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le g is la tu re . Thoy became p rin c ip a l leaders in  a s tragg le  over A e th e r  to  
bu ild  a new c a p ito l in  Santa Fe o r Albuquerque. And th (^  backed d lffe i^
ent party  fav o rite s  idxan leaders assembled in  May, 1884, to  se le c t a dele-
23gation fo r  th e  Republican National Convention.
Also, C atron 's indecision  on idiom to  support as congressional 
nominee in  1884 provided Chavez a strong a lly . Early in  th e  year, idaen 
the  renomination o f Democratic Delegate Manzanares seemed c e r ta in , Catrcaa 
had so lic ite d  th e  candidacy of wealthy natron and former Delegate Mariano 
S. Otero to  get f in an c ia l backing fo r  lo c a l Ring candidates. Running 
Otero on th e  Republican t ic k e t  meant sa c r if ic in g  the  congressional race 
to  the  Democrats, since Manzanares was by fa r  th e  more popular of th e  two. 
But Catron was w illing  to  make th e  s a c r if ic e  to  get O tero 's money because 
Manzanares had shown no in c lin a tio n  to  f i ^ t  th e  Santa Fe Ring during h is  
f i r s t  term. He d id  not attenqpt to  undermine th e  R ing's control in  the  
le g is la tu re , nor d id  he oppose C atron's crusade to  k e ^  the  cap ito l in  
Santa Fe.
P rio r to  convention time Manzanares declined to  ran and i t  appeared 
th a t  Antonio Joseph, an open opponent o f th e  Ring, would receive the  Demo­
c ra tic  nomination. As a consequence, Catron had to  change course and find  
a Republican candidate idio could win. For a tim e he considered supporting 
% Diam Rynerson o f Las Cruces. This would have been id e a l, fo r  i t  would 
have combined two strong regional fac tio n s . But fo r  some unknown reason— 
perhaps th a t  %nerson was from th e  wrong p a rt  o f New Mexico—Catron changed
^^Santa Fe New Mexican Review. March 6 , 1884, p. 2, May 19» 1884, 
p. 2, August 28, 1884, p. 2 and August 29, 1884, p . 2; Santa Fe VeelcLy New 
Mexican and l iv e  Stock Journal, j ^ r l l  29, 1886, p. 4; Otero> My l i f e  on 
the  F ro n tie r 1682-1897. pp. 23^40 .
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h is  mind again and leaned toward Ring supporter L. Bradford Prince. ^
This indecision  was im portant. For làiat i t  did was f i r s t  In sp ire  
%merson to  seek the  nomination and lead  him to  be lieve  he would get i t .
But then, a f te r  build ing up h is  hopes, i t  l e f t  him em bittered, with no 
support outside  h is  own fac tio n . His embitterment in  tu rn  accounted fo r  
i&at happened a t  th e  next nominating convention. Bynerson, h ith e r to  
having befriended th e  Ring, suddenly changed sides idien he found C atronites 
and Chavezites f ig h tin g  each o th er a t  th e  opening session. % th  l i t t l e  
h e s ita tio n  he agreed to  head an Ind^enden t Republican t ic k e t  composed o f 
Chavezites, walked out o f -Uxe convention h a l l ,  and took with him delegations 
from Colfax, B e rn a lillo , Valencia and a l l  o f  th e  southern counties.
Thus, much because o f C atron 's own blunders, h is  s trugg le  with 
Chavez grew in to  a Republican upheaval. When Ghavez and Rynerson bo lted  
they broke th e  p a rty  roughly along th e  same geographic l in e  th a t  divided 
i t  back in  1871. l ik e  th ir te e n  years e a r l ie r ,  th e re  once again were two 
Republican nominees. Prince, representing northern counties, ran with 
the  support o f the  Regular Republican Central Committee, th e  Santa Fe 
Ring and the  New Mexican. I^nerson, from th e  South, headed th e  Independebt 
t ic k e t  backed by the  Albuouerque Journal and Chavez, now Chairman o f  a 
r iv a l  c en tra l committee.
C erta in ly  n e ith e r  side  hoped to  win the  e lec tio n , fo r  under the
^4Note by J . Sloan, 1884, Catron Papers, box lab e lle d  P o l i t ic a l  
Campaigns—New Mexico—I 878- I 906 and Catron to  E lkins, January 13, 1901, 
Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XVm, p. 431.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican Review. A pril 19, 1884, p . 2, August 13,
1884, p . 2, August 27, 1884, p . 2, September 1, 1884, p. 2, September 2, 
1884, p . 4, September 8 , 1884, p . 2 and September I 9 , 1884, p . 2; The 
Weekly New Mexican Review and l iv e  Stock Journal. August 26, 1884, p. 2 
and September 4, 1884, p. 2; Otero: Msr l i f e  on the  F ro n tie r  1882-1897. 
p. 242.
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circumstances the  re s u lts  were a foregone conclusion. The two Republican 
candidates divided some 15,000  votes between them, allowing Jlntonio 
J o s ^  to  win a p lu ra l i ty .  What m attered, however, was who would be 
blamed fo r  th e  defea t. On th is  po in t Catron was c le a rly  the  v ic to r .
I t  was Colonel Chavez idiom p a rty  leaders chose to  d iscard  from 
inner c irc le s , because he had disgraced them in  1882 and perpe tra ted  the  
defections th a t  divided th e  p a rty  in  1884. Chaves would continue to  p a r t i ­
c ipate  in  R ^ b l ic a n  a f fa i r s  fo r  approximately two decades, but never 
again would he fig u re  as a major contestan t fo r  predominance over th e  
party  as a vtoole. Thus Catron’s f i r s t  major b id  fo r  power ended in  triumph, 
forced Chavez out o f  contention, and l e f t  only him self and Rynerson as 
important com petitors.
Had th e  p a rty  no t been in  a s ta te  o f chaos, perhaps he and Rynerson 
would have continued the  f ig h t a t  the  next opportunity, fo r  they  had be­
come b i t t e r  enemies. Obviously in  1885 n e ith e r  could gain from such an 
engagement, however, because th e re  were two Republican p a r t ie s , each led  
by i t s  own Central Committee. U n til some conqiremise could be found through 
which a l l  Republicans could reunify , th e re  would be no v ic to ry .
More than a year passed before such a compromise was a ffected . 
N either Catron nor Rynerson suggested a so lu tion  because th e  key issu e  
was whidi o f two c en tra l committees would p rev a il, and fo r  e ith e r  to  have 
yielded would have meant r e t r e a t .  But f in a l ly  "William Breeden offered  
to  re linqu ish  h is  chairmanship in  1886 to  make way fo r  a new, r is in g
The Weekly Hew Mexican Review and l iv e  Stodc Journal. November 
27, 1884, p . 2; T w itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory. I I ,  
pp. 496- 500.
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican Review. December 5» 1884, p . 2.
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figure  idiom he hoped everyone could a c c ^ t .  Jo s^ h  Woitauan Dwyer, leading 
Republican in  th e  northeastem  counties, was untarnished by previous 
fac tio n a l d ispu tes. Having arrived  in  New Mexico as recen tly  as 1874, he 
had spent most o f  h is  time attending to  personal and lo c a l public a f fa ir s .  
His only important involvement outside h is  own region was to  organize the  
f i r s t  Stock Growers Association o f New Mexico during the  early  1880's, 
and in  th a t  endeavor he won respect. Catron d id  no t l ik e  him personally .
But since no one could b en efit from the  current s itu a tio n , Dwyer was
2ftaccepted as Central Committee Chairman and congressional nominee fo r  1886. 
Accordinglÿ the  two p a r tie s  again became un ited .
Now th a t  a reorganized Republican p a rty  ex isted  to  f ig h t over, 
no one showed any in c lin a tio n  to  renew old  q uarre ls . For new problems 
arose forcing Republican leaders in to  a tru ce  idiich would endure fo r  
approximately fiv e  years. One was th e  lo ss  o f  support during the  up­
heaval o f th e  early  1880's, idiicb forced them to  cease figh ting  each o ther 
in  order to  merely hold th e i r  own a t th e  p o lls  against the  Democrats.
Evan by working together in  the  e lec tions o f  1886, 1888 and 1890, they were 
unable to  do more than m aintain contro l o f  both the le g is la tu re  and a 
m ajority  o f  lo c a l o ff ice s . In  the  same e lec tions they  fa ile d  to  unseat 
Delegate Antonio JToseph.
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican Review. February 19» 1884, p. 2 and March 
4, 1884, p . 2; Santa Fe ^«w Ifoxican. June 3» 1886, p . 2, August 3* 
1886, p. 2 and September o, 188o, p. 1; Marion Dargan: "New Mexico's
F i ^ t  fo r  Statehood, 1895-1912," New Mexico H is to rica l Review. XXV ( j ^ r i l ,  
1939), pp# 131-34; Catron to  E lkins, February 9, I8i89, Catron Papers, 
Personal Correspondence, I ,  p. 30.
^^Santa Fe Daily New Mydean. March 22, 1886, p. 2, September 13, 
1886, p. 1 and December 4, 1886, p. 2; Weekly New Mexican Review. May 31, 
1888, p. 2, August 30, 1888, p. 1 , September 13, 1888, p. 2, December 13,
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A second and more compelling cause fo r  th e  tru ce  was Grover 
Cleveland's se lec tion  o f  a t e r r i t o r i a l  governor in  1885» Republicans 
doubtless found ge tting  along with each o ther re la tiv e ly  easy in  comparison 
to  pu tting  up with Ecbm. G. Boss. As Governor he displayed the  same 
uncompromising nature  th a t  he revealed in  th e  impeachment proceedings against 
President Andrew Johnson, but in  the  former instance i t  was no a t t r ib u te .  
IfCLthin a short time o f  h is  inauguration he antagonized a l l  leading Repub- 
l ic a n s . He was so unbending, in  fa c t, th a t  even th e  main leaders o f  h is  
own p a rty  joined the  Republicans to  oppose him. Delegate Joseph, Harvey
B. Fergusson and Democratic Central Committee Chairman Charles H. G ilder- 
sleeve a l l  fought him a t  various tim es during h is  adm inistration.
To stop Ross from seizing contro l o f  le g is la t io n  and patronage. 
Republican leaders cooperated to  an almost unbelievable extent in  th e  
le g is la tu re , appointing Colonel Chavez as m ajority  lead er in  the  Council, 
Albert J . Fountain o f  Las Cruces as head o f  th e  House, and Catron, i t  
appears, as a kind o f  behind-the scenes supervisor. Forming th is  com­
b ination  must have been extremely d i f f ic u l t  because i t  involved bringing 
represen ta tives from each major fac tion  together in to  common cause. Yet 
once i t  was formed i t s  members thought o f  nothing o ther than checking 
Governor Ross a t  every tu rn . He vetoed more than 150 b i l l s ,  but they 
passed most o f these over h is  veto. He submitted l i s t  a f te r  l i s t  o f
1888, p. 1 and October 25, 1894, p. 2; Santa Fe Weekly Mew Mexican and 
liv e  Stock Journal. July  22, 1886, p . 1 and December 97 188é. p. 4; Rio 
Grande Republican. June 22, 1889, p . 2, May 3, I 89O, p. 2, June 21, I 89O, 
p. 1 and November 22, I 89O, p. 2; Otero; My L ife on th e  F ro n tie r 1882- 
1B22» PP» 219, 227; Tw itchell; The Leading Facts o f  New Mexlco_History.
II," pp. 510, 53.4; Dargan; "New Mœdco's Bight fo r  Statehood, 1È95-1912, "
H F (January, 1939), PP* 131-33; Catron to  E lk ins, January 27, 1889, Catron 
Papers, Personal Correspondence, H ,  p. 107; Catron to  E lkins, May 1,
I892, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, V, p. 81.
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re la tiv e s  and frien d s  fo r  t e r r i t o r i a l  appointment, but they re jec ted  them 
in  th e  Council. He attempted to  remove Republican o fficeho lders fo r  
cause, but they  f o u ^ t  him in  the  c o u r t s .^  For four years th e  b a tt le  
went on, keeping a l l  lead ers  o f  various Republican fac tio n s  from each 
o th er’ s th ro a ts .
In ev itab ly , t h i s  a r t i f i c i a l  bond began to  d is in te g ra te  when Ross 
l e f t  o ff ic e  in  1889. As th e  decade drew to  a close o ld  anim osities re­
appeared and Republican lead e rs  grew re s t le s s .  Catron esp ec ia lly  f e l t  he 
had no t received recognition commensurate to  h is  con tribu tion . In  h is  
l e t t e r s  to  Stephen Elkins he complained o f  m istreatm ent, and about a p lo t 
fo ste red  by I» Bradford Prince to  destroy  him p o l i t ic a l ly .  ^
J^ a r t  from h is  unquenchable t h i r s t  fo r  power th e re  a re  a t  le a s t  
two add itiona l explanations fo r  h is  su llen  a tt i tu d e  a t  th a t  tim e. F ir s t ,  
P resident Benjamin Harrison ignored h is  wishes—expressed th ro u ^  S tev en
^ I b i s  wi31 d ire c t  th e  reader to  more than s u f f lc im t  évidence to  
su b stan tia te  assumptions drawn about Edmund G. Ross, one o f  Hew Mexico’ s 
most famous but most con troversia l governors. Santa Fe Dailv New Mexican. 
September 10, 1885* p. 2, November 9, 1885* P» 4, Novœiber 12, 1885, P* 2, 
November 13* 1885* P* 1* November l4 , 1885* pp# 1, 4, November 19* 1885* 
p. 1* November 20* 1885* P# 2, November 23, 1885* P# 4, November 27, 1885,
p. 4, November 30, 1885, P# 2, December 3* 1885* P* 4, December 5, 1885,
p. 2, December 8 , 1885* p. 2, February 4, 1886, p. 2, February 11, 1886, 
p. 2, February 20, 1886, p . 2, March 15, 1886, p . 2, March 23, 1#86, p .
4, December 3* 1886, p . 3 , January 18, 1887* p. 2, February 2, 1887, pp.
3-4, f'ebruaiy 24, 1887, p; 2, February 25, 1887, P# 2, February 26, 1887* 
p. 2, May 31* 1887* p. 2, Ju ly  5* 1887* P# 2; Santa Fe New Mexican Review. 
September 13* 1884, p . 2 and October 25, 1894, p . 2* Santa Fe Weekly New 
Mexican and l iv e  Stock Journal. Ju ly  22, 1886, p . Ï  and December 9, 1886, 
p. 4; Tw itchell; The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H iatorv. H ,  pp. 500-92; 
George Curry: An Auto^ograbby. 1861-1947 (Albuaueroue: U niversity  o f
New Mexico Press; 1958), p; 88.
My U fe  on th e  F ro n tie r 1882-1897. p . 27I ;  Catron to  
E lkins, February 9 , I 889, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, I I ,  p . 
I 3O; Catron to  E lkins, November 18, 1889, Catron Papers, Personal Corres­
pondence, H ,  p . WO; Catron to  E lkins, February 23, 3892, Catron Papers, 
Personal Correspondence, 17, p . 4?4.
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Elkins—by appointing L. Bradford Prince Govemor in  I 889. Vttiile Prince 
had bean a frien d  and re l ia b le  supporter from th e  time o f h is  a rr iv a l ten  
years e a r l ie r ,  making him Govemor was another th in g . In  th a t  capacity  
he had a c lique o f h is  own and became a r i v a l . S e c o n d l y ,  Catron’s 
power and moraine suffered  a blow in  th e  e lec tio n  o f 3J888. That year fo r  
th e  f i r s t  time Demccrats took Santa Fe county away from the  Santa Fe Ring, 
winning every o ff ic e  but th a t  o f  Councilor, which the  Mng lead e r won 
him self.
These and doubtless numerous o th er inc iden ts  in sp ired  Catron to  
break th e  tru ce  liiich  had endured fo r  seven years and launch a second 
major strugg le  fo r  p a rty  con tro l in  I 892. I t  would be in te re s tin g  to  know 
a l l  th a t  tran sp ired  in  th e  way o f  p reparation , but o f such events th e re  
i s  no complete record. I t  can be surmised, however, th a t  carefu l plans 
were made. Though Republican leaders argued over such issu es  as free  
s i lv e r , th e re  was a conspicuous cairn in  in n er p a rty  c irc le s  >hen Catron 
and Govemor Prince under normal circumstances would have quarreled.
Also, idien Catron f in a l iy  decided to  overthrow h is  adversaries and seize  
contro l o f  th e  p a rty , he d id  so in  a se r ie s  o f  ca re fu lly  executed steps.
The f i r s t  o f  these  came a t  the  convention o f  Republican leaders 
in  the  spring o f I 892 to  se le c t a delegation to  a ttend  the  Republican 
National Convention in  HLnneapolis. In  the  course o f  th a t  convention 
Catron managed to  defeat Govemor Prince and overshadow th e  now fa il in g  
but s t i l l  i n f lue n tia l  W iliam  Qynerson. He persuaded Tranquilino Luna o f
^ T w itc h e ll: The Leading Facts o f  Hew Mexico H isto ry . H ,  pp. 502- 
04; Otero: Mr L ife  on th e  F ro n tie r  1882-97. pp, 230-31.
33rw itchell: The Leading Facts o f New Mexico H istory . I I ,  pp. 53.0-
12.
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Valencia County, Rynerson from th e  south and a r is in g  figure  from north­
east exn San I&guel County, Miguel A* Otero IX, to  support him in  naming 
th e  delegation . To prevent an up rising  from th e  Governor, he then sent 
ELpolito V ig il to  kidnap a ^ o l e  delegation o f Prince supporters from 
Taos County and lock them in  a ra ilro a d  car a t  Lamy u n t i l  the  meeting 
ended. Having thus fixed th e  convention, he se t out to  show " ^ o  were the  
rightftCL leaders o f th e  Republican p a rty .
Everything went as planned. P ra c tic a lly  without opposition he 
chose a delegation consisting  of h im self as Chairman, Tranquilino luna, 
Miguel Otero I I  and th ree  le s s e r  Santa Fe Ring members. Then, a f te r  
using I^ynerson to  defeat Prince, Catron replaced him as Republican National 
Committeeman. So as Rynerson and Prince l e f t  th e  convention, n e ith e r  any 
longer possessed enough, p res tig e  to  f ig h t e ffe c tiv e ly  fo r  contro l o f  the 
party . The l a t t e r  went to  Minneapolis, bu t with no o f f ic ia l  capacity, 
he lp less  to  do more than stand ty  and watch Catron proclaim to  represent 
New Mexico.
The second step in  C atron 's scheme came in  h is  winning the  congres­
sional nomination fo r  the  f i r s t  time in  the  f a l l  o f  1892—a kind o f  formal 
announcement th a t  he now con tro lled  the  pa rty . Here again he prepared 
carefu lly . He f i r s t  made sure o f support from the  n a tio n a l Republican 
organization by acquiring a commitment o f  approval and f in an c ia l aid  
from N ational Central Committeeman Richard C. Kerens. Then he te s te d
^^Ptero: My l i f e  on tiie F ro n tie r  1882.97. p . 258.
^^ e e k ly  Mew Mexican Review. October 5, 1893, p. 2; Otero: My l i f e  
on th e  F ro n tie r 1882-97. p p . 258-6l: Catron to  E lkins, March 2, 1892,
Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, V, p. 12; Catron to  E lkins, May 1, 
1892, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, V, p . 81; Catron m i^ t  have 
saved h is  concern fo r  Iv e rs o n , fo r  th e  l a t t e r  died in  1893.
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p o l i t ic a l  channels to  got assurance of probable v ic to ry  before announcing 
h is  in ten tio n  to  run. F ina lly , a t th e  nominating convention he was 
se lec ted  by acclamation. ̂
Then came -üie l a s t  step in  C atron's coup. Almost as an a f te r -  
th o u ^ t  he removed Joseph Dwyer from th e  chaizmanship o f th e  Central 
Committee. Since by custom the  current Republican congressional nominee 
possessed the  p rerogative o f choosing the  Chairman, a l l  he bad to  do was 
c a l l  fo r  D ryer's resignation . In  h is  p lace he appointed a young bu t im­
portan t Ring lie u ten a n t, Ralph Emerson T w itc h e ll .^
Thus, a f te r  approximately two decades o f  consisten t e f fo r t  and 
two major power s trugg les , Catron emerged th e  m aster o f th e  e n tire  Repub­
lican  organization. For a l l  p ra c tic a l purposes he took possession idien 
he won th e  congressional ncanination in  1892, and th e  p a rty  was h is  pezu 
sonal province fo r  th e  succeeding fou r years. As i t s  prime lead e r he was 
never a success. Thou^ he ruled t e r r i t o r i a l  convoitions with an iro n  hand 
and expanded h is  Ring in to  constituencies h ith e r to  dominated Ty Colonel
■W eek ly  News Mexican Review. June 28, 1894, p. 1; Richard C.
Kerens to  Catron, Catrcm Papers, August 16, 1892, Correspondence, Box ZV, 
#8602; Kerens to  Catron, October 31. 1892, Catron Papers, Correspondence,
Box ZVI, #9185: Catron to  E lkins, August 23, 1892, Catron Papers, Personal 
Correspondence, V, p . 302; George W. Gregg to  Catron, August 27, 1892,
Catron Papers, Correspondence, ZV, #8650; D. Martinez to  Catron, August 30, 
1892, Catron Papers, Correspondence, ZV, #6681; Joseph D. Martinez to  
Catron, September 2, 1892, Catron Papers, Correspondence, Box 16, #6715; 
Anthony Gavin to  Catron, October 30, I 892 , Catron Papers, Correspondence,
Box 16, #9161; Note on S e c tio n  re tu rns 1892, Catron Papers, box lab e lle d  
P o li t ic a l  Campaigns—New Mexico—I 878- I 906 ; Catron to  V. S. Hopewell, 
November 27, I 892, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, V, p . 402; Catron 
to  Kerens, November 27, 1892, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, V,
P« 399; Catron to  Kerens, January 3, 1893$ Catron Papers, Personal Cor­
respondence, V, p. 469.
37Rio Grande Republican. October 28, 1892, p. 1; The c h ia fta in  
(Socorro), November 30, 1694, p . 2.
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Chavez, Iv e r s o n , Dwyer and o th ers , he was s t i l l  despised Iqr many leaders 
and rank and f i l e  p a rty  members. This became obvious almost immediately 
vhen he lo s t  th e  congressional e lec tion  o f 1892 to  Jhitonio Josefdi by some 
600 votes, desp ite  h is  l ib e r a l  use o f m on^ and in fluence . He atten^ ted  
to  explain h is  defea t in  terms o f inadequate support from th e  National 
Central Committee and the  acciden ta l a lien a tio n  o f Republicans th ro u ^  
previous contacts in  h is  law p ra c tic e . But th e  re tu rn s revealed th a t  
a lth o u ^  he had defeated leaders in  western and southern New Mexico, i t  d id  
not mean th a t  t h e i r  follow ings would ^ o le h e a r te d ly  support him a t  the  
p o lls .
Two years l a t e r  he appeared to  have gained popu larity  when he 
won back th e  o ff ic e  of Delegate fo r  th e  Republicans by unseating Joseph 
a f te r  th e  l a t t e r  had served f iv e  successive term s. But im portant as th is  
was to  the  p a rty , i t  cannot be considered a personal triumph fo r  Catron.
He obviously won renomination only because o f th e  overwhelming power o f 
the  Santa Fe Ring, and no t because he was generally  acceptable. P rio r to  
the  nominating convention newspapers a l l  over the  t e r r i to r y ,  from Albu­
querque southward, vigorously popularized lo c a l fav o rite s  to  oppose him. 
Even the  younger Otero, supposedly h is  "watch-dog” fo r  northeastern  coun­
t i e s ,  th reatened to  lead  a re v o lt. Only a f te r  considerable c o n flic t did 
th is  opposition break down and make possib le  Catron’s heading the  Repub­
lic a n  t ic k e t  again. ̂
Another in d ica tio n  th a t  Catron ruled th e  p a rty  with sheer force 
was th a t  he won in  1894 through methods not un like  those p rac ticed  a
3^ e e k ly  New Merican Review. June 14, 1894, p . 2, June 21, 1894, 
p. 1 and August 23, 1894, p. 2 ; Otero: Msr l i f e  on th e  F ro n tie r  1882-1897. 
p . 275.
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decade e a r l ie r  by Colonel Chavez. I t  i s  impossible to  a scerta in  how many
votes he bought, but he borrowed heav ily  and depleted h is  own bank account.
F ina lly , perhaps the  most im portant reason he won was a general rebellion
led  ty  Harvey B. Fergusson and A lbert Bacon F a ll against Antonio Joseph
Uûin  the  Democratic party .
That Catron was unacceptable to  many Republicans does not a l t e r  
the  fa c t  th a t  i t  was he more than any o th e r who brought the  p a rty  through 
a second and very important stage o f  development. I t  w ill  be recalled  
th a t  William Breeden had been the  prime figu re  in  the  f i r s t  stage; He 
created a c en tra l organization and kept peace among Republicans u n t i l  the  
party  became ^ rm ly  entrenched. C atron 's sp ec ia l ro le  was to  expand lo c a l 
organization across norths.central New Mexico, then to  o th er regions by 
defeating  o r winning over o ther fac tio n a l lead ers , u n t i l  f in a l ly  by the  
micU1890*s he had made the  Republican p a rty  one association  o f lo c a l organi­
zations with a sing le  po licy  and d irec ted  by one se t o f  henchmen. Rest­
le s s  th o u ^  many Republicans may have been, they nevertheless now belonged 
to  a p a rty  a t  le a s t  loosely  u n ified  and prepared to  command the  vast 
m ajority  o f th e  Æ ectorate  during the  succeeding decade.
As th e  party  thus took th e  shape o f one te rrito ry -w id e  organization 
through C atron 's influence, a l l  i t  needed to  achieve i t s  modem form was 
o f f ic ia l  p a rty  machinery to  replace th e  h ighly  personal Santa Fe Ring
^^Weekly New Mexican Review. June 28, 1894, p. 1 and October 25, 
1894, p. 2; Otero: My Nine Years as Govemor. p . 143.
W e e k ly  New Ifexican Review. September 7, 1893» P* 2; Santa Fe 
Newjfexican. September 29, 1902, p . 2; Las Vegas Daily Ootic. S^tem ber 
25» I894 , p . 2, October 2, 1894, p . 2 and October 25, 1894, p. 2; Rio 
Grande Republican. October 27, 1894, pp. 1 , 3: The flKiaffcajn (Socorro), 
November 23, 1894, p . 2; Curay: An Autobiography, pp. 80-82; Dargan:
"New Mexico's Fight fo r  Statehood, 1895-1912," XVI (January, 1941), pp. 
85-86.
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o f Catron as th e  unifying fo rce . Freeing th e  Republican organization from 
dependence upon Catron, o r any ind iv idual fo r  th a t  m atter, was th e  con­
tr ib u tio n  o f Miguel A. Otero, H .
CHAPTER V
THE CX)VEBNOR»S RING AND NIGUEL A. OTERO H ,  1 8 9 6 - 1 9 0 4
The rev o lt against C atron 's leadersh ip  was climaxed with th e  
appointment o f Ifiiguel A. Otero as govemor o f th e  T e rrito iy  / ü n ^  
a lth o u ^  th i s  d id  not end C ation 's p o l i t ic a l  career • . • h is  
influence was g rea tly  diminished by th e  " l i t t l e  g o verno r.'!
Govemor IBLguel Otero was no t alone responsible fo r  changes in  
the  New Mexican Republican p a rty  around the  tu m  o f the  tw entieth  century. 
To be sure, many fac to rs  influenced developments a t  th a t  tim e, e sp ec ia lly  
the  in flu x  o f partisan-minded Anglos. Ehmmants o f so c io -p o lit ic a l  change, 
such as urbanization and th e  enlargement o f  patronage, a lso  played no 
small ro le . The eclipse  o f  th e  patr6n system g rea tly  enhanced both major 
p a r t ie s . But o f  a l l  the  various in fluences, th a t  exerted by Otero was 
th e  most s ig n if ic a n t. I t  was he tiio took what Thomas Catron l e f t —an 
association  o f lo c a l u n its  held  loosely  together by the  Santa Fe Ring— 
and changed i t  in to  a compact, cen tra lized  organization operated th ro u ^  
regu lar pa rty  channels. Mich because o f  h is  influence th e  p a rty  became 
fo r  the  f i r s t  time a power and an ob jec t o f  lo y a lty  in  i t s e l f .  Indeed, 
most c re d it belongs to  th i s  remarkable " l i t t l e  Governor"—as Catron 
d e ris iv e ly  ca lled  hint—fo r the  emergence o f  a mature, w e ll-d isc ip lined  
Republican organization before statehood.




Before discussing Otero, however, we should re tu rn  to  Catron and 
examine events leading to  h is  downfall. Not only was h is  overthrow an 
important episode in  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican h is to ry , bu t th e  way i t  
happened had bearing upon th e  ease with \diich Otero subsequently seized 
power and d irec ted  Republican a f f a i r s .
That Catron lo s t  con tro l o f  th e  p a rty  w ithin approximately four 
years a f te r  he took i t  over doubtless came as no su rp rise . In  fa c t  many 
New Mexicans wondered uhy he la s te d  so long. Unprincipled in  h is  personal 
l i f e ,  he looked rid icu lous conducting campaigns. Though he had excelled 
as a behind-the-scenes o rganizer and p o l i t i c a l  s t r a te g is t ,  he remained 
u n a ttrac tiv e  as a lead er. Always se lf-cen te red  and unoomprcNnising, he 
fa ile d  to  win re a l  lo y a lty  from o ther reg ional lead ers . His ru th lessness 
in  con tro lling  Ring members caused them to  grow r e s t l e s s . ^ ihe  opposi­
tio n  which Catron brought on him self gave warning th a t  desp ite  th e  power 
o f  the  Santa Fe Ring he could l a s t  a t  th e  head o f  th e  p arty  only u n t i l  
something arose to  overthrow him.
Such an occasion grew out o f  Idie infamous "Borrego a f f a i r .  " 
Catron’s unfortunate re la tio n sh ip  with Francisco Gonzales y  Borrego began 
a f te r  th e  e lec tio n  o f  1890 due to  h is  determ ination to  get Republicans 
back in to  Santa Fe County government. Since Borrego represented the  
unsavory elements o f  society  in  th e  c a p ita l  c ity  i t  seems strange a t  f i r s t  
glance th a t  Catron became involved with him. C atron 's prime purpose a t  
the  time was to  se ize  contro l o f the  whole t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican p a rty  
th ro u ^  the  Santa Fe Ring, and the  acq u isitio n  o f  an unseemly assoc ia te  
could only have placed th a t  purpose in  jeopardy. T et, he. nevertheless
^Otero: My Nine Years as Governor, p . 149.
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risked  scandal fo r  th e  p re s tig e  o f p lacing Republicans in  Santa Fe County 
o ff ic e s .
P o l i t ic a l  a f f a i r s  in  th e  County had fa lle n  in to  th e  hands o f 
two c liques: th e  Democratic "button hole" gang and Hie Republican 
Alliance League. Catron con tro lled  th e  League. Among i t s  o ther leaders 
were Santa Fe Bing member IW-lAi Raerson Twitchell and New Mexican ed ito r 
Max F rost. Hence, the  fortunes o f  the  lo c a l A lliance League, the  p res tig e  
o f Catron and o ther Santa Fe Ring lead e rs , and the  p ro b ab ility  o f  th e  
Ring’s winning contro l o f  the  t e r r i t o r i a l  p a rty  were c lo se ly  in tertw ined. 
Anything e ffec tin g  one had an impact upon th e  o thers.
I t  i s  understandable, H ierefore, i6y  th e  d isrepu tab le  Borrego 
was welcome Hien he walked in to  C atron 's o ff ic e  following th e  e lec tion  
o f 1890. Catron was sulking because Hie A lliance League had lo s t  the  
county S e c tio n  to  the  "button hole" gang fo r  a second tim e, and he now 
saw a chance to  get th e  League back in to  lo c a l govexnment. Borrego had 
ju s t  been e lected  county coroner on th e  Democratic t ic k e t ,  only to  see 
th e  o ffice  reduced in  importance. Consequently he resigned from the  
Democratic pa rty  and esprsssed a d es ire  to  jo in  the  League. Catron quickly 
signed him up and convinced him to  withdraw h is  resignation  so as to  look 
a f te r  the  League's in te r e s ts  a t  county headquarters. But H iile  he was 
changing p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  h is  p o sitio n  already had been f i l l e d ,  Hiereupon 
Borrego sought out h is  successor and k i l le d  him. Thus, he inadverten tly  
involved Catron, the  League, and the  Santa Fe Ring in  murder.
Obviously, C atron 's p re s tig e  suffered , but th e  damage need not 
have been pem anent. Had he immediately repudiated B orrego's actions and 
removed him from Republican r o l ls ,  he might have avoided d isgrace. In  the
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end Borrego went free  fo r  want o f  proof th a t  he committed th e  murder 
in te n tio n a lly , and the  idiole inc iden t was o f f ic ia l ly  dropped. Unfortunately 
Catron continued to  associate  with him, however, u n t i l  a second and even 
worse crime was committed.^
In  th e  spring o f  1892 Francisco Chavez (not to  be confused with 
Colonel J . Francisco Chavez) was shot to  death in  the  s t r e e ts  o f Santa 
Fe. This time th e re  seemed to  be l i t t l e  question e ith e r  o f  the  k i l l e r 's  
in ten tio n  o r o f  Catron* s involvement. For one th ing , Ghavez had been 
head o f  the  Democratic p a rty  in  Santa Fe and had helped defeat th e  A lliance 
League in  1888 and 1890. Also, as S h eriff  o f  Santa.Fe County, Chavez had 
been in  diarge o f th e  a rrh s t o f Borrego the  previous year and everyone 
in  Santa Fe knew Catron had been try in g  to  prove him responsible fo r  th e  
murder o f a w itness who came fo rth  to  t e s t i l y  in  Borrego's beha lf. I t  
required l i t t l e  imagination to  conclude th a t  i f  Catron h im self had not 
planned th e  crime, th e  League a t  le a s t  was involved.
Democrats across th e  te r r i to r y  accused Catron o f  having Ghavez 
murdered as a p o l i t i c a l  maneuver through which to  regain contro l o f  Santa 
Fe County. No a ;m s ts  were made during Governor P rin ce 's  adm inistration , 
but vhw  Democrat W iliam  T. Thornton became Govemor in  1893 he ordered 
an in v es tig a tio n . Several u ltim ate ly  were a rre sted , including Borrego, 
and a l l  o f  whom belonged to  th e  League.^
C atron 's fa te fu l  re la tio n sh ip  with Borrego thus placed him in  
th e  mi dd le o f a w eU -publicized crim inal p lo t,  and soon i t  caused s t i l l
^Twitchell: The Leading Facts o f  New HeodLco ELstorv. H .  on.
5L0-11. .  ;-------^
*̂Ibid. . p. 512,
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other developoimts i6 idh  fa r th e r  disgraced him. l i r s t ,  because he agreed 
to  defend Chavez' accused murderers and th e  t r i a l  took place between 1894 
and 1896, he was able to  achieve l i t t l e  as Delegate to  Ck>ngress. Moreover, 
suspicions were substan tia ted  idien h is  c lie n ts  swore before they  were 
executed th a t  Catron paid  them to  k i l l  Chavez. F ina lly , he faced charges 
fo r  unprofessional conduct a t  th e  t r i a l  and avoided disbarment only because 
one judge conveniently l e f t  th e  te r r i to x y  in  time fo r  an a c q u itta l.  ̂
Even a f te r  a l l  o f th is ,  Bepublican o f f ic ia ls  attempted to  ih i t e -  
wash th e i r  lead er by e lec ting  him President o f th e  T e r r i to r ia l  Bar. The 
damage was irrep a ra b le , however, fo r  Catron was so vulnerable th a t  n e ith e r  
honorary recognition nor den ia ls could make him presentable .
The s itu a tio n  was not lo s t  on Republicans ^ o  had jo ined Catron 
in  1892 but who now drew away to  save face. Obviously i f  they  pub lic ly  
re jec ted  him a t  th e  next opportunity h is  power could be almost completely 
destroyed and one o f them could ru le  th e  party . That opportunity  arose 
Republican leaders assembled p r io r  to  the  p re s id e n tia l nominating 
convention o f I 896. Wiat t r a n ^ i r e d  in  preparation  i s  d i f f ic u l t  to  deteiv  
mine except th a t  plans were made to  defeat Catron in  much the  same way 
th a t  he had defeated Govexnor Prince and T&lliam Rynerson p r io r  to  the  
previous p re s id e n tia l nominating convention. M.guel A. Oterft H  took 
charge, wi'Ux th e  ready assistance  o f  patron Pedro Perea and Solomon luna,
^Twitchell: Tha Faots o f  New Mexico H istory. H ,  pp. jOL2,
5L8-19; Otero: Mg Mine Years as Govemor. p. 143; SLuga: "Kxe P o l i t ic a l
l i f e  o f Thomas Benton Catron," pp. 11-14; Catrem to  BlM ns, Ju ly  I 3 , I 896 , 
Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XHI, p . 2l6; Catron to  E lk ins, 
August 24, 1895t Catron Papers, personal Correspondence, XU, p. 4 ^ ;
Catron to  Elki n s , August 24, 1895. Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, 
X n , p. 4%; Catron to  E lkins, Januaxy 23, 1895» Catron Papers, Personal 
Correspondence, XI, p . 49; Catron to  Kerens, Januaxy 23, 1895» Catron 
Papers, Personal Corre^wndence, XI, p. 51
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now th e  leading Republican in  Valencia County. Inna replaced Catron as 
National Cbmmitteeman. He, Perea and John 8. CLaxic, a frien d  o f Otero 
from Las Vegas, headed th e  delegation  to  r ^ r e s e n t  the  p a rty  a t  S t. Louis, 
'«bile Catron stood by watching h is  own demise.^
Stripped o f p a rtisa n  o ff ic e , C atron 's r i ^ t  to  lead  th e  p a rty  
now rested  so le ly  upon h is  holding the  o ff ic e  o f Delegate, The Otero- 
Luna-Perea co a litio n  needed a way to  remove him from th a t  o ff ic e  to  in su re  
h is  complete downfall. This proved im possible, because Santa Fe Ring 
leaders s t i l l  commanded a m ajority  o f  Republican county organizations and 
Catron won renomination in  "the f a l l  o f  I 896. What Otero and h is  friends 
could not do fo r  'themselves, however. Democratic nominee Harvey 6 , Fergusson 
did  fo r  'them by subsequently winning th e  congressional race.
Though he t r ie d  to  f o r e s ta l l  t o t a l  d is a s te r  by ezplaining h is  
defeat in  terms o f Populiaa and th e  s i lv e r  is su e , Catron had only him self 
to  blame. Populism never won widespread support in  New Mexico, Moreover, 
Republican defections re su ltin g  from the  s i lv e r  issue  were fU lly  o ffse t  
idien William E. Childers led  a  group o f  Gold-Democrats in to  th e  Republican 
party . Undoubtedly, th e  most im portant cause fo r  h is  defeat was the  Borrego 
a f f a i r .  Next was th a t  h is  influence res ted  upon sheer fo rce , and a t  th e  
f i r s t  sign o f  weakness h is  supporters deserted  in  la rg e  numbers. There 
was also th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  Republican p ress could never find  anything good 
to  say about him, and with th i s  unsavory p ast he simply could not compete 
with Fergusson on th e  p o l i t ic a l  stump, ̂
SLuga: "The P o l i t ic a l  L ife  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," p , 15,
7Tha Chlaftfl̂ n (Socorro), October 29, 1896, p, 2; TwitcbeU: The 
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What previous claim he had to  leadersh ip  amon& Republicatis 
p ra c tic a lly  vanished in  th a t  e lec tio n . This he leaxned read ily  in  the  
spring o f 1897 ^ e n  he attempted to  convince President William U cE in l^  
th a t  he spoke fo r  most t e r r i t o r i a l  Republicans in  opposing th e  s ^ e c t io n  
o f Miguel A. Otero H  fo r  the  goveznorship. His in a b i l i ty  to  stop O tero 's 
appointment cannot be a ttr ib u te d  sol^uy to  h is  lo ss  o f power in  the  party . 
McKinley's re fu sa l to  hear Catron and h is  deteznination to  appoints.
Otero resu lted  much from, previous developments fo r 'Hhich iro n ic a lly  Catron 
him self was responsible.
Back in  1892 vdien he in v ite d  Otero to  jo in  him in  defeating  
Governor P r in c e 's  e ffo r ts  to  se le c t a delegation fo r  th e  Iflnneapolis con­
vention, Catron unknowingly se t in  motion a se rie s  o f events # i c h  probably 
had as much to  do with O tero 's  landing in  the  Governor's Mansion as any 
o ther fac to r. Otero was appointed to  th e  committee a t  Minneapolis to  
inform Benjamin Harrison o f h is  renomination. The Chairman o f  th a t  com­
m ittee  was W iliam  McKinley, and th e  two became acquainted on the  t r a in  
rid e  to  Washington. There McKinley en terta ined  Otero a t  h is  home. L ater 
Otero reca lled  pledging h is  new^^riend th e  suppoiçb o f  the  New Mexican Repub­
lic a n  delegation  fo r  th e  p re s id e n tia l nomination in  1896, and he fa i th fu lly  
kept th a t  promise.^ Accordingly, when McKinley won th e  presidency,
th e  F ro n tie r  1882-1897. p. 283; Curry: jfa Autobiography, p . 95î Catron 
to  BUdns, Ju ly  30, 1896, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, t t t t , 
p. 282; R. Hudson to  Catron, November 7, 1896, Catron Papers, box lab e lle d  
P o li t ic a l  Canqpaigns-New Ifex  ̂CO, I 878- I 906; Jess Bello to  Catron, October 
28, 1896, Catron Papers, box ?Ibbelled  P o l i t ic a l  Campaigns-New Mexico, 
1878- 1906; F. Parker to  Catron, November 6, I 896, Catron Papers, P o li t ic a l  
Campaigns, box lab e lle d  P o l i t ic a l  Campaigns-New Mexico, 1878-1906.
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90
nothing Catron could have done would have a lte red  Otero* s favorable posi^ 
t io n  a t  the  White House. Nor could Catron have said  anything to  make 
him self acceptable to  th e  President, because in  I 896 he had ac tiv e ly  
supported the  nomination o f Ebuse Speaker Thomas B. Beed.^
Catron rea lized , nevertheless, th a t McKinley could not appoint 
anyone u n a cc ^ tab le  to  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican party . Therefore he 
gathered o ther d isg run tled  Republicans around him to  force McKinley to  
appoint Pedro Perea as Govexnor, Solomon Luna as United S tates Marshal and 
him self as United S tates Attorney. Obviously h is  puzpose was to  draw 
Perea and Luna out o f  O tero 's  camp, hoping thereby to  b o ls te r  h is  own, 
but the  e f fo r t  proved f i t i l e .  McKinley leam ed  th a t  Catron no longer 
represented the  m ajority  o f  New Mexican Republicans and promptly awarded 
the  governorship to  Otero. Moreover, he appointed Iifiiliam B. Childers 
United S tates Attorney fo r  bringing GolcUOemocrats in to  Republican ranks, 
and consulted with th e  new Govemor regarding o ther fed e ra l appointments.
Following th is  unmistakable rebuff Catron t r ie d  once more, 
o ffering  th e  President h is  personal s la te  fo r tth e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Supriame 
Court. A fter th a t  fa ile d  he re lu c ta n tly  accepted a diminished ro le , however, 
and f in a lly  reoognized Otero as h is  successor a t  the  head o f th e  party .
C atron 's d isgrace and f a l l  from power in  1897 contributed s ig n i­
f ic a n tly  to  O tero 's success in  Republican a f f a i r s  during the  next nine
^Otero: Mv L ife  on th e  F ro n tie r 188&-1897. pp. 278-83 and 
Nine Years as Govemor. p p .  7. 143-W.
^®Otero; Mv l i f e  on the  F ro n tie r 1882-1897. pp. 28^92; SLuga:
"Ihe P o li t ic a l  L ife o f  Thomas Benton (iatron, " pp. 4^-46, 49-56; Catron to  
E lkins, June 7* 1897# Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, KDT, p. 10.
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years. Previously, every change in  leadersh ip  had been accompanied by 
feuds rfiich impaired the  effectiveness o f th e  v ic to rs  to  make p a rty  
policy , but Otero took charge under almost id ea l circumstances. His 
appointment and r is e  to  the  head o f  th e  p a rty  came a t  a tim e idien most 
Republicans vanted new leadersh ip , and ïdien no one possessed th e  power 
to  oppose him e ffe c tiv e ly . Once in  con tro l he had only to  defend against 
period ic  a ttack s, leaving  ample time to  reshape the  p a r ty 's  organizatior^a 
and rebuild  i t s  membership.
This d id  not mean th a t  O tero 's success as Republican lead e r was 
mainly acciden ta l. On th e  craitrary, idiat he adhieved fo r  th e  p a rty  
resu lted  even more from the  app lica tion  o f  h is  own ta le n ts .  Sdiooled Ty 
Thomas Catron him self, Otero was an a r t f u l  p o l i t i c a l  s t r a te g is t  and posses­
sed a n a tu ra l f la re  fo r  leadersh ip . He understood th e  New Mexican people 
and knew th e  p e c u lia r i t ie s  o f  t h e i r  p o l i t ic s  as w ell as any man in  the  
te r r i to ry .  Circumstances notw ithstanding, i t  was diiefL y th r o u ^  methodi­
cal app lica tion  o f these  personal a tt r ib u te s  th a t  he transform ed th e  imper­
fe c t association  he in h e rite d  from Catron in to  a mature o rganization .
% iile  he used numerous methods, two amply i l l u s t r a t e  how he 
drew ever increasing  numbers o f vo ters toge ther in to  a s i n ^ e ,  compact 
organization. One was th e  judicious d is tr ib u tio n  o f  patronage. I t  i s  
appropriate to  conclude th a t  Otero was New Mexico's f i r s t  re a l p a rtisa n  
spoilsman. Unlike h is  predecessors, vàio frequently  d is tr ib u te d  public  
o ffice s  to  meet personal ob liga tions , Otero purely made an appointment 
without improving d isc ip lin e  and u n ity  in  Republican ranks. He gave 
patronage new meaning by using i t  generously and making unwavering lo y a lty  
to  the  Republican p a rty , ra th e r  than to  any in d iv id u a l, th e  p re re q u is ite
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fo r acquiring pub lic  office* He created  vacancies in  'wholesale fashion 
and f re e ly  forced Democrats out o f  o ff ic e  to  make room fo r  f a i th fu l  Repub­
licans* Even -the most in f lu e n tia l  Democrats, vhom Catron would doubtless 
have l e f t  in  o ff ic e  fo r  th e  p rice  o f cooperation, were fired* The summary 
discharge o f  M bert B* F a ll as Attorney General and th e  appointmœt o f  
Edward L* B a rtless , fa i th fu l  Republican and a capable spoilsman, serves 
as an example*
Another method was in  acquiring favorable p u b lic ity  fo r  the  
p a rty  ty  courting t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican newspaper e d ito rs , i&o h ith e r to  
had seldom _agreed regarding p a rty  leadership* Otero went out o f  h is  way 
"to appease than u n t i l  he had support from more im portant newspapers than 
any p a rtisa n  lea d e r in  -the t e r r i t o r i a l  period* Most s ig n if ic a n t was th e  
lo y a lty  o f Max F rost, o f  th e  New Mexican, idiom he lu red  away from Catron*
He also enjoyed support from th e  Rio Grande Republifean o f  Las Cruces and 
The C hieftain  o f  Socorro, while th e  only noteworthy R^xublican newspaper 
th a t  opposed him co n s is ten tly  was th e  ALbuoueraue Journal* ^
Because o f  O tero 's  p o l i t i c a l  acumen and techniques th e  p a rty  
acquired a idiole new conplexlon during h is  adm inistration* People now 
flocked to  "the Republican banner with enthusiasm and no t out o f  fe a r  o f 
re p r isa l from some natron and regional p o l i t ic ia n  as t h ^  always had.
They jo ined  out o f respect fo r  th e  " l i t t l e  Governor, " fo r  patronage, so c ia l 
p res tig e  and th e  mere p riv ile g e  o f belonging* Indeed, giving New Mexicans 
new incen tive  to  support Republicanism was O tero 's  g rea te s t con tribu tion  
as the  p a r ty 's  leader*
11,: Santa Fe New Mexioan. December 5» 1905# p* 2; Oterot Mv Nine 
Tears As Govemor. pp; 2. lo -17 . 1 ^ 2 1 ; 1* Bradford Prince: A Concise
H istory o f New Mexico, p . 214.
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Iforeover, Otero displayed a singo lar detexninatlozi to  prevent the  
kind o f open r i f t s  -within th e  p a rty  idiidh h ith e r to  had frequently  to m  i t  
apart. Unlike previous Republican governors, he did not separate h is  ro le  
o f  adm inistrative lea d e r  from th a t  o f  p a rtisa n  leader. Bis idiole adminis­
t r a t io n  revolved around Republican a f f a i r s ,  and to  m aintain him self in  th e  
o ff ic e  o f  Govemor he reoognized the  need to  su sta in  general support as a 
p a rtisa n  leader. Hence he never jeopardized p a rty  u n ity  fo r  a personal 
-vhim. Rather, he al-ways p ro tec ted  th e  Republican organization against 
the  kind o f  d isrup tion  c h a ra c te r is tic  o f  i t s  e a r l ie r  h isÿo iy  by refusing 
to  engage o ther leaders openly u n t i l  i t  became im possible to  do otherwise. 
Even then he saved.-the p a rty  from d is a s te r  by a d isp lay  o f  p o l i t ic a l  
craftsmanship unprecedented in  New Mexico.
During -the nine years Otero Was Govemor h is  p o sitio n  a t  -fche 
p a r ty 's  head was in  serious danger tw ice. The f i r s t  challenge came with 
an a ttack  from Catron ih ich  la s te d  u n t i l  I 90I ;  -the second was an uprising  
o f  the  so -ca lled  Hubbel.lites from western and southem  New Mexico in  1903- 
04. In each instance Otero chose a d iffe m n t defense, but in  both the  
re s u lts  were the  same. The p a rty  survived in ta c t ,  l i t t l e  worse fo r  the  
strugg le .
Catron challenged O tero 's  leadership  because he s t i l l  had not 
lo s t  h is  influence in  Santa Fe County and he continued to  occupy a sea t 
in  -the t e r r i t o r i a l  Council. Moreover, i t  was no sec re t th a t  he resented 
Otero fo r  replacing him as Republican lead er and he a ttra c te d  o thers idio 
f e l t  inadequately compensated fo r  "their e ffo r ts  in  th e  p a r ty 's  behalf.
% th  them fbzmed a sizeab le  c o a litio n  o f  d iss id en t le s s e r  leaders idiich, 
th o u ^  bound loosely  together only by common jealousy  o f  -the Govemor,
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could r a l ly  troublesome opposition.
One lead e r in  th i s  new C ationite c o a litio n  was Eugene A. F iske. 
a foïsner assoc ia te  o f  Qovenior Prince. Eiske joined Catron a f te r  the  
two men unsuccessfully  competed fo r  the  o ff ic e  o f United S ta tes Attorney 
in  1897. Another was Frederick JfiiHer, never a foremost Republican but 
always a power around Santa Fe. Two o thers were William Berger, E ditor 
o f  the  Santa Fe C apital, and L. Bradford Prince «ho had fought Catron fo r  
nearly  e i ^ t  years, but now rejo ined  him in  hopes o f ge tting  back in to  
high p a rty  councils.
These and o ther le s s e r  leaders opposed Otero p e rio d ica lly  during 
h is  f i r s t  four years as Govemor by any means availab le . Catron u su a lly  
concentrated on d isc red itin g  him in  the  Council by try in g  to  block h is  
nominations fo r  t e r r i t o r i a l  o ffice s  and h is  use o f public  funds to  swell 
th e  ranks o f th e  Governor’s Bing.^^ Catron and h is  follow ers likew ise 
opposed Otero a t  every Republican convention, and they  spent l ib e r a l ly  
and often  collaborated  with Democrats to  defeat h is  friends in  e lec tio n s. 
They scandalized him in  th e  t e r r i to iy  a t  eveiy opportunity and b io u ^ t  
charges against him in  Washington in  hopes o f causing h is  discharge from 
the  governorship.^^
Had th is  group o f malcontents stood in  opposition to  a Colonel 
Chavez o r a Prince who would engage them openly, they  could have a lte re d
^^Otero; Mv Nine Tears as Govemor. pp. 146-48; Curiy: An
Autobiography, p . I 89.
^^Sluga; "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron, " p.
Otero: Mv Nine Years as Governor, pp. 75» 81; Santa Fe New Mexican. 
November 5» 1904-, p . 2.
^^Otero; Kv Nine Years as Govemor. pp. 132-33; 240-4-5.
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t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican h is to ry  s ig n if ic a n tly , fo r  they  had considerable 
support in  c e rta in  constituencies, e sp ec ia lly  around Albuquerque. They 
made l i t t l e  headway against Otero, however, because he would no t step  fo rth  
and f i ^ t .  in stead  he awaited th e  chance to  d isperse  them unceremoniously, 
and meanwhile gave them sudi wide berth  th a t  fo r  the  f i r s t  two years even 
Catron was uncerta in  whether to  t r e a t  him as friend  o r  foe. Thou^
Otero replaced o f f ic ia ls  during these  years, t h ^  were never important 
C atronites.^^  He voiced opinions regarding nominations, but compromised 
a t  th e  f i r s t  sign o f tro u b le . In  1898 he went to  th e  congressional 
nominating convention committed against Pedro Perea, idiom the  C atronites 
supported. Upon learn ing  th a t  C atron 's fav o rite  had strong support, he 
dropped h is  own candidate, helped nominate Perea, and then shared th e  
c re d it fo r  h is  e lec tion . In  fa c t, th e  l i t t l e  Governor was so f le x ib le  
th a t not u n t i l  th e  spring o f 1899 d id  th e  o ld  Ring lead e r f in a l ly  decide 
fo r c e rta in  th a t  any attempt to  bargain fo r  p o l i t i c a l  advantage would be 
f ru i t le s s  and th a t  he should have been fig h tin g  him as a personal enemy 
a l l  along.
IXiring the  le g is la t iv e  session o f  1899 Catron concentrated upon
15otero: My Nine Years as Governor, pp. 2 4 5 -^ ; Catron to  BUdns, 
June 3f 1897* Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XIXE, p. 678; Catron 
to  Elk in s , November 18, 1897, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XXV, 
P« 375» Catron to  Elk in s , December I 3 , 1897» Catron Papers, Personal Cor- 
re^ondenca, XIV, p. 439.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. January 9, I 900, p . 3 and February 1,
1900, p . 2 ; The New Mexican Review. November 24, 1898, p . 1; Bio (hrande 
tem b lie an . Ang^^t 19, 1898, p. 2; The Las Vegas Daily Qntie. October 1, 
1898, October 19, 1898, p. 1 and October 31, 1898, p. 2 ; Otero: Mv Nine 
Years as Governor, pp. 134-35.
Catron to  Elkins , i ^ r i l  8 , 1899, Catron Papera, Personal Cor­
respondence, XV, p. 763.
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th e  Govemor’s misuse o f public  funds, and most vigorously opposed h is  
nominees fo r  appointment. He erased a l l  doubt about h is  in ten tio n s  th a t  
year >4ien he prevented th e  confirm ation o f O tero 's nominee fo r  the  o ff ic e  
o f T e r r i to r ia l  T reasurer, supported th e  reappointment o f  th e  Democratic 
incumbent, and offered  the  l a t t e r  free  le g a l advice i f  he would remain in  
office.^®
The next year Catron andJiis a l l i e s  kept up the  a ssa u lt.^ ^  
Evidently th e i r  goal was to  create  enough opposition to  provoke an erup­
tio n  a t  th e  nominating convention in  the  f a l l  o f  1900, s p l i t  the  party , 
and e ith e r  force Otero to  include them in  the  Republican inner c ir c le  o r  
surrender con tro l completely. Had Otero responded to  th e i r  challenge 
the  C atronites m i^ t  have succeeded, fo r  as th e  various county delegates 
arrived  a t  th e  convention C atron's s tra te g y  was the  main to p ic  o f  couver, 
sa tion . But 16en th e  se lec tio n  o f a congressional nominee f in a l ly  came 
to  the  f lo o r, Otero acted much as he had in  the  previous e lec tio n  year. 
Catron gave him a  chance to  quarre l when he proposed a dxange in  nominees 
and suggested th e  replacement o f  Pedro Perea Bernard S. Rodey a t  th e  
head o f th e  t ic k e t .  In stead  o f  fig h tin g , Otero agreed to  despoil Perea 
o f th e  o ff ic e  o f  Delegate. He gave wholehearted support to  th e  nomination 
o f  Rodey, campaigned in  h is  behalf, and subsequently claimed h is  v ic to ry
Santa Fe Mew Mexican. September 23, 1902, p . 2 and September 29, 
1902, p. 2. This o f course comes from tiae pro-Otero p ress amid th e  Catron- 
Otero strugg le . I t  seems v a lid , nevertheless, because Catron subsequently 
crossed p a rty  l in e s  frequently  to  serve h is  own ends.
^^Santa Fe Mew Mexican. February 20, 1900, p . 2, February 26, 1900, 
p . 2, March 17, 1900, p. 1 , Ju ly  10, 1900, p. 2, August 2, 1900, p . 2; 
Catron to  Elk in s , February 10, I 900, Catron Papers, Personal Correspon­
dence, X7H, p . y i5 i Catron to  E lkins, March 1900, Catron Papers, Per­
sonal Correspondence, ZVH, p. 447; Catron to  Pedro Perea, January 29,
1900, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XTH, p . 2?6.
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over Octaviano S. Larrazolo ty  some 3» 700 votes as a personal mandate
20and ir re fu ta b le  evidence o f p a rty  u n ity .
Because Otero thus refused to  engage Catron and h is  follow ers, 
th e i r  attempt to  undemine h is  power fa ile d . Most Republicans re adily  
turned fiom p o l i t ic s  to  th e i r  usual d a ily  p u rsu its  hard ly  aware o f the  
troub le  in  high p a rty  councils. Pro-Otero newsmen occasionally  re fe rred  
to  a lte rc a tio n s  between th e  Governor and th e  C atronites, but in  such a 
way as to  imply th a t  they were no more serious than the  p e tty  quarre ls 
c h a ra c te r is tic  o f  a l l  New Mexican campaigns and e lec tio n s.
Beneath th e  facade o f peace troub le  continued, however, and not 
so much fo r  Otero as fo r  th e  C atronites. Throughout th e  campaign and 
e lec tion  Otero continued to  d isp lay  fforbearanoe in  the  face o f c ritic ism  
and seemed determined not to  f ig h t. Yet, he not only successfu lly  warded 
o ff  a ttacks from th e  C atronites, but a lso  took s t ^ s  to  d isperse  them.
His most obvious maneuver was to  deprive them o f e ffec tiv e  leadersh ip . ■
He despoiled Catron o f h is  sea t in  th e  Council^ and l e f t  th e  
C atronites no one with enou^  p o l i t ic a l  s ta tu re  to  represent them. F i r s t ,  
he ordered O tero ites in  Santa Fe County to  run a second Republican in  
competition with Catron and thereby caused th e  e lec tion  o f Democratic ncfit- 
inee Charles P. Easley. Then, when Catron t r ie d  to  contest th e  e lec tio n , 
Otero engineered a change in  e lec tio n  ru le s  and made i t  Impossible fo r
^ S a n ta  Fe New MeodLcan. October 4, 1900, p . 1 and October 13» 1900, 
p . 1: Dona Ana Gountv Republican. October 6, 1900, p . 4; SLuga: "The
P o li t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," pp. 5^62 ; Otero: My Mine Years 
as Gtovemor. pp. 136-41, 224; Catron to  Perea, October 17, ̂ 9 0 0 , Catrcnx 
Papers, Personal Correspondence, XVIIÏ, p. 274; Catron to  ElKLne,
January 13, 1901, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, XVIII, p . 429»
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him to  present h is  case to  the  le g is la tu re .^ ^
Less obvious but even more e ffec tiv e  was ihe  Goveznor's handling 
o f the  p ress . Realizing th a t  Catron and h is  friends oould no t undeznine 
h is  position  without p u b lic ity  fo r  th e i r  cause, Otero urged newsmen to  
ignore them. In  doing so he not only curbsd th e i r  attem pt to  bu ild  up a 
la rg e r  following by c z itic iz in g  h is  adm inistration, he also  deprived them 
of ju s t  c re d it fo r  Republican v ic to r ie s . Had the  tzu th  been known, 
C atronites would have gained considerable popu larity  fo r  th e i r  ro le  in  the  
e lec tions o f 1898 and 1900. As i t  was, both Pedro Perea and Beznard
Rodoy were nominated th ro u ^  Catron’s e ffo r ts  and won th e i r  la rg e s t m ajori-
22t i e s  in  Valencia and B ernalillo  Counties where C atronites were in  con tro l.
By overlooking these important fa c ts , pro-Otero newsmen deprived them o f 
recognition and reason fo r  existence. Thus, s tripped  o f  e ffec tiv e  leadeiv 
ship and p u b lic ity , the  C atronites q u ie tly  d iss ip a ted .
By 1901 four years had lapsed since O tero 's appointment, and the  
President and the  United S ta tes Senate had to  review  h is  past performance. 
Catron, Prince, Berger, M uller and several o thers went to  Washington in  a 
desperate e f fo r t  to  explain why New Mexico needed a new governor and the  
p a rty  another lead er. They accused Otero o f u n fitn ess  as an adm inistrator,
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. Septm ber 15, 1902,. p . 2, September 29,
1902, October 10, 1900, p . 2, October 25, I 900, p . 2 , October-2?, 1900, p .
2, and November I 3 , 1900, p. 4; The C hieftain (Socorro) November 24, I 9OO, 
p. 2; Sluga: "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," p . 62; Catron
to  Elkins , December 5, 1900, Catron Fapez^s, Personal Oorrespondenoe, XVJJI, 
p. 372; Catron to  E lkins, January 30, 1901, Catron Papers, Personal Cor­
respondence, % vm , p . 4 ^ .
2?  ■
*̂̂ Santa Fe New Mexican. Ju ly  28, 1900, p . 2, October 6, 19OO, p.
1, October 16, 1900, p . 2, October 31. 1900, p. 1 , November 9, 1900, p . 2, 
Hovemisor 13 , 1900, p . 2, November 19, 1900, p . 2, November 22, 190O, p. 1, 
and November 23, 1900, p. 2; The C hieftain  (Socorro) October 6, I 9OO, p .
1 and Novmaber 24, 1900, p . 2; Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico 
H istory, n ,  p. 543.    :-----
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charged him with misuse o f  patronage and o f co llaborating  with Democrats. 
They argued th a t  i f  he were no t removed the  adm inistration o f  tiae te r r i to x y  
would f a l l  in to  conAision and i t s  Republican p a rty  would d is in te g ra te .^ ^
Otero had l i t t l e  to  fe a r  because McKinley was no more in c lin ed  
to  believe them than he had in  1897» But M cK inl^ 's a ssassina tion  occurred 
before th e  Senate conflm ed O tero 's  reappointment. This gave Catron and 
h is  friends new hope because P resident Roosevelt showed more concern about 
the  t e r r i t o r i a l  p a rty  than had McKinley, and i t  was wetQBJmown th a t  he did 
not l ik e  Otero. ï e t ,  a f te r  hearing a l l  viewpoints, he f in a l ly  concurred 
with McKinley's judgment. He f e l t  ob liga ted  to  Otero fo r  th e  recruitm ent 
o f Bou^ Riders in  New Mexico during th e  D anish  American War. Moreover, 
Otero had many friends whose exodus from New Mexico apparently  exceeded 
th a t  o f h is  adversaries. At l e a s t  a dozen im portant figu res from both 
major p a r tie s  spoke s u f f ic ie n tly  in  h is  behalf to  convince Roosevelt and 
th e  Senate.
The p res tig e  Otero gained from surviving th is  onslaught was the  
deaüi k n e ll o f the  C atron ites. Subsequently they  vanished completely, 
leaving him free  from e ffe c tiv e  opposition. Those few frien d s o f  Catron 
vtio d id  no t immediately take  cover soon received a push in  th a t  d ire c tio n . 
L. Bradford Prince, fo r  example, 160 re s is te d  p o l i t ic a l  obscurity , was 
f ire d  from th e  Board o f  Regents a t  th e  College o f  A griculture and Mechanic
23ptem : My Nine Years as Governor, pp. 179-89; Sluga: "The
P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," pp. 64-73; Catron to  E lkins, 
November 15, 1901, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, p. 249; 
Catron to  El k ins , October 18, 1901, Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, 
XIZ, p . 177; Catron to  Elk in s, January 13$ I 9OI, Catron Papers, Personal 
Correspondence, ZVIIl, p . 434.
pi.
^^Santa Fe New Mexioan. August 13 , I 90I ,  p . 2; August 17 , 19OI; p.
2 and August 22, I 90I ,  p . 2; Otero: My Nine Years as Govemoy. pp. 86, 179, 
314, 316-19; Sluga: "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," pp. 76 ,
80.
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Arts tgr th e  Govemor. Otero in s is te d  th a t  he had removed Prince fo r  
cause, but everyone outside th e  Govemor* s Ring recognized the  removal 
as a portentous gesture and gave up th e  s trugg le .
% th  C atronites absent from th e  scene Otero enjoyed a peaceful 
in te rlu d e  o f two years in  ;6 ich  he had a free  hand in  th e  p a rty . This 
gave him a chance to  t i ^ t e n  i t s  c e n tra l o rganization . His following 
constan tly  grew la rg e r  as would-be defecto rs jo ined  h is  Ring fo r  want o f  
o ther leadersh ip . P rosperity  and th e  rap id  development o f the  t e r i i t o i y  
enhanced h is  popu larity . By the  end o f  th e  year 1903 h is  p o l i t i c a l  power 
exceeded th a t  o f any o ther man in  t e r r i t o r i a l  h is to ry .
This proved fo rtunate  fo r  Otero, because he was soon to  need a l l  
th e  power he amassed. While he enjoyed two peaceful years, th e  Hubbells 
o f Albuqjierque b u i l t  a su b s ta n tia l follow ing, presented th e  second 
challenge to  h is  leadersh ip , and n early  caused h is  downfall. The Hubbell 
co a litio n  was re la te d  to  th e  C ationite a llia n c e  fiiich  fought Otero e a r l ie r ,  
fo r  Catron and many o f  h is  colleagues jo ined  i t .  However, i t  d iffe re d  
in  leadersh ip , issu e s , and in  geographic scope. Opposition to  th e  " l i t t l e  
Governor" now gathered around Frank Hubbell, one o f  the  l a s t  o f  th e  g rea t 
patrones. ru le r  o f  th e  powerful B ern a lillo  County Republican organization 
and curren t Chaixman o f  th e  Republican Central Ctmnittea. Now in te r e s ts  
o f communities overshadowed personal vendettas and th e  in fiin r o f  hnndgrants 
revived old  antagonisms between Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Moreover, such 
issues as economic predominance and th e  lo ca tio n  o f  th e  c ap ito l entered 
in , with eadi region speaking em phatically th ro u ^  th e  columns o f  th e  . .
25otero; Mv Nine Years as Govemor. p . 248.
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Santa Fe Mev Mexican and th e  ALbaonerane Joum al.^^
This complicated sec tional quarre l gradually  brought to  the  su r­
face a movement against Otero in  the  Republican party . Numerous leaders 
from southern and western New Mexico joined Frank Hubbell in  th e  endeavor 
to  curb th e  " l i t t l e  Governor's" power. They hoped to  prevent him from 
se izing  complete contro l o f  the  le g is la tu re  th ro u ^  th e  judicious use o f 
patronage, and from gaining fu rth e r  popu larity  by fa lse  claims to  sole 
re sp o n s ib ility  fo r  Delegate Rodey's record success a t  the  p o lls . Also, 
they  intended to  b o ls te r  Chairman H ubbell's power in  h i ^  p arty  councils, 
fo r  he was t h e i r  only hope o f averting  complete submission to  northern 
New Mexican Republicans in  p a rty  a f f a i r s . ^
A fter a year o f th re a ts  and accusations by both sides the  quarrel 
between Hubbell and Otero resu lted  in  the  most sensational in tra -p a r ty  
power struggle  since the  Catron-Chavea f i ^ t  twenty years e a r l ie r .  I t  
culminated a t  th e  congressional nominating convention o f  1904 ih e re  
Otero faced th e  a lte rn a tiv e s  of e ith e r  removing Frank Hubbell from the  
chairmanship o f  th e  Central Committee o r  stepping down from th e  head o f 
th e  p a rty . There be was p i t te d  against a c o a litio n  o f lead ers , idiich, 
among o thers, included Frank and Thomas Hubbell, Delegate Rodey, Catron 
and Ralph Skerson Tw itchell. The only important Republicans who d id  not 
oppose him were b d llis a  ÏÏ. Andrews, a young man ^ o  arrived  in  New Mexico 
in  1902, and Holm 0. Bursum, a stock-grower whose career in  hig^ p a rty
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. August 16, 1901, p . 2 and May 8 , 1907» p. 
2; Sluga: "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron, " p . 63; Curry:
An Autobiography, p . I 9I .
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexioan. July , 1902 to  June, 1904. passim: Otero: 
My Nine Years as Governor, pp. 224.26; Tw itchell: Tha T.Aflcî ,rie Facts o f 
New Mexico H istory . H ,  p . ^ 3.
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councils barely  had begun.
Otero quickly discovered th a t  he could not remove Hubbell without 
f i r s t  blocking th e  renomination o f Delegate Rodey. As congressional 
nominee, Rodey had th e  power to  choose th e  Central Committee Chaiman fo r  
the  next two years and he had agreed beforehand to  reappoint Hubbell.
Rodey was extremely popular and a su b s ta n tia l m ajority  o f county delegations 
came p r^ a re d  to  support him. Even to  Otero th is  must have seemed an 
almost impossible undertaking.
As usual the " l i t t l e  Govemor" d id  not want fo r  ingenuity , 
however, and before the  f i r s t  session h is  v ic to ry  already was assured. In  
h is  address to  each county delegation as i t  a rrived  he held  out th e  tempting 
b a it  o f  patronage. By the  time the  l a s t  delegation  had l e f t  h is  su ite  
fo r  the  convention h a l l ,  Otero had more than enou^i support ^  defeat 
Rodey. A member o f the  Governor's Ring nominated Andrews fo r  Congress, 
and each delegation voted with a minimum o f  d e lib e ra tio n . Otero then 
l e f t ,  accompanied by congressional nominee Andrews, and th e  new Central 
Committee Chaiman, Hoim Bursum.
Thus, fo r  a second time Otero saved him self from overthrow and 
th e  party  from d isrup tion . So e ffec tiv e  was h is  p o l i t ic a l  craftsmanship 
th a t  fu rth e r  opposition on the  p a rt o f Hubbell and h is  friends a t  the  
time was hopeless. They returned to  Albuquerque, ca lled  a second conven­
tio n  and nominated Rodey fo r  Delegate on an Independent Republican t ic k e t .  
Their purpose, l ik e  th a t  o f  previous Independent groups, was th e  hollow 
sa tis fa c tio n  o f  defeating the  regu lar Republican candidate by drawing 
o ff  votes fo r  the  Democratic nominee. But years o f  c a re f i l  organization, 
the  d is tr ib u tio n  o f  o ffice s  and favorable p u b lic ity  bore f r u i t  fo r  Otero.
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Thou^ Rodey carried  B ern a lillo  Oounty, Andrews won the  e lec tion  by a 
margin o f approximately 2,000 vo tes . ̂
Andrews' v ic to ry  was th e  capstone o f  O tero 's  p a rtisa n  career and 
symbolized h is  triumph over a l l  opponents. Despite determined e ffo r ts , 
f i r s t  by the  follow ers o f Gatron, then Frank Hubbell and h is  friends, 
the  " l i t t l e  Govemor" m aintained con tro l over th e  la rg e  m ajority  o f Re­
publicans. He succeeded in  bringing th e  p a rty  through i t s  f in a l  stage o f  
development by tak ing  over C atron 's loose association  o f  lo c a l Republican 
machines and binding them firm ly  toge ther in to  a smooth-operating, c en tra l­
ized  organization. He b u i l t  up the  p a r ty 's  membership to  a po in t where i t s  
preponderance was no longer in  question. During remaining t e r r i t o r i a l  
years Republican leaders would continue to  v ie  fo r  power and the  enormous 
constituency created  by Otero would be reduced to  a s l ig h t  m ajo rity . But 
subsequent events could no t a l t e r  the  fa c t th a t  the  Republican organization 
reached m atu rity  during h is  adm inistration .
^ S a n ta  Fe Hew:Mexican. September 3, 1904, p. 1, September 8 , 1904; 
p . 2, September 10, 1904, p . 1, Septembe-’ 12, 1904» pp. 1 , 2, September 13» 
1904, pp. 1, 2, September 17, 1904, p. 2 and November 11, 1904, p . 2; Rio 
Grande Republican. August 19» 1904, p. 2 and September 23, 1904, p . 2; 
Otero: My Nine Tears as Governor, p p . 226-33; 237-38; TwitchelL: The 
Leadine % e ts  o f  New Mexico H isto ry . H ,  pp. 5 ^ 4 5 ;  Curry: An Antebio-
grapby, p. 191} Catron tO Rodey, December 16» 1903» Catron Papers, Personal 
Correspondence, XXU, p. 377.
CHAPTER VI
REPDBUCAN UPBBAVAL AND REDNIFICAIXON, 190^10
Then came th e  v o la t i le  Geoi^e Carry. . .  \iiose adm inistration 
calmed th e  angry p o l i t i c a l  sea.^
In  numerous ways Govemor O tero 's  adm inistration  was th e  p o li­
t i c a l  h igh ligh t o f  th e  New Mexican t e r r i t o r i a l  period . The previous 
chapter revealed h is  ta le n t  fo r  leadersh ip  and how he enhanced th e  develop­
ment o f  th e  Bepuhlican p a rty . Nhile he was Governor, p a r t ie s  eclipsed  
th e  p o l i t ic s  o f t ra d i t io n , and in  th i s  he played no small p a r t .  Otero 
also  possessed s in g u lar adm in istrative  a b i l i ty .  Ralph Qaerson Tw itchell 
p raised  him fo r  the  "excellen t condition o f  finances" during h is  adminis^ 
t ra t io n . He commended Otero fo r  fo s te rin g  ra ilro ad  construction , i r r i -  
gation en te rp rises , in d u s tr ia l  growth and a score o f  o th er improvements.
Of course such fac to rs  as immigration, outside investment and congressional 
le g is la tio n  contributed , but in  eadi im portant diange h is  ro le  was consid­
erab le.
Surprisingly , he was no t allowed to  r e t i r e  from th e  Governor's
MSnsicm v o lu n ta rily . Friends and foes a lik e  recognized h is  many con­
tr ib u tio n s  and by the  end o f  1904 he enjoyed enthusiaeWLc support from a
la rg e  m ajority  o f  the  New Mexican R e c to ra ts .  At th e  same time he
^Santa Fe New Mieodcan. January 15» 1812, p . 4.
Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory . H ,  pp. ^46-48.
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had th e  confidence o f  President Boosevelt and o ther Washington o f f ic ia ls .  
Tet, approximately a year a f te r  h is  power reached i t s  sunmit he lo s t  the  
govexnorshlp, and as a re s u l t  he no longer was th e  lead e r o f h is  party .
GLrcumstanoes %hidh forced Otero to  surrender leadersh ip  o f Repub­
lic a n s  in  general bore l i t t l e  s im ila r ity  to  those vbieh had caused Catron's 
downfall a  decade e a r l ie r .  Otero never disgraced him self, no r d id  h is  
power diminish due to  open c o n flic t with o th er t e r r i t o r i a l  lead ers . Ebŵ  
ever, th e re  was one likeness in  th e  demise o f  th e  two men: each in  p a r t
lo s t  con tro l o f  Republican a f f a i r s  fo r  being too successfu l. Ju s t as 
C atron's personal d ic ta tio n  o f  p a rty  po licy  produced resentment in  Repub­
lic an  ranks, so did O tero 's untrammeled power cause o th er p a rty  lead ers  to  
grow re s tiv e . That a  word from Otero was tantamount to  p re s id e n tia l 
approval fo r  fed era l appointment annoyed them. They grew jea lous as 
Democrats defected to  h is  Ring fo r  p o l i t ic a l  favors, fnd they sulked 
because o f  a  new e lec tio n  code, Thioh promised to  give th e  Govemor's 
friends fu r th e r  advantage in  succeeding e le c tio n s .^
Many Republican leaders a lso  feared r ^ x i s a l  as th e  Govemor took 
revenge on h is  fa lle n  foes in  1905* A fter he removed Frank Hubbell frcm 
th e  Central Committee chaizmansbip, i t  doubtless appeared th a t  no one 
could sa fe ly  oppose th e  Govemor's Ring. Otero atteoqpted to  a lla y  th e i r  
fears  by c a llin g  h is  a ttack  on th e  "Hubbell gang" o f  Albuquerque a "war 
on corrup tion ,"  but even th o u ^  i t  was tru e  i t  fa ile d  to  appease them.
The Hubbells ran public  a f f a i r s  in  B ernalillo  County l ik e  a 
p riva te  fiefdom during most o f O tero 's  adm inistration. The bro thers Frank
^Santa Fe Hew Mexican. S ^ e m b e r 20, 1904, p. 1, A pril 22, 1905,
P* 2; December 6 , 3.905# P* 1; December 13, 1905» p. 1; December 27, 1905,
p . 1.
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and Thomas, along with Eslavio F lg l l ,  con tro lled  the  county B ^ b l ic a n  
madiine and divided the  b est lo c a l o ffices  among them selTes.^ As County 
Treasurer and Tax C ollector, Frank an^loyed public  funds to  operate h is  
p riv a te  en te rp rises . Thomas p ro fite d  as S heriff o f th e  County by over­
looking vice and by padding prisoner allowance records, v h ile  V igil in  
the  o ff ic e  o f County School Superintendent a llegedly  s to le  e&ioational 
appropriations.
U n til 1904 no one questioned the  a c t iv i t ie s  o f th e  "Hubbell gang," 
but a f te r  th e  nominating convention th a t  year Otars resolved tc  d rlv s  thsm 
out of o ff ic e  and make them ju s t i f y  p ast behavior* Ih  th e  next county 
e lection  follow ers o f Otero In c ited  rebe llion  among B ern a lillo  County 
Republicans and collaborated with the  lo c a l Democratic par^y. Xeamdiile* 
the  Govemor also  ordered an in v estig a tio n  vhioh u ltim ate ly  d isc red ited  
Prank Hubbell and V ig il and brought the  a rre s t  o f  Thomas Hubbell fo r  
fraud. ̂
Under the  circumstances O tero 's Investiga tion  was ju s t i f ia b le ,  
but i t  was unduly ru th le ss  and untimely as f a r  as h is. p o sitio n  in  th e  
party  was concerned. Republican leaders vho already despised him became 
sympathetic with th e  "BibbeGLl gang." The so -called  "*ar on eorruption" 
caused each o f them to  fe a r  th a t  he might be i t s  next v ictim . Conseqpiently, 
most o f the  leaders vho opposed him a t th e  previous nominating convention 
drew together In  defense o f th e  Hubbells, and unloosed th e  a ttack  idiieh 
subsequently le d  to  O tero 's demise*
^ e r o i  Hv Nine Tears as Governor, p* 227? Cuny: An Autobio­
graphy. p. 191.
^Santa Fe New Meodean. August 31, 1905» p. 1 , September 1 , 1905, 
p. 2 and October 6, 1905, p . 2; Curryj An Autobiography, p. 192.
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The Httbbells inoagarated th is  new war in  th e  f a l l  o f  1905 with 
a v icious "smear campaign" against the  Govemor and h is  fellow  adminis­
t r a to r s .  They charged Otero with misuse o f o f f i c ia l  prerogatives against 
them and amassed evidence to  show th a t  D is tr ic t  Attorney Frank W. Clanqy,
Tdio d irec ted  th e  prosecution o f  Thomas Babbell, was g u ilty  o f in e ffic ien cy  
in  o ff ic e . E ditors o f th e  Albuonerane Journal jo ined th e  so -ca lled  crusade 
with an in v es tig a tio n  o f  Delegate IBLlliam Aidrews idiidh produced " ir re -  
fa ta b le  evidence" o f h is  involvement in  a bank scandal in  P eon^lvania. 
Thomas Catron again spoke out against th e  " l i t t l e  Govemor" in  th e  Council 
in  much the  same way as he had s ix  years previously . Moreover, nearly
every noteworthy d iss id e n t Republican in  th e  t e r r i to r y  h u rried  to  Washington
6to  undermine Otero *s p o sitio n  th e re .
The l a t t e r  action  proved most e ffe c tiv e , fo r  O tero 's  opponents hdd 
a re a l issu e  in  idiidh to  cloak th e i r  a ssa u lt. Thsy concurred with Theodore 
Roosevelt th a t  New Mexico should accept jo in t  statehood with Arizona, 
xdiile Otero le d  th e  movement fo r  s ing le  statehood. Since Roosevelt hoped 
fo r  immediate admission o f  New Mexico and Arizona as a s i n ^ e  s ta te ,  he 
lis te n e d  a tte n tiv e ly  to  rep o rts  th a t  Otero intended to  block th e  plan 
unless New Mexico could e n te r th e  Union alone. These r ^ r t s  in  tu rn  made 
him r e c ^ t iv e  to  o th er appeals fo r  a change o f governors, e sp ec ia lly  th e  
asse rtion  th a t  i f  Otero remained in  o ff ic e  a rev o lt soon would occur in  
the  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican organization . ̂
^Santa Fe New Miaxioan. September 9t 1905. P» 2, November 7» 1905» 
p. 2, November 29. 1905. P* 2, December 2, 1905. P« 2, December 6, 1905. 
p . 1 and January 4, 190o, p. 2.
7Santa Fe New Mexican. October 4, 1905. p . 2, December 23, 1905. 
p. 2, December 29, 1905. p . 2 and 1906 passim.
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At the  same tim e Roosevelt heaxd l i t t l e  favorable comment because 
th e  only inqportant leaders idio spoke in  Otero* s behalf were Delegate 
Andrews and Holm Bursum* B atu ra lly  th is  conflm ed h is  suspicion th a t  % e 
" l i t t l e  Govemor" had become unpopular, and he harbored pioayunish griev­
ances %hioh fhrbher Induced him to  b e lieve  th e  w orst. For example, a t  
the  f i r s t  reunion o f Bough Riders in  Las Vegas . New Mexico, Otero d e l i ­
be ra te ly  stood in  th e  way so Roosevelt could no t have h is  p ic tu re  taken 
alone* These and various o th er fac to rs  convinced th e  P resident th a t  a 
diange was neeessaxy, and f in a l ly  in  November, 1905 he ca lled  fo r  O tero 's 
resignation*^
Nhen Roosevelt removed the  " l i t t l e  Govemor" he p rec ip ita te d  th e  
very c r i s i s  he hoped to  prevent, since he deprived Republicans o f  the  
f im  hand which held  them together* B ioediately th e  p a rty  began to  d is in te ­
grate* Because Otero no longer con tro lled  patronage, he lo s t  h is  influence 
among lo c a l lead ers , and in  tu rn  h is  hold on th e  Republican d ec to ra te*  
Likewise, he l o s t  con tro l over h i ^  p a rty  councils and every major lead er 
was now free  to  esqtress h is  views about Republican p o liq r  without fe a r  o f 
reprisal* I
Almost equally devasta ting  to  th e  p a rty  was R oosevelt's subse­
quent re fu sa l to  spare th e  " l i t t l e  Governor's" feelings* To avoid 
hum iliation Otero announced h is  in te n tio n  to  step  down* L ater he explained 
th a t  he "had enough o f p o l i t i c s  fo r  awhile" and "deserved a vacation*
®The Bio Grande Republican. December 1 , 1905» P« 1; Otero; gg 
Nine Years as Governor, no* oa-63. 314-19, 321, 325. 26, 329-33.» Twitchell* 
The Leading Facts o f  Hew Heixico H isto ry . H ,  pp* 525-26; Curry* An jtato- 
tiogranhy. p . 192*
^Santa Fe New Mexioan* March 14, 1905, p . 2 and November 21,
1905» p. 1; Otero* Mv Nine Years as Governor, p* 335*
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Had th e  President indeed allowed him sudi sa tis fa c tio n , he doubtless w o ld  
have re t i re d  peacefu lly , fo r  he wanted more time with h is  fam ily. New 
Mexicans soon learned o f h is  actual d ism issal, however, idien Roosevelt 
bragged to  newsmen th a t  he f ire d  Otero to  save th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican 
party . I t  was p a r t  o f  a scheme to  qu ie t th e  turbulence which had char­
ac te rized  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican p a rty  since i t s  c reation . But th is  
in d isc re tio n  n a tu ra lly  em bittered Otero and h is  fr ien d s , and inadverten tly  
changed th e  Governor's Ring in to  a m ili ta n t m inority .
Thus in  a few days Roosevelt wrecked the  machine which had 
e ffe c tiv e ly  ru led  the  p a rty  fo r  nine years. This rash ac t reduced Repub­
lic a n  p o l i t ic s  once again to  a contest between an tagon istic  fac tio n s . But 
th e  President believed th a t  i f  he replaced Otero w ith an o u tsid er idro knew 
something about New Mexican p o l i t ic s ,  but 160 was uncommitted to  any one 
fac tio n , a l l  Republican leaders w u ld  accept him as a p a d f ie a to r  and the  
p a r ty 's  problems would be solved. U nfortunately, i t  d id  not work out 
th a t  way.
Considering th e  p e c u lia r i t ie s  o f  New Mexican p o l i t ie s ,  i t  seems 
un like ly  th a t  any o u ts id er could have succeeded, but Roosevelt believed 
he had in  Herbert J .  Ragerman th e  r ig h t man fo r  th e  job . Hagerman had 
grown up in  Wisconsin, attended Cornell U niversity  and immediately a f te r  
graduation became, a foreign diplomat. He seemingly knew something about 
New Mexican p o l i t ic s ,  fo r  h is  fa th e r  had been a ra ilro ad  promoter in  th e  
Pecos Valley. Therefore# whan Roosevelt reca lled  Mm in  January, 1906 
to  replace Otero as Govemor, he confidently  expected him "to clean up th e  
mess" in  th e  party .
^^^ e  Bio Grande Republican. December 1, 1905* p . 1; Curry* Jin 
Autobiography, pp. 192-93.
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Hageman had ample opportunity to  carxy out these  in s tru c tio n s , 
fo r  he was b e t te r  received than any govemor in  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  period .
New Mexican newsmen almost unanimously h a iled  h is  appointmsnt as th e  
salvation  o f t e r r i t o r i a l  Republicanism. Since no one R ^ b l ic a n  lead er 
had th e  power to  dominate th e  o thers , they a n  agreed to  a c c ^ t  hjjti as a 
t i t u l a r  leader. At f i r s t  a concidatozy mood reigned in  high p a rty  councns 
and both th e  Republican Central Committee and the  Repubncan Executive 
Committee included leaders from a n  fac tions vho worked peacefu lly  to ­
g e th e r .^  Though the  eonciliatozy  mood th a t  ex isted  was an uneasy one, 
i t  was broken only once during Hageman* s tenure vhen Otero*s frien d s in  
th e  le g is la tu re  re d is tr lc te d  the  t e r r i to r y  and despoiled Catron o f  h is  
sea t in  the  Councn.
Under these circumstances Hageman could have been t i e  most 
successful pa rty  leader in  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  period i f  he merely had aoeqpted 
th e  ro le  o f peacemaker and remained a loo f from p a rtisan  a f f a i r s .  He 
fa n e d  completely, however, because he took R oosevelt's in s tru c tio n s  as a 
command to  re fom  New Mexican p o l i t ie s  single-handedly. His s tra teg y  
evidently  was to  replace a l l  ex is ting  t e r r i t o r i a l  o f f ic ia ls  without regard  
fo r  fac tion  o r  pa rty  a f f i l ia t io n  in  hopes o f  creating  a nonpartisan o rder 
which he could con tro l completely.
D ievitably, Hageman* s refom  program turned every major
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. December 5, 1905« p , January 4, I 906, 
p . 2, January 17, 19O6 , p . 2, January IB, 1906, p. 1, September 29» 1906, 
p . 1, October 10, I 906, p . 1 and May 20, I 907, p. 2; T w itc h ^ ;  The 
Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory. H ,  p. 551.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. March 29, 1906, p . 1 , J p r i l  4, I 906, p , 1, 
May 17, I 9O6 , p . 2, September 26, I 906, p . 1 and October 24, I 906, p . 1; 
S3Luga: "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," p . 91.
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Republican lead e r in  New Mexico against him. The H ubb^ls drew away 
because he appointed Thomas' prosecutor, Frank W. dan cy , to  th e  Board 
of Regents o f th e  U n ire rs ity . He annoyed them furU ier vben he appointed 
Democratic Central Committee Seoretaxy Charles F. Easley to  a vacancy on 
th e  Board o f P en iten tia ry  Commissioners. This ac t ra ised  C atron's i r e  
espec ia lly , since i t  was Easley eho had replaced him in  the  Council fo l­
lowing the  con troversia l e lec tio n  back in  1900. Hagezman a lso  antagonized 
O tero 's  friends with an o rder th a t  no ind iv idua l could hold more than one 
public  o ff ic e  a t  a  tim e, and some hM  to  surrender patronage they  had held  
fo r  years. He made a b i t t e r  enemy o f Chairman Holm Bursum when he re ­
moved him from the  superintendency o f th e  P en iten tia ry . Aid he almost 
caused a revolution in  th e  p a rty  when he removed ^ e  e n tire  membership of 
th e  Bureau o f Immigration whidi Republicans had con tro lled  since 1880, 
and packed i t  with Democrats.
Indeed, had the  new govemor d e lib e ra te ly  planned to  destroy
support from every q u a rte r, he could no t have done b e t te r .  Leaders in  each
fac tio n  gloated as he offended o th ers , but in  th e  end they  a l l  cooperated
to  d isc re d it  him. O tero 's  frien d s le d  th e  way because they  con tro lled
patronage when Hageman had taken o ff ic e  and consequently suffered  most
from h is  re fo m s. Holm Bursum, fo r  example, p ra c tic a lly  devoted f u l l  time
to  f i t t i n g  Hageman. New Mexican e d ito rs  ran a se r ie s  o f  a r t ic le s  poin ting
out th a t  i f  he remained in  o ff ic e  th e  Democrats soon would take  over th e  
I kte r r i to r y .
^^Sm ta Fe New Mexican. January 8 , 1906, p . 2, February 21, 1906, 
p. 2, A p ril 5* 1906, p . 2 , May 18, 1906, p . 1, September 5» 1906, p. 2 and 
A pril 26, 1907, p* OteroX Mv Nine Years as Governor, p . 98; Oarry;
An Antobiographv. pp. 193-95»
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. A p ril!), 1907, p .2 and Ju ly  25, I 907, p .
2; Curryx An Antobicgraritar. pp. 19k~95,
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Delegate Andrews went to  th e  White Bmse to  ta lk  to  Roosevelt, 
and was followed by a idiole procession o f o ther c r i t ic s .  N aturally  tiiey 
enqdiasized Hageman* s co llaboration  with Democrats and produced evidence 
to  prove i t .  Indeed, l ik e  evexy previous t e r r i t o r i a l  governor Hageman 
had promised favors to  Democratic and Bepuhlican Councilors a lik e  to  win 
approval fo r  h is  nominees.
Roosevelt also heard a one-sided version o f  th e  Governor's Inm 
volvement in  a land swindle. A group o f  speculators had bargained with 
the  previous adm inistration  fo r  a la rg e  t r a c t  o f t e r r i t o r i a l  land a t  a 
rid icu lo u sly  low p rice , bu t Otero had fa i le d  to  approve th e  sa le . Con­
summation o f th e  deal f e l l  to  Hageman who rea lized  th a t  i t  was n o t in  th e  
best in te r e s t  o f  the  t e r r i to r y .  Yet, because i t  seemed le g a l, he signed 
th e  papers. This ev iden tly  was th e  ex ten t o f  h is  p a rtic ip a tio n , bu t by 
om itting c e rta in  d e ta ils ,  such as th e  fa c t th a t  Hageman d id  not p ro f i t  
personally , h is  adversaries placed him in  a bad l i ^ t . ^ ^
At any ra te , R oosevelt's v is i to r s  planted su ff ic ie n t seeds of 
doubt, wbidi combined with o th er fac to rs  caused the  P resident to  reconsider 
h is  choice o f  governor. Ju s t as personal grievances had influenced 
Roosevelt to  discharge Otero, they likew ise hastened h is  decision to  f i r e  
Hageman. The President expected th e  Govemor to  appoint a  fo m er Bou^ 
Rider, Captain George Curry, to  th e  o ff ic e  o f  Secretary o f  th e rT errito ry . 
Hageman in s tead  proposed th e  menial job o f  game warden. This, p lu s a 
rumor th a t  Hageman m i^ t  no t send a delegation to  th e  forthcoming
^%3gB0 R. Bichardsont "George Curry and the  P o li t ic s  o f  Forest 
Conservation in  New Uaocioo," New Mexico K Lstorical Review. A H III (October, 
19^)»  p . 278; Twitchell* Tha tAadiRR Facts o f  New Mexico H istory . U .  
pp. 5 ^ 5 5 ;  Curry* An Autoblogranhv. pp. 195-99*
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Repabllean National Convention amenable to  B oosevelt's in s tm c tio n s , con­
vinced th e  President th a t  he had made a m istake. In  ü p i i l ,  1907, he called  
fo r  Hageman*s resignation .^^
Again d issiden t Republican leaders celebrated th e  demise o f a 
dominating govemor, but vhen they turned back to  p a rtisa n  a f f a i r s  t h e i r  
d e l i c t  soon changed to  gloom. At no time since Catron* s dovnfall had 
th e  p a rty  been in  so bad a condition. For six teen  months i t  had gone 
without e ffec tiv e  supervision because a dozen d if fe re n t leaders had t r ie d  
to  fashion po licy  a t  the  same tim e. Now with Hageman out o f  th e  way o ld  
antagonisms reappeared. In  th e  succeeding fiv e  months New Mexico waé 
without a govemor and tension  mounted in  h i ^  p a rty  councils. Eadi mem­
b e r wanted to  take dbarge but d id  no t have su ff ic ie n t power to  overshadow 
the  o thers . Meanihile, Roosevelt had sen t agents to  the  t e r r i to r y  to  d e te r­
mine vhat could be done to  "d ea n  iq) the  mess, " so even i f  a l l  had agreed 
to  follow  one lead er there  was no c e rta in ty  th a t  he would be allowed to  
manage th e  p a rty . Moreover, what i f  th e  next Govemor proved as determined 
as Hageman to  run p o l i t ic s  by himself?
The Republicans a lso  faced th e  problem o f  diminishing m ajo ritie s  
a t  th e  p o lls . Democratic ranks had grown s te ad ily  from immigration in to  
eastern  New Mexico and from hundreds o f  disenchanted Republicans. This 
trend  became evident in  th e  congressional race in  I 906, then Andrews won 
by only 300 vo tes. Even then he was hard  pressed to  convince a congres­
sional committee th a t  h is  v ic to ry  was leg itim ate .
^^Santa Fe New Mexioan. J ^ r i l  25, 1907, p. 2, May 2, 1907, p . 2; 
T w itd ie ll: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory . H ,  pp. 550, 554-56.
^^The Rio Grande Renubliean. ^ r i l  20, 1907, p . 2; Santa Fe New 
Mexican. October I 7 , 1902, p . 2, November 10, 1906, p . 1 , May 24, 1 ' ^ ,  p.
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Then came the  f in a l  blow to  R ^ b l lc a n  morale idien word arrived  
th a t  George Cany was to  succeed Hagezman. New Mexicans remembered Curry 
from e a r l ie r  days idien he was a Democrat, and everyone knew how h e  had 
achieved p o l i t ic a l  prominence. Soon a f te r  h is  a r r iv a l  in  1B79, he launched 
h is  p o l i t ic a l  career as a member o f  th e  ru th le ss  “Whitlock gang" in  Colfax 
County. From th ere  he moved to  Lincoln County to  work fo r  James J .  Dolan 
o f Lincoln County War fame. Dolan and h is  friends secured h is  appointment 
to  several lo c a l o ff ice s , and eventually  h is  e lec tion  to  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
Council. The appointment o f  a man with such a background to  re s to re  har- 
mony in  the  Bepuhlican party  seemed to  Republicans l ik e  p la in  lunacy.
But Roosevelt saw Curry in  a d if fe re n t l ig h t .  He remembered him 
as a sound p a rty  man whom he had influenced to  jo in  the  Republican p a rty  
during the  % anish American War. Moreover, he served as a regional goverw 
nor in  the  Philippines and had received h i^ i  p ra ise  from William Howard 
T aft fo r  h is  adm inistrative  a b i l i ty .  Also he seemed to  have th e  q u a li t ie s  
Roosevelt a t  f i r s t  believed he saw in  Hageman. Curry possessed consider­
able knowledge about New Mexican p o l i t ic s ,  y e t he was unassociated with 
any fac tion  because o f long absence from th e  te r r i to r y .  Thus, ignoring 
p ro te s ts  from th e  te r r i to ry ,  Roosevelt appointed Curuy with confidence 
th a t  he would succeed idiere Hageman had fa ile d .
This time th e  President was no t disappointed, fo r  Curry displayed 
a l l  o f the  above a ttr ib u te s  and more. Doubtless much o f  h is  success as 
Qovempr resu lted  from h is  close friendsh ip  with Roosevelt and T aft, and
2, Ju ly  3, 1907, p . 2 and Ju ly  27, I 907, p . 2; Tw itchell: The 
Facts o f  New México H istory. H ,  pp. 54^46; Curry: An Antobiegrauhv.  pp.
198-99; Richardson: “George Curry and th e  P o li t ic s  o f  Forest Conservation 
in  New Mexico, " pp. 277. 78.
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18th a t  he consequently enjoyed unreserved cooperation from th e  White House. 
However, as a p a rty  lead er he succeeded through h is  own acumen. He 
excelled p rim arily  because he accepted th e  ro le  o f  appeaser and made no 
attempt to  dominate p a rty  a f f a i r s  o r  to  use h is  o ff ic e  fo r  s^ f-ag g ran d ize - 
ment.^9
Cuny se t th e  pace fo r  h is  adm inistration even before he returned
to  New Mexico. In  a telegram  he assured p a rty  lead ers  th a t  they need not
fe a r  h is  co llabora tion  with th e  opposition, fo r  he now was thoroughly
Republican. He also said he would no t take  sides in  ex is tin g  d i l u t e s .
Rather, i t  would be h is  purpose to  get a l l  Republicans to  work to g e th er
20in  order to  revive th e  p a rty ’ s power.
Once in  o ff ic e , he acted accordingly and went out o f  h is  way to  
befriend  major lead ers  o f a l l  fac tio n s . He t r ie d  e sp ec ia lly  hard to  con­
vince Catron and Otero to  work to g e th er, fo r  a t  th e  time they  were th e  most 
troublesome. To achieve t h i s  he se lec ted  a delegation  to  the  Republican 
N ational Convention o f 1908 which included Catron and Spiess from th e  one 
fac tio n , and Otero and Bursum from th e  o ther. He also  in v ite d  Otero and 
h is  frien d s to  p a r tic ip a te  in  h is  adm inistration  and he he ld  Catron in  
check through personal favors and f la t te ry .  For example, Then General J . 
ïŸanklin B ell came to  Now Mexico to  a tten d  th e  T e r r i to r ia l  F a ir  in  1906, 
Curry ju d ic io u sly  chose Lieutenant Thomas Catron, J r .  as th e  Garerai* s
^ O te ro ; Mv L ife on th e  F ro n tie r. 186^1882. pp. 106-07; Oirry:
An Autobiography. pp7 126-27; Tw itchell; The Leadlnp; Fafita o f  New Mexico 
H istory. U ,  pp. ^ 2 -6 3 .
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. January 7» 1908, p . 2.
^° I b id . , August 5, 1907» p. 2.
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aid . Whan Carry accompanied President T aft to  h is  famous meeting with 
P o rfirio  Diaz in  EL Paso, he in v ite d  Catron along. Through such gestures 
he acquired g rea t influence over th e  o ld  Santa Fe Ring leader. On Carry* s 
request, Catron even went so f a r  as to  personally  move in  th e  Council fo r 
O tero 's  appointment as T e r r i to r ia l  T reasurer.
Nor was i t  only by convincing o thers to  forgo pezw nal prefer^, 
ences th a t  Carry excelled as a p a rty  lead er. He compromised h is  own 
d esires  when p a rtisa n  harmony was a t  s take, e sp ec ia lly  a t  the  congressional 
nominating convention in  th e  f a l l  o f  1908. I t  was no sec re t th a t  he p e r­
sonally  d is lik e d  Delegate ^drew s and was dstenained to  oppose h is  
renomination. When Central Committee Chairman Bursum asked th e  Govemor 
to  reverse h is  po sitio n  to  avert upheaval, however, he turned h is  ^ b l e  
energy toward assuring Andrews' renomination and campaigned vigorously in  
h is  behalf.
One by one Republican leaders accepted Curry u n t i l  he had p ra c ti­
ca lly  th e  e n tire  p a rty  under con tro l. During h is  two year tenure he 
faced serious opposition only from one sm all group—Hagerman's d isgrun tled  
follow ers. And even they eventually  agreed to  support him, and made 
approval o f  h is  adm inistration p ra c tic a lly  unanimous in  th e  p a rty . A fter
th a t ,  only th e  "Hubbell gang" opposed him, bu t they  counted fo r l i t t l e .
1
During th e  l a s t  few t e r r i t o r i a l  years they  concerned themselves d i ie f ly
22
W ith  th e  recovery o f  l o s t  influence in  B ern a lillo  County.
Thus, had i t  been l e f t  to  t e r r i t o r i a l  Republican lead ers , ]Gkny
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexioan. January 18, 1906, p . Z; Sluga: "The
P o li t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," pp. 106-08; Curry: An Auto-
bio erabhy. pp. 202- 36, 246.
^^Curry: An Autobiograpbr. pp. 198, 208.
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doubtless would have remained in  o ff ic e  u n t i l  statehood. Though he made 
many friends, he unfortunately  made one enemy in  Washington lAo forced him 
to  give up th e  governorship in  th e  f a l l  o f  1909» As a cattleman with 
land adjoining the Lincoln N ational Forest, Curry opposed federa l conser­
vation p ro jec ts  as unnecessary encroachments upon th e  freedom o f  stodb- 
growers and an in ^a im en t o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  developmento During h is  f i r s t  
months in  o ff ic e , he nearly  clashed with Roosevelt and Gifford Finchot over 
th is  po licy , but y ielded out o f  regard fo r  th e  P re sid en t's  friendsh ip .
L ater, he stood h is  ground, idien Public Land Commissioner B. A. B allinger 
ordered a group o f  homesteaders around Clovis to  re linqu ish  lands upon 
vhich t h ^  had already f i le d  claims and made improvememts. U ltim ately,
Curry went to  Washington to  appeal th e i r  case, and Then he received no 
sa tis fa c tio n  from the  Public Land O ffice, he convinced Roosevelt to  rescind 
the  order. This triumph n a tu ra lly  enhanced h is  popu larity  in  th e  te r r i to ry ,  
but i t  proved h is  undoing. Wien T aft succeeded Roosevelt he appointed 
B allinger Secretary o f the  In te r io r  and thus made him Curry* s d ire c t 
superior. Cuny liv ed  with the  tense s itu a tio n  fo r  approximatoLy a year, 
then resigned because he believed h is  in a b i l i ty  to  wort with th e  Secretary 
adversely e ffec ted  New Mexican in te re s ts .
Unfortunate as th is  was fo r  Curry, i t  d id  no t n u l l i fy  h is  c o n tri­
bution to  th e  p a rty . He had already cemented th e  various fac tio n s , Wiieh 
continued to  cooperate as a  c lo se-k n it o rganisation  u n t i l  statehood.
W iliam  J .  M ills, th e  l a s t  t e r r i t o r i a l  Governor, d id  nothing to  d is tu rb
^^Twitchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexieo ELstorv. H ,  pp. 566-  
6fi; Curry: An Autobiography, pp. 225-27, 242-46; Richardson: "George Curry
and th e  P o lit ic s  o f  Forest Conservation in  Now Mexico, " pp. 278- 83 .
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Curry's achievements. Bat h is  ro le  in  th e  p a rty  -was in s ig n if ic a n t, fo r  
hy th e  time he took o ff ic e  Republican leaders were too preoccupied with 
forthcoming changes in  government to  n o tice  th e  change o f  governors.
Gurry i s  remembered as the  l a s t  prcsninent figure  in  t e r r i t o r i a l  
Republican h is to ry . He stands out with Breeden, Catron and Otero among 
th e  major a rd ii te c ts  o f th e  modem Hew Mexican Republican party . He took 
charge when the  p a rty  was on th e  verge o f  d is in te g ra tio n , t ie d  i t  together, 
and thereby preserved the  f r u i ts  o f  th e i r  e f fo r ts .
Furthermore, he had g rea t in fluence upon th e  l iv e s  o f  New Mexicans 
a f te r  statehood, fo r  h is  reu n ifica tio n  o f  the  p a rty  assured Republicans o f  
th e  p riv ileg e  o f  w riting th e  c o n stitu tio n . During h is  two yearrs in  o ff ic e  
Republican ranks continued to  sw ell and consequently p a rty  leaders had 
l i t t l e  d if f ic u lty  packing th e  C onstitu tional Convention with men amenable 
to  th e i r  philosophy. A ccordin^y, fo r  b e t te r  o r  worse, i t  was much because 
o f  Curry's influence th a t  New Mexico was to  embark on i t s  statehood course 
under conservative organic law .^^
^^S teta  Fe New Mexioan. January 15, 1912, p . 4; Tw itchéll: The 
Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory. U ,  pp. 566, 568? Curry: An Auto- 
biography, p p .  247. 2 4 9 . '
^% ie  Rio Grande Republican. November 14, I 908, p . 1: Santa Fe 
New Mexican. March 23, 1907, p . 2, March 25, 1907, p . 2, i4 ) iil  2, I 907, p . 2, 
October 23, I 908, p . 4, November 23, 3L908, p . 1, November 25, I 908, p . 4, 
February 15, 1910, p. 1, February 28, 19IO, p. 4  and January 15, 1912, p.
4; Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory. H .  pp. 545-46j 
Richardson: "George C uny and th e  P o li t ic s  o f  Forest Conservation in  New
Mexico," p . 277.
Œ£FSm  VII
THE CQNSTITaTIONÂL CONVENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH
With th e  Republicans in  th e  overtdielming m ajo iity  the  Con­
s t i tu t io n a l  Convention 1 9 1 ^ , th e  Democrats could no t do much 
but argue and vote 'no ,"  \M.eh t h ^  d id  on issu e  a f te r  is su e , thus 
e s tab lish in g  a record on some im portant fea tu res  o f  th e  co n sti­
tu tio n  %hich were to  reac t d isa s tro u s ly  against th e  Republican 
p a rty . 1
The New Mexican Republican p a rty  had developed th ro u ^  four major 
s t ^ s .  i l r s t ,  l&lliam Breeden estab lished  a Central Committee. Then 
Thomas Catron foste red  lo c a l  organizations and drew them toge ther under 
one leadersh ip  and a sing le  po licy . Next, Miguel Otero H  increased  the  
p a rty ’s  membership, coordinated lo c a l and c e n tra l machinery, and fashioned 
a t ig h t ly  d isc ip lin ed  u n it  out o f  i t s  m ajor wing. F in a lly , George Curry 
appeased d iss id e n t lead ers , lu red  them in to  the  main organization l e f t  
tgr Otero, and fo r  the  f i r s t  time drew a l l  fac tions to g e th er in to  a u n ified  
làiole.
By th e  time Curry had l e f t  o ff ic e  the  f in a l  touches had been 
given to  th e  p a r ty 's  machinery and th e  whole complexion o f  Republican 
a f fa i r s  had begun to  change from top to  bottom. Management o f  po licy  by 
a sing le  ind iv idua l now became a th ing  o f  th e  p a s t, fo r  h e re a f te r  lead e r­
ship emanated from th e  Central and Executive Committees. Ih te m a l 
wrangling lessened in  in te n s ity , as most o f  the  im portant leaders obtained
^Curry: An Aatobiogranhv» p. 255.
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a place in  th e  o rganizational h ierarchy , and n n ity  o f  purpose supplanted 
divergency o f aims. Thus, th e  f u l l  force o f th e  p a rty  f in a l ly  could be 
channeled in to  competition u ith  the  Democrats fo r con tro l o f  th e  s ta te  
government.
Thou^ Curry* s influence and th e  inclusion  o f  most leading  Repub­
lic a n s  in  the  in n e r c irc le  played a major ro le , th e re  were o th er fac to rs  
Tdaidh con tz itu ted  to  p a rty  u n ity . Foremost was the  rap id  growth o f th e  
Democratic p a rty  during th e  l a s t  few t e r r i t o r i a l  years. Previously, 
Republican leaders had f e l t  l i t t l e  incen tive  to  cooperate with one another 
since success a t  th e  b a llo t  box was a foregone conclusion. Rot only did 
they win the  m ajo rity  o f county o ffice s  in  every e lec tio n , they  also  
dominated both houses o f th e  le g is la tu re  except during the  years 189^98. 
Mareover, as th e  ta b le  on the  following page in d ic a te s , they m aintained 
contro l o f  the  g o v e m o r^ p  a l l  but e igh t o f  ü ie  fo r ty -f iv e  years o f  t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  h is to ry . During th e  same period  they  con tro lled  the  e le c tiv e  
o ff ic e  o f  Delegate to  Congress a l l  but six teen  years.
This predominance had allowed fo r  in tra -p a r ty  feuds and defections, 
but -üie rap id  growth o f  th e  Democratic p a rty  portended a more equal d iv i .  
Sion o f governmental contro l unless Republican leaders could s tic k  together. 
Even more compelling was th e  prospect o f  statehood, th e  primary in te g ra ­
t iv e  force o f  ih e  p a rty  fo r  several decades. Always Then ta lk  o f  a consti­
tu tio n a l  convention occurred. Republican lead ers  in s t in c tiv e ly  drew to ­
gether. The obvious reason was to  dominate th e  proceedings o f  a consti^ 
tu tio n a l convention, no t only fo r  p re s tig e  but also  to  insure  a conservative 
document. Since most Republicans were so c ia lly  and economically promin@it»- 
la iy e rs , m iners, bankers, merchants and ranchers—they n a tu ra lly  opposed
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Period Governor Delegate to  Congress
IB67-69 Bobert H itchell-B J* Francisco Ghavez-R
1869-71 WLlliam Pile-R J* Francisco Cbavez-R
2871-73 Marsh GLddings-R Jose Gallegos-D
1873-75 M ar^ (BLddlngs-R Stephen E33dLns-R
1875-77 Samuel Axbell-R Sbephen Elkins-R
1877-79 Samuel iz te l l -R Trinidad Romero-R
1879-81 Lewis Wallaca-R Mariano Otero-R
3881-83 L io n ^  aieldon-B Tranquilino Lona-R
1883-85 Lionel Sheldon-R F. A» Manzanares-D
1885-87 Edmond Boss-D Antonio Joseph-D
1887-89 Edmund Boss-D Antonio Joseph-D
I889r91 L. Bradford Prlnce-R Antonio Joseph-D
1893^93 L. Bradford Prince-R Antonio Joseph-D
1893-95 William Thomton-D Antonio Josqph-D
1895-97 VELlliam Thoznton-D Thomas Catron-R
1897-99 Miguel Otero-R Harvey Fergusson-D
1899-01 KLguel Otero-R Pedro Perea-R
1901-03 Miguel Otero-R Bernard Bod^-R
1903-05 Miguel Otero-R Bernard Rodey-R
1905-07 Herbert Eageiman-R William Andrews-R
1907-09 George Curry-R W iliam  Andrews-R
1909-11 m iia m  MLlls-R W iliam  Andrews-R
any fom  o f  western l ib é r a l is a  lA idi threatened t h e i r  h is to r ic  priv ileges* 
Bren diuring th e  b i t t e r e s t  fac tio n a l wars they read ily  cooperated with
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one another to  cuzh l ib e r a l  ideas.
likew ise, ü ie  prospect o f immediate statehood reg u la rly  in s t i l l e d  
peace in  h i ^  councils because each leading Republican hoped to  induce 
o thers to  help him capture an im portant post in  th e  new government. For 
a l l  th e  energy Thomas Catron e:^ended on immediate aims, fo r  example, he 
always considered e lection  to  the  United S ta tes Senate by the  f i r s t  s ta te  
le g is la tu re  as th e  prtmaxy end o f  p a rty  membership. This was tru e  even 
in  th e  years th a t  he sought e lec tion  as Delegate to  Congress, when con tro l 
o f  th e  p arty  was a t  stake. He confided to  Stephen KUdns th a t  h is  can- 
didacqr in  1892 and 1894 was e sse n tia lly  " p r^ a ra to iy  to  statehood. " I f  
he were to  "get anything under statehood," l ik e  a "Senatorship," he f e l t  
i t  necessary to  d isp lay  the  a b i l i ty  to  win f i r s t  p lace on the  t e r r i t o r i a l  
Republican t ic k e t .  ̂
Otero was no d if fe re n t. The p r o j e c t  o f  statdaood underlay h is  
determination to  conceal from th e  public  any opposition to  h is  adminis­
t r a t io n . Indeed, one o f  h is  ch ie f preoccupations was to  remain popular 
so th a t  pressure from th e  e le c to ra te  u ltim ate ly  would force  o th e r Repub­
lic a n  leaders to  choose him as the  f i r s t  United S ta tes Senator from 
northern New Mexico,^
^Bio Grande Republican. September 16, 1910, p . 2; Reuben W.
H eflin: "New Mexico C onstitu tional Convention, " New Mexico H is to riaa l
Review. XXI (January, 1946), p . 62; Thomas C« Donnelly: "The Making o f  th e  
New Mexico C onstitution—The C onstitu tional Convention &f 1910, " New 
Mexico Q uarterly. XU (November, 1942), pp. 437, 439-49; T. B. Catron to  
R. Fu lton  Cutting, October 25, 1911, Catron Papers, Personal C o rre^n d en ce ,
xXXi., p. 291#
^Elkins to  Catron, August 19, 1892, Catron Papers, Personal Cor­
respondence, Box 15 , l e t t e r  8606; Catron to  E lk ins, October 3, 1894,
Catron Papers, Personal Correspondence, Z, p. 619.
^ r g a n :  "New Mexico's F i ^ t  fo r  Statehood 1895-1912," New
Mexico H is to riaa l Review. XIV (January, 1939), p. 32.
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The same was tru e  with o ther p rln c ip h i Republican leaders during 
th e  l a s t  few t e r r i t o r i a l  y ears, as statehood seemed " ju s t  around the  
com er."  As a re s u lt  th e  p a r ty 's  in n er c ir c le  assumed th e  charac ter o f  
a congenial soc ie ty  o f fr ien d s , and once Congress passed th e  Enabling Act 
the  members campaigned together, cooperated to  apply maximum pressure on 
lo c a l leaders , and thus won contro l o f th e  C onstitu tional Convention. The 
pre-convention e lec tio n  was a Republican landslide ; out o f  one hundred 
delegates chosen, seventy-one were Republicans, tw e n ty -e i^ t  were Democrats, 
and one was a S o c ia l is t .^
Because o f th is  m ajority . Republican lead ers  saw no reason to  
include th e  opposition in  d ra ftin g  New Mexico's c o n s titu tio n . Proceedings 
revolved ch ie fly  around a "co te rie  o f  s ix " : R ^ b l ic a n  veterans Thomas
Catron, Solomon Luna, Holm Bursum and Charles % ie ss , and A iture leaders  
Albert F a ll  and Charles ^ r in g e r .  These h a lf  dozen men took complete 
charge, divided th e  work among themselves and wrote th e  document p ra c ti­
ca lly  without a ssis tan ce .
The means used were simple. F i r s t ,  %)iess won th e  convention 
chaim anship to  assure favorable decisions in  case o f  controverey on 
th e  flo o r. Then th e  "co te rie  o f six" took contro l o f  the  im portant 
Committee on Committees, th e  c h ie f function o f  # i6 h  was to  appoint 
twenty-seven standing committees. N aturally , they  chose themselves to  
head the  ones o f  g rea te s t importance. For example, A lbert F a ll became 
dhaiman, o f  th e  Committee on th e  L eg isla tive  Department, Bursum dominated 
th e  im portant Committee on Corporations, and Springer ran th e  Committee
^Thomas J . Mabry: "New Mexico's C onstitu tion in  th e  Making—
Reminiscences o f  1910," New Mexico H is to rio a l Review. XIX (A pril, 1944), 
p. 170.
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on C onstitu tional Revisions.
Technically th e  C onstitution had to  run the  gaun tle t o f popular 
referendum, and since the  e le c to ra te  vas unsdiooled and h i ^ l y  vulnerable 
to  suggestion, issu es counted l i t t l e  in  t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i t ic s .  N aturally  
Democratic l ib e r a ls ,  h o s t i le  because o f th e  shabby treatm ent they received 
by th e  conservative m ajority , planned to  a ttack  each provision o f  the  
co n stitu tio n  in  hopes o f defeating  i t .  The "co te rie  o f there fo re  
had to  devise means to  shut o f f  the  Democrats and a t  th e  same time to  keep 
th e  public  in  th e  dark as much as possib le . Th^y th ere fo re  required th a t  
a l l  standing committees submit th e i r  respective  recommendations to  the  
Republican caucus fo r  ^ p ro v a l. Once before th e  f lo o r  they could be 
voted upon without unnecessary delay. Moreover, the  Republicans allowed 
no r o l l  c a l l  except by request from t h i r t y  members—one more than the  
to ta l  non-Republican delegation. This was designed to  prevent embarrassment 
to  ind iv idua l de legates idien th e  tim e came to  s e l l  th e  fin ished  document 
to  th e i r  co n stitu en ts . For s tm ilis r  reasons, only committee reports 
and to ta l  vo tes appeared in  o f f ic ia l  records.^
Subsequently Republican lead ers  mingled with constituen ts and 
to ld  them how to  vote. Because o f sudi ta c t ic s ,  the  e le c to ra te  obviously 
responded, '«hen ca lled  upon to  accept the  C onstitu tion . Thou^ some 
opposition ex is ted  in  th e  eastern  counties, seventy .five  percent o f  th e  
vo ters expressed approval on referendum day.
Thus, -Uirough mutual cooperation and p ra c tic a l p o l i t ic s .  Repub. 
lic a n s  b r o u ^ t  about th e  crowning achievement o f  th e i r  p a r ty 's  h is to ry .
^Tw itchell: The leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory . H ,  p. 584*, 
Donnelly* "The Making o f  th e  New Mexico C onstitu tion ,"  pp. 4)9-49.
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As most o f them saw i t ,  not only had they as a party  received a mandate 
to  se t up th e  f i r s t  s ta te  government, thqy likew ise had won public 
endorsement o f conservatism. Leaders such as Catron and Bursum ju b i­
la n t ly  pred icted  th e  collapse o f  the  opposition and a sweep o f th e  fo rth ­
coming e lec tion .
Some prominent Republicans d id  not share th is  confidence, however, 
Ralph Bnerson Twitch e l l  warned th a t  pub lic  endorsement o f  the  C onstitution 
migjht have stemmed from o ther causes, and th a t  once New Mexico became a 
s ta te , vo ters m i^ t  re-examine the  p rin c ip le s  i t  contained and resen t 
th e  means by idiidi i t  was forced upon them. He f e l t  th a t  many approved 
only as an expression o f g ra titu d e  to  Delegate William Andrews, th ro u ^  
Those influence with Senators Matthew Quay and Boies Penrose th e  New 
Mexico Bhabling Act had been passed. Others saw race as th e  c ru c ia l fa c to r . 
There was not a sing le  "native” among th e  tw enty-eight Democratic dele­
gates a t  th e  Convention, ThUe out o f seventy-one R ^ b l ic a n s ,  th i r ty -  
fiv e  bore Spanish names. Perhaps th e  "natives" accepted th e  C onstitution 
in  re tu rn  fo r  th i s  recognition. S t i l l  o thers believed a su b s tan tia l per­
centage o f vo ters rea lized  the  reluctance o f  President T aft and numerous 
Congressmen from th e  A tlan tic  seaboard to  endorse statehood under a consti­
tu tio n  any le s s  conservative than th e  one d rafted . 7
Even th e  "co te rie  o f  six;" must have had some doubts th a t  approval 
fo r  th e  Constitution would be tantamount to  v ic to ry  in  the  f i r s t  s ta te  
e lec tion . At the  Convention they c a re fu lly  gerrymandered the  new s ta te  
“to assure domina'tion o f  th e  f i r s t  le g is la tu re , and hence th e  f i r s t  United
^TwLtehell: The Leading Facts o f New Mexico H istory. H ,  pp.
546, 575-78, ^8 -8 9 ; Beck: New Miexico. pp. 298-99: Donnelly: "The Making 
of th e  New Mexico C onstitu tion ," p . 444; Curry: An Autobiogranhv. p . 256.
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S ta tes Seaaatorships. For puzposes o f  represen ta tion  in  th e  s ta te  le g is ­
la tu re  th sy  attached Democratic Lincoln and questionable Otero Counties to  
Republican Dona Aa& County. Socorro County, tdiich was a lso  sa fe ly  R i^ b - 
l ic a n , received i t s  own s ta te  Senator, and in  addition  was combined with 
surrounding counties in  **shod-string" d i s t r i c t s  to  assure Republican 
contro l over th ree  o th e r sea ts .^
Once th e  C onstitu tion was approved by th e  e le c to ra te , however, 
most o f th e  prinqipâib p a rty  lead ers  ignored th e  an a ll but deteznined 
group o f  l ib e ra ls .  This was a m istake, fo r  under th e  leadersh ip  o f  
Harvey Fergusson the  l ib e r a ls  made good use o f  evezy opportunity to  a s s a i l  
th e i r  opponent* s hi^i-handed methods, denounce conservatian, and to  pub­
l ic iz e  th e  advantage o f  popular goveznment. By th e  time th e  p ra- convention 
e lection  ended, evezyone knew the  meaning o f  i n i t i a t iv e  and referendum. 
Thou^ pressure from lo c a l Republican c h ie fta in s  and the  d esire  fo r  s ta te ­
hood would detezmine th e  choice o f de legates, th e  v o ters  were schooled in  
appropriate means to  l ib e ra te  themselves th e  fu tu re  from these  p o l i t ic a l  
overlords.^
Vlhere possib le  Fergusson Democrats got th e i r  views across to  th e  
public from the  Convention f lo o r . Frequently, th e i r  arguments were cut 
short, and they # d  not get in to  o f f ic ia l  records, but th e  convention was 
open to  the  public  and newsmen reported p a rts  o f  the  debates. At le a s t  
evezyone leazned o f  the  s ix te e n  " irreco n cilab les"  160 held  out to  th e  end
®Bdward D. Tittmann: "New Mexico's C onstitu tional Convention:
R ecollections," New Mexico H is to riea l Review. ZXVU (Ju ly , 1952), p . 179; 
Mabzy: "New Mexico's C onstitu tion in  th e  Making," p. 1?4.
^Donnelly: "The Making o f  th e  New Mexico C onstitu tion, " p . 436.
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because tb%r believed th e  co n stitu tio n  was an indefensib le  encroachment 
upon popular p rerogatives.
L ater vdien th e  co n stitu tio n  went before th e  public  fo r  approval, 
Fergusson and h is  apostles followed Republican c o n s titu tio n a l promoters 
from constituency to  c o n s titu e n c y .^  Soon a f te r  th e  v o te r had heard a 
favorable speech in  behalf o f th e  c o n stitu tio n , he then learned  o f some 
o f i t s  shortcomings, such as unreasonable apportionment, expensive govern­
mental machinezy, favoritism  to  corporations and i l l e g a l  land laws. The 
Fergusson group also  p ro tested  vigorously against th e  exclusion o f  e lec tio n
and corrupt p rac tic e s  a c ts  and among o th er th in g s th e  i n i t i a t iv e ,  refe ren -
12dum and re c a l l .
As th e  f i r s t  s ta te  e lec tio n  drew near in  th e  f a l l  o f  1911, 
importance o f  th i s  l ib e r a l  in d o c trin a tio n  became in c re a s in ^ y  evident. 
Geogge Curry saw i t s  s ign ificance  idien he cautioned Chairman Bursum th a t  
New Mexican v o te rs  now were "thinking fo r  themselves, " and no longer could 
be counted upon to  sutm it to  "iron hand" ta c t ic s .  I t  was in  response to  
a new mood in  th e  e le c to ra te  th a t  Herbert Hagerman threatened to  lead  an
^^Donnelly: "The Making o f  th e  New Ifexico C onstitu tion ,"  p.
H eflin: "New Mexico C onstitu tional Convention, " pp. 64-6?; Tittmann:
"New Mexico's C onstitu tional Convention: R eco llec tions," pp. ]j81-82;
Mabry: "New Mexico's C onstitu tion in  th e  Making," pp. 173-74, 177-79;
Harvey B. Fergusson and Frank W. Clancy: M dresses on th e  MaMne o f  a 
C onstitution (Albuquerque: U niversity  o f New Mexico; 1910) , pp. 0- I 5.
^D onnelly : "The Making o f th e  New îfexico C onstitu tion ,"  p . 446;
Tittmann: "New Mexico's C onstitu tional Convention: R eco llec tions,"  p .
177; Mabry: "New Mexico's C onstitu tion in  th e  Making," p . 171; T w i tc h ^ :
The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico H istory . I I ,  p» 586.
^^Rio Grande Republican. November 11, I 910, p . 2; Coarv: A H istory  
o f  New Mexico. I .  p . 415: T w itchell: The Lemding Facts o f New Mexico His­
to ry . H ,  pp. 58&-88; Mabry: "New M exico's C onstitu tion in  th e  Making,"
pp. 170- 71.
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uprising  in  the  party  un less i t  " k ^ t  up u ith  the  tim es. " E d ito rs o f 
th e  powerful Rio Grande Republican recognized the  trends vh m  they pre­
d ic ted  d is a s te r  fo r  the  p a rty  un less i t  became %ore progressive.
Republican lead.ers should have taken new stock o f th e  s itu a tio n  
when a b o lt occurred in  B em alillo  County. There W. H. GiUenwater foisaed 
a separate County Republioan Central Committee and launched a Hageman-for- 
Goveznor movement. Danger also  ex isted  from the  fa c t th a t  Fergusson's 
follow ers were growing rap id ly  from immigration. During the  month o f 
March, 1911 alone approximately 3,000 Anglos moved in to  th e  eastern  counties, 
and most o f  these  wore l ib e r a l  Democrats.^^
Any one o f these  signs should have induced th e  "co te rie  o f  six" 
to  a c t more dem ocratically idien thqy made up th e i r  t ic k e t ,  but they  s t i l l  
deluded thanselves in to  th inking  th a t  v ic to ry  would be th e ir s  regard less 
o f  h i^ -handed  ta c t ic s .  New Mexican e d ito rs  encouraged th i s  b e l ie f  with 
assurance th a t  public  approval o f the  C onstitution had reduced th e  Demo­
c ra tic  p a rty  to  a conglomerate o f fac tio n s , and th a t  men l ik e  Hagerman 
and Gillenwater eventually  would f a l l  in  l in e . Republican leaders  also 
received encouragement from th e  defection o f  Democratic ch ie fta in  Octaviano 
Larrazolo in  August, 1911. Larrazolo seemingly contro lled  th e  "native" 
bloc o f  th e  Democratic p a rty . He ^ e n t  th e  e n tire  f a l l  campaigning against 
race prejudice among former assoc ia tes , urging a l l  l^anish-Americans to
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. September 23, 1911, p.. 2, S^tem bor 27,
19U , p. k  and November 28, 1908, p. 4; Curry: An Autobiography, pp. 27I -
72.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. April 8 , I 9I I ,  p. 4, August 3I ,  191I ,  p . 3 , 
September 9. 1911, p . 3. S^tem ber 12, 191I ,  p . 3, S^tem ber 28, I 9I I ,  p.
7 and February 28, 1917, p . 2; Rio Grande Republican. September 9, I 9IO, 
p. 2 and November 10, 1911, p . 2 .
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jo in  him in  th e  Republican party .
The ^co terie  o f six" concluded th a t  th e re  was no great d iscontent 
among th e  rank and f i l e .  Bursum immediately seized th e  gubexnatoiial 
nomination fo r  h im self, and awarded o ther choice p o sitio n s to  fav o rite s  
o f  th e  inner c ir c le .  He then ca lled  a nominating convention to  r a t i f y  
h is  actions.
However, a rebe llion  occurred a t  th e  convention \diich would prove 
the  most important p a rtisan  event o f  th e  c o n s titu tio n a l period. Heibert- 
Hageiman quickly co llec ted  a bloc o f  delegates, a l l  o f  idiom agreed before­
hand to  b o lt un less the  Old Quard changed i t s  ways. They then decided 
upon th e  gubexnatorial nomination as a t e s t  case and announced th a t  thqy 
would leave th e  p a rty  un less -someone o ther than Holm Bursum headed the  
t ic k e t .  Accordingly, th%r issued  an ultimatum idien proceedings opened. 
Hageiman received no response and withdrew h is  following to  organize 
another convention under th e  name Republican Progressive League o f  New 
Mexico.^?
At f i r s t  th e  Old Guard ignored th e  Progressive movement as 
another temporary phenomenon l ik e  th e  Independent u p ris in g s  o f t e r r i t o r i a l  
years, For a tim e th e i r  a tt i tu d e  seemed justifialxLe because th e  League's 
membership was sca tte red  in  small groups a l l  over th e  te rz ito x y  and 
floundered fo r  lack  o f  coordination and d irec tio n . Soon i t  became more
^ ^Santa Fe New Mexican. March 31, 1911, p. 4, August 31, 1911, p#
3 and August 25, 1911, p . 4 ; Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Maxlco 
H istory. H, pp. 596- 99.
^^Twitchell: The Leading Facts o f New Mexico H istory. I I ,  pp.
597-98.
Charles B. Judah: Qovemor Richard n. r a n  on: A Study in  New
Mexico P o li t ic s  (Albuquerque: D ivision o f  Research, Department o f  Govern, 
ment. U niversity  o f  New Mexico; 1948), p . 11.
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serious, Tôien two o th er ezmgovernors le n t  t h e i r  support. Miguel Otero 
joined in  hopes o f  recovering h is  lo s t  p o l i t i c a l  forbunes, and quickly 
became Mew Mexico's foremost Progressive. George Curxy, th o u ^  he did 
not ac tiv e ly  p a r tic ip a te  as a member, likew ise  gave h is  support because 
he believed in  th e  League's p rin c ip le s . % th  Hageiman, Otero and Curxy 
behind i t ,  the  Progressive movement swelled rap id ly . Numerous le s s e r  
leadeM  who had b en efltted  from th e  adm inistrations o f  these  th re e  men 
b ro u ^ t  in  add itiona l members, and by e lec tio n  time th e  Progressives 
commanded several thousand vo tes.
By themselves they  posed no immediate th re a t  to  th e  Old Guard 
and stood l i t t l e  chance o f  upse ttin g  th e  pow erfil Republioan t ic k e t  as a 
th ird  party . Yet, simple arithm etic  showed th a t  i f  they  were to  jo in  
forces wi"Wi th e  Democrats and presen t th e  b e s t candidates from both p a r t ie s  
on th e  same t ic k e t ,  they  had a good chance to  win a su b s ta n tia l percentage 
o f adm inistrative  posts , and even to  defea t Holm Bursum in  th e  Governor's 
race. N aturally  th e  Progressives had qualms about fusion with t h e i r  fo m er 
adversaries, but the  stakes were h i ^ .
Due to  gerrymandering a t  th e  C onstitu tional Convention, regu la r 
Republicans were assured o f  contro l over th e  le g is la tu re . By capturing 
th e  adm inistrative branch, as w ell, they  could continue th e  predominance 
t h ^  enjoyed in  t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es. In  a n tic ip a tio n  o f  a sweep o f  th e  f i r s t  
s ta te  e lec tion  th e  "co te rie  o f  six" had fixed  th e  te rn s  o f th e  f i r s t
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. January 10, 1912, p. 4, August 2, 1912, 
p. 6 , October 11, 1912, p . 6 and Ju ly  15» 1916, p. 2; Rio Grande Republic 
can, November 17, 1911» p« 2; Judah: Richard G. Pjinon. p . 10; Richardson: 
"George Cuny and th e  P o li t ic s  o f  Forest Conservation in  New Mexico," 
p. 283.
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s ta te  adm inistrative  o f f ic ia l s  a t  f iv e  y e a r s .  Thus, Progressives 
eventually  concluded th a t  they had to  co llabo ra te  with th e  Democrats.
I f  they  fa ile d  to  make a mark in  th e  f i r s t  s ta te  e lec tio n , th e i r  chances 
o f su rv ival as an Independent group appeared remote indeed.
Forming a Democratic-Progressive t ic k e t  was problem atical because 
o f H arv ^  Fergusson. Foremost among lead ers  a t  th e  jo in t  nominating con­
vention, he was the lo g ic a l one to  compete with Republican Holm. Bursum fo r  
th e  governorship. S t i l l  because o f  h is  rad ic a l views, many in  attendance 
abhorred th e  prospect o f  h is  running th e  s ta te  government. The wealthy 
Hagerman must have winced a t  th e  th o u ^ t ,  fo r  a l th o u ^  he posed as a 
l ib e ra l ,  he was in  the  Progressive movement mainly to  get revenge on th e  
Old Quard—not to  fo s te r  a v e rita b le  so c ia l and economic revolu tion . 
Numerous o th er moderates in  both th e  Democratic and Progressive p a r t ie s  
f e l t  the  same, and th e re  were many d iss id en t Republicans ready to  defect 
to  th e  Democratic p a rty  i f  o ffered  leadersh ip  tdiich would respect th e  
ex is ting  order. Since FergdSeson obviously could no t carry  these  moderates, 
he was persuaded to  become a candidate fo r  th e  United S ta tes  House o f  
R ^ resen ta tiv e s . His a cc ^ tan c e  was th e  re s u l t  o f  a d e s ire  to  re tu rn  to  
Washington, p lu s th e  fa c t  th a t  he rea lized  th a t  Iftlliam  C. McDonald had 
a b e tte r  chance in  th e  governor’ s race. An a ffab le , conservative business­
man, McDonald had a wide appeal, and th e  l ib e r a l s  were c e rta in  to  follow
^^Republican lead ers  claimed to  have fixed  adm in istra tive  te rn s  
a t  l iv e  years because o f  u n certa in ty  as to  idien th e  f i r s t  s ta te  e lec tio n  
would be held . Their confidence o f  v ic to ry  was probably more im portant 
to  th a t  decision , however. The o rig in a l co n s titu tio n  also  provided fo r  
a four year term fo r  th e  Governor, but th i s  was reduced to  two years by 
amendment in  1914. As fo r  s ta te  le g is la to r s ,  they  always have served terms 
o f  two years. Goan: A H istory  o f Mew Mexico. I ,  p. 496.
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Fergusson*s lead  anyway.^®
Together th e  Democrats and Progressives carried  out a h ighly 
e ffe c tiv e  campaign, with McDonald a ttra c tin g  moderates from a l l  th ree  
p a r t ie s . As fo r  Fergusson, no one except Albert F a ll could compete with 
Mm as a campaigner. Otero, the  Progressive candidate fo r  th e  s ta te  
Senate from Santa Fe County, as usual a ttra c te d  a la rge  following.
Hageiman also  contributed immeasurably, fo r  he now owned an in te re s t  in
21th e  Albugueraue Journal and used i t  to  popularize th e  Progressive League.
The Democratic-Progressives centered the  a ttack  ch ie fly  upon 
Republican machine bossism. Holm Bursum bore th e  brunt, but th e  so-called  
"Blue B allo t controversy" received considerable a tten tio n  as w ell. This 
controversy took i t s  name from a blue b a llo t  Thereby ihe  v o ters  were 
ca lled  upon by the  United S ta tes House o f  Representatives to  reconsider 
th e i r  to ta l  acceptance o f th e  C onstitu tion . The House, Then i t  saw th a t  
amendment precedures made fu tu re  c o n s titu tio n a l rev ision  Impossible, 
rewrote the  a r t i c le  on amendments and ordered th a t  th e i r  rev is ions be sub­
m itted  to  the  New Mexican v o te rs  in  th e  f i r s t  s ta te  S e c tio n . This enabled 
Progressives and Democrats to  remind the  e lec to ra te  o f  th e  "iron hand" 
methods used by the  "co te rie  o f  six" a t  th e  C onstitu tional Convention.
In  addition, they sharpened th e ir  c iitic ism s o f stalTiait conservatism, 
and demanded the overthrow o f  the autocratic machine Thich had ruled
Santa Fe New Mexican. February 27, 1917, p. 4; TTJitcheOLl: The 
Leading Facts o f  New Itegieo H istory . U ,  p . 599; Curry: An Autobiography.
pp. 258- 59.
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. October 6, 1911» P» 3» October 13, 19H» 
p. 6, October l4 ,  I 9I I ,  p . 4, October 17, I 9I I ,  p* 3 snd October 19, 1911» 
p. 4; T w itchell: The Leading Facts o f New Mexico H istory . I I ,  pp. 6OO-OI; 
Curry: An Autobiograthv. o . 260.
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22New Mexico fo r  so long.
E lection day proved a devastating blow to  Republicans idien the  
people accepted Fergusson's advice regarding the  Blue B a llo t. Whereas some 
seventy-five percent o f  the  vo ters had voted fo r  the  C onstitution pre­
viously, now more than s ix ty  percent endorsed e a s ie r  amendment procedures. 
This revealed th a t  acceptance o f  the  C onstitu tion had not been so much a 
RepulxLican mandate a f te r  a l l .  Rather i t  ind icated  the  d esire  fo r  s ta te ­
hood, and with statehood a certa in iÿy  th e  vo ters more accurately  œqpressed 
th e i r  fee lings on Republican ta c t ic s  and eonservatiam by demanding more 
voice in  governmental a f fa ir s .
S tate  e lec tion  re tu rns likew ise re fle c ted  a p a r t ia l  re jec tio n  
of Republican leadersh ip . The Old Guard claimed a triumph vhen th e i r  
candidates won tw o-th irds o f  the  367 o ffice s  f i l l e d ,  but more carefu l 
analyses ind icated  otherwise. Republican in te rp re ta tio n s  fa i le d  ^  show 
th a t  th e i r  g rea te s t success was in  the  le g is la t iv e  e lec tion , which they 
had “rigged" th ro u ^  gerrymandering. Moreover, they passed over th e  fa c t 
th a t  many o f  th e i r  candidates were Republican in  name only. George 
Curry, fo r  example, won a sea t in  th e  n a tio n a l House o f  Representatives 
on the  Republican t ic k e t ,  but he belonged ph ilosophically  to  th e  Progres­
sive  party .
At th e  same time the  Republicans suffered  defeat in  severa l very 
important races, e spec ia lly  fo r  th e  ^ b e m a to r ia l  o ff ic e . Democratic 
candidates also won th e  lieu ten an t governorship and th e  o ff ice s  o f  S ta te
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. October 1?, I 91I ,  p. 4 and November 9»
1911. p. 4; Curry: An Autobiography, p . 257,
^^Curry: An Autobiogranhv. p. 26l.
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Treasurer and Saperinteaident o f  Public In s tru c tio n . Progressives Richard 
H. Hanna and George A. Van Stand were e lected  to  th e  Supreme Court and 
Corporation Commission. Indeed, the  fa c t th a t  the; Republican p a rty  was 
a t the  peak o f i t s  power p r io r  to  th e  e lec tion  would seem to  in d ica te
2 llth a t  a tzinmph required  a  complete sweep a t  th e  p o lls .
This l a s t  po in t was o f  considerable importance, and fa i lu re  to  
win a l l  o ff ice s  spread di&iHusionment up and down the  ranks. The ProG 
gressive-Democratic campaign had concentrated successfu lly  upon Holm Bursum 
as a symbol o f  Republican bossism. likew ise. Republican streng th  was 
g rea tly  damaged the  Progressive-Democratic v ic to ry  on th e  Blue B allo t 
issu e . Fergusson l ib e ra ls  had proved popular w ith th e  e le c to ra te . Pro­
gressives were on the  ascent, and Republicans were destined  to  f a l l  unless 
th e i r  leaders heeded th e  warnings "to keep up with th e  tim es.
Republicans did f in d  some consolation in  the  prospects o f 
se lec ting  United S ta tes Senators, since they now con tro lled  th e  s ta te  
le g is la tu re . T e t, even th is  had i t s  discouragement fo r  th e  u n ity  they 
formerly enjoyed a t  th e  C onstitu tional Convention had been shakened by 
the  e lec tio n . Bursum* s defea t weakened confidence in  p a rty  leadersh ip  
and forced each to  Ihok to  h is  own in te re s ts .  The se n a to ria l con tests 
th ere fo re  quickly turned in to  an "every-man-foxv-himself a f f a i r .
^ S a n ta  Fe Hew Meadcm. November 25. 1911, p . 4, December 28, 1911, 
p. 6 and March 16, 1912, p . 4; T w itchell: The lead^npf ffants o f  New Meacioo 
H istory. H ,  p. 602; Curry: In  Autobiogranhv. pp. 261-62: Coan: A H is-"**
to ry  o f  New Mexico. I ,  pp. 49^-97; Mabry: "New Mexico's C onstitu tion in
th e  Making," p. i f 5.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. November 13, 1911, p; 4 , February 15, 1912, 
p. 4 aiui March 7, 1912. p. 4; Bio Grande Republican. November 3$ 1911, p.
2; Tw itchell: The Leading Facts o f  New Mexico Histohv. H ,  pp. 552-53; 
T heil: "New Mexico's B ilingual P o li t ic s  and Factiorial D isputes," p . 23;
John T. R ussell: "Racial Groups in  th e  New Mexico L eg isla tu re , " Ann «la o f
th e  Anerloan Academy o f P o l i t ic a l  and Social Science. CXCV (1938), p . 67.
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Fom er Delegate Andrews and Bursum demanded senatorshlps in  
re tu rn  fo r  t h e i r  e ffo r ts  in  th e  statehood movement. % lliam  M ills th o u ^ t  
he deserved reward fo r  h is  serv ice  to  th e  pa rty  id iile  in  th e  Governor* s 
Mansion. Solomon Inna, L. Bradford Prince, Charles Springer and Octaviano 
Larrazolo likew ise  entered th e  race. Moreover, Thomas Catron, A lbert 
F a ll and Charles %)iess, believed th a t  they  were equally deserving o f 
the  honor.
The se lec tio n  o f F a ll fo r  one Senatorship was never in  doubt.
L ater Bronson Cutting produced evidence th a t  F a ll won th e  o f f ic e  th ro u ^  
b ribery , but th e re  were o ther reasons. For one th ing , he was th e  most 
popular p o l it ic ia n  in  the  p a rty . And, l ik e  Curry, he had recen tly  come 
in to  the  party  without the  stigma o f  bossism. Moreover, no one in  th e  
s ta te  except Fergusson b e t te r  grasped th e  proper ro le  o f a le g is la to r ,  o r 
could b e tte r  p resen t Mew Mexico’s problems and d esires  on th e  f lo o r  o f  
th e  Senate.
I t  was th e  o ther sea t th a t  caused tro u b le . Throu^i th ir ty - f iv e  
b a llo ts  th e  various contenders fought, and the  strugg le  would no t have 
ended then but fo r  a rumor th a t  Spanish-American Republican l e g i s l a t o r
were planning to  support some Democrat fo r  th e  o ff ic e , provided he was a
' )
member o f  th e i r  race. Also, ih e re  was a meeting in  th e  "smoke f i l le d "  
h o te l room o f  Thomas Catron. Evidence regarding what took p lace i s  not 
availab le  to  th i s  w rite r, but th e  meeting resu lted  in  th e  old Ring le a d e r 's  
u ltim ate  se lec tio n .
^^Santa Fe Mew Mexican. Februaxy l6 , 1911, p. 7, Februaiy 20, 1911, 
p . 3, August 23, 1911, p . 3, December 11, 1911, p. 4, March 27, 1912, p . 1 
and August 24, 1914, p . 1 ; Cuny: An Autobiography, pp. 265-66;, Sluga*
"The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron, " p. 123; Armstrong* P o r tra i t  
o f  Bronson Cutting, p. l4 .
136
I t  g ra t if ie d  many Republicans to  send Catron and F a ll to  the  
Senate» ba t they a l l  knew th a t  the  change from t e r r i to r i a l  s ta tu s  to  s ta te ­
hood had had a ruinous e ffe c t upon th e  p a rty . Prospects fo r  th e  fu tu re  
were dim, fo r  New Mexican vo ters had made i t  c le a r  t iia t they no longer 
would support d ic ta to r ia l  leaders o f to le ra te  "iron hand" ta c t ic s .  The 
democratic pa rty  on the  o th er hand was obviously growing stronger. Repub­
lic a n s  faced add itional th re a t from the  Progressive League, i6 ioh  promised 
to  grow in to  a A H -fledged  party . Less than two years before a t  th e  
C onstitu tional Convention th e  Republicans seemed unbeatable, but now they 
were in  a s ta te  o f  conAxsion and decline , i f  no t destined fo r  to ta l  
ex tinc tion .
CEAPTBB V in
PROGRESSIVES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1912-1930
The Republican p arty  needs j^Bronso^ Cutting a damed sig h t worse 
than Cutting needs th e  party . ̂
Pears of. add itional setbacks soon proved v a lid . Lmnigrants con^ 
tinued to  flock in to  eastern  counties, and by 1912 th e  Democratic pa rty  
lacked only a few thousand votes o f  overtaking tke  Republicans. At th e  
same time th e  Progressive pa rty  grew to  more than 8,000 members, a 
figure  la rg e  enough to  m aintain a balance o f  power a t  th e  p o lls . As a 
re su lt  th i s  th ird  party  would determine th e  outcome o f  a l l  but two elec­
tio n s  over th e  next twenty years.
One reason fo r  th e  remarkable upsurge o f Progressive streng th  
was mounting opposition to  Republican bossism. Another was more e f f ic ie n t  
in te rn a l organization. In  guly, 1912 th e  Progressive League became th e  
Progressive p arty  and soon emerged as a fu ll-f led g ed  p o l i t ic a l  movement. 
Miguel Otero, Chairman o f th e  f i r s t  Central Committee, perfected  p a rty  
machinery a t  every le v e l and schooled "local leaders on l ib e r a l  ob jec tives. 
He also in s t i l l e d  d isc ip lin e , e n lis ted  scores o f  new members, and in  a 
short time did  fo r  th e  Progressive movement many o f  th e  same th ings he
2
had accomplished fo r  th e  Republican p a rty  a decade and a h a lf  e a r l ie r .
^Santa Fe New Mexican. August 23, 1928, p. 4.
^ Ib id . .  September 4, 1911, p . 4, Ju ly  29, 1912, p . 1 , July  30, 
1912, p. 1 , August 16, 1912, p . 2, Marnh 10, 1913, PP* 1 , 8 , September 3, 
1914, p. 2 and JtOy 15, 1916, p . 2 .
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Even more im portant was th e  appearance o f a new leader* Bronson 
Catting became ac tive  in  th e  Progressive movement soon a f te r  he arrived  
from New York in  1911* î i r s t  he was an o f f ic e r  in  the  League, then he 
became th e  p a r ty 's  Treasurer in  1912# Two years l a t e r  he p ^ la c e d  Otero 
as Progressive Central Committee Chairman, and from th a t  time forward 
h is  leadership went unchallenged.
The acqu isition  o f  the  New Mexican in  the  summer o f  1912 was 
th e  key to  C u tting 's p o l i t i c a l  success, and in  tu rn  to  th e  success o f 
th e  Progressive movement. Not only d id  th is  deprive th e  Republican p a rty  
o f i t s  b est organ, i t  a lso  gave th e  Progressives the  advantage o f  reaching 
p ra c tic a lly  every l i t e r a t e  v o te r in  th e  s ta te ,  fo r  Cutting g rea tly  improved 
th e  New Mexican. C irculation  soared almost immediately because o f  i t s  
more extensive lo c a l and n a tio n a l news coverage, a t t r a c t iv e  advertisem ents, 
and broadened c la s s if ie d  section . The p a p e r 's  popu larity  also  was enhanced 
because i t  provided concise inform ation on how th e  v o te r could fre e  him­
s e l f  from Republican bosses who had ru led  so long. Subsequent e d ito r ia ls  
by one o f New Mexico's foremost newsmen^ B. Dana Johnson, explained th e  
whole Progressive platform  in  terms understandable to  th e  average reader»^
Johnson proved almost as im portant to  the  Progressive p a rty  as 
Cutting because he knew New Mexico's people b e t te r  than h is  employer d id , 
and he understood which o f  the  various Progressive platform  planks would 
be most a tt ra c t iv e  to  them. As c h ie f e d ito r  o f  th e  Albuquerque Journal he 
had fought th e  Old Guard during th e  C onstitu tional Convention. He also  
^ k e  fo r th e  d iss id en t G illenwater Republioans o f  B em a lillo  County, and
^Armstrong* P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, p . 11; Santa Fe New 
Mexican. September 4, 1914, p . 1 ,
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he had popularized th e  Progressive League fo r  Hageiman in  th e  f a l l  o f
1911. A ccordin^y, Cutting found in  him a worthy p a rtn e r in  thé  Pro­
gressive crusade 'which he launched in  1912 and continued th ro u ^  th e
hMew MeariLcan fo r  mere than twenty years.
Nor d id  Cutting and Johnson l im it  th e  New Mexican to  th e  ro le  
o f l ib e r a l  organ. Under t h e i r  jo in t  supervision i t  continued as New 
Mexico's most in f lu e n tia l  campaign instrum ent. ]h  th e  e lec tio n  o f  1912 
i t  played an im portant ro le , as th e  Progressives proved th a t  the  re tu rn s 
o f th e  previous year had not been an accident. Moreover, th e  Republicans 
could expect more o f th e  same. IXie to  congressional reapportionment, only 
one sea t in  the  United S tates &)use o f  Representatives was a t  stake th a t  
year. This was fo rtunate  fo r  th e  Progressives since i t  afforded them a 
chance to  put t h e i r  strength  to  an unequivocal t e s t .  At f i r s t  i t  appeared 
they might f a l t e r ,  what with two ttro n g  l ib e ra ls  av a ilab le , Cuny and 
Fergusson. A clash  between these  two incumbents would have meant a c lea r-  
cut Republican v ic to ry , but lu c k ily  Curxy declined th e  Progressive nomina­
tio n  to  allow Fergusson's e lec tio n . Both Republicans and Progressives 
then ran unknown candidates, and a lth o u ^  th e  Progressives po lled  only 
tw ^ v e  percent o f  th e  to ta l  vo te, they drew support from tra d i t io n a l  Repub­
lic a n  s tro n ^ o ld s . As a r e s u l t ,  Democrat Fergusson was r ^ ^ e c t e d  a 
p lu ra l i ty .^
4santa Fe New Mexican. February 12, 1912, p . 3, Ju ly  2, 1912, p.
7 , Ju ly  8, 1912, p . é  and October 30, 1920, p. 1; Armstrong: P o r tra i t  o f
Bronson Cutting, pp. 12-13, 3OL; Judah: Richard C. D illon, p . 12; Curry:
■An Autobioeranhy. p. 27I .
^Santa Fe New Mexican. September 11, 1912, p . 4, September 14,
1912, p . 6 and November 12, 1912, p . 4 .
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The Old Guard ezperienoed another catastrophy th a t  same year 
^ e n  Solomon Luna died in  an accident on h is  Valencia County ranch. Luna*s 
power in  h is  own county, and h is  persuasive in flu w ce  among ^ a n i ^ -  
jRmericans in  g w e ra l had o u tla sted  th a t  o f  a l l  o th er patrons. His passing 
now freed  th e  "natives” almost completely from th e  t ra d i t io n a l  r e s t r a in t  
ïdiich so long had b en efltted  the  Republican p a rty , fo r  i t  removed a l l  bu t 
a tra c e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  feudalism.
Encouraged by these  events. Cutting and Johnson augmented th e i r  
a ttack  against th e  Old Guard th ro u ^  th e  columns o f  the  New Mexican in  
1913* Otherwise i t  would have been a bad year fo r  th e  Progressive p a rty  
in  New Mexico, since in te r e s t  in  p o l i t ic s  had sh ifted  from s ta te  and lo c a l 
to  n a tio n a l and in te rn a tio n a l l e v ^ s .  Throu^out th e  year th e  New Mexican 
promoted l ib e r a l  id eas, and in  th e  f a l l  i t  waged a v ic ious a ssa u lt on th e  
Republicans fo r  t h e i r  method o f choosing a United S ta tes Senator. A lbert 
F a ll, idio had drawn th e  sho rt term th e  previous year, was autom atically 
reappointed by the  Republican le g is la tu re . This gave Cutting and Johnson 
opportunity to  c rea te  a minor sensation over the  so -ca lled  "steam roller" 
ta c t ic s  employed. Thus, they  kept a liv e  th e  Progressive movement through 
an otherwise a rid  period.^
Mb en both s ta te  le g is la to rs  and New Mexico's Congressman ran fo r  
re -e lec tio n  th e  next year. Cutting had a chance to  present the  Progressive 
idiilosophy again because public a tten tio n  returned to  lo c a l p o l i t ic s .
He also took complete charge o f h is  p a rty  and personally  organized th e
^ Ib M ., August 8 , 1912, p . 4, August 29, 1912, p . 6 , August 30, 
1912, p. 1  and September 14, 1912, p . 6 .
7' I b id . , January to  October, 1913, passim.
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Progressive nominating convention in  1914, and worked hard a l l  year in  
the  b e lie f  th a t  the  Old Guard's power continued to  d im in i^ . N either the  
Progressives nor th e  Democrats expected to  upset Republican candidates 
fo r contro l o f the  s ta te  le g is la tu re . But i t  was generally  believed th a t  
Progressive candidate Francis G. Wilson would again draw o ff  enou^ Repub-
o
lic a n  votes to  enable Democratic Congressman Fergusson to  win re -S e c tio n . 
This, o f  course, was C utting 's goal, since the  Progressive p a rty  was f a r  
too small to  e le c t Wilson.
The conjecture seemed a l l  the  more tenable  as th e  Republicans 
met to  se lec t th e i r  candidate. In  th e  previous e lec tion  Progressives had 
turned the  balance o f  power in  favor o f Fergusson ^ e n  th e  Republicans 
were united , and now the l a t t e r  engaged in  an intra^-parby b a tt le  idiich 
was reminiscent o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es. I t  began p r io r  to  the  s ta te  nomina- 
tin g  convention, idien a v e rita b le  race war developed in  B em alillo  County. 
There S heriff Jesus Romero re d is tr io te d  the  County and packed th e  lo c a l 
convention with "native" delegates -vdio would support h is  frien d , ELfego 
Baca, fo r  th e  Congressional nomination. When Anglo leaders p ro tested , 
Romero ordered h is  deputy sh e r if fs  to  d rive  them from th e  convention. The 
lo c a l pa rty  then s p l i t  along race l in e s , and th e  Anglos subsequently ca lled  
a separate convention.^
Two B em alillo  County delegations appeared a t  the  s ta te  cohveom 
tio n . Catron, Spiess, Bursum, Charles Springer and a l l  th e i r  cohorts 
immediately sided with th e  Anglos. I t  seemed th a t  Romero and Baca would
^Ib id . , August 17, 1914, p. 1, September 3» 1914, p . 1 and 
tamber 4, 1914, p. 1 .
, Ju ly  28, 1914, p. 1, August 10, 1914, p. 1, August 14, 
pp. 1, 2 and September 7» 1914, p. 2,
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cap itu la te , and th a t  the  session w u ld  qu iet down, u n t i l  s t i l l  oü ier 
up risings occurred. Encouraged hy ex is ting  tensions, land and mining 
barons from th e  northern counties in s is te d  upon th e i r  fa v o rite  fo r  the 
nomination. Then e&.Delegate Bodey b r o u ^ t  A irther chaos with th e  demand 
th a t  a l l  ex is tin g  candidates withdraw and th a t  th e  nominee be sh e e te d  
vy state-w ide primary.
I t  appeared th e re  would be a t  le a s t  th ree  Republican candidates, 
o r  none a t a l l ,  u n t i l  major leaders  cooperated with each o ü ie r to  prevent 
d isa s te r . U ltim ately, a l l  but Romero and Baca agreed th a t  the  c ru c ia l 
race was fo r  th e  le g is la tu re , and since th e  p a rty  needed support from th e  
Republican barons o f northern Kew Mexico, they  were allowed to  run 
Begnigpo.:' C. H ernandez.^ Thus, peace was res to red , but even most Repul>. 
l ic a n s  assumed Hernandez would lo se  to  Fergusson.
The Republicans were as surprised  as Fergusson and Cutting idien 
they both re ta ined  contro l o f  th e  le g is la tu re  in  1914 and e lected  Hernandez 
to  Congress with a safe  m ajority . His v ic to ry  was a ttr ib u te d  prim arily  
to  a decline  in  Progressive streng th  a t  th e  n a tio n a l le v e l following 
Theodore Roosev^t*s defeat in  1912. This caused many New Mexican Pro­
gressives to  re tu rn  to  the  Republican p a rty  in  th e  b e l ie f  th a t  th e  m ov^ent 
was dead. Also, wool-growers in  New Mexico voted unanimously fo r  Hernandez 
because o f  the  t a r i f f  controversy in  Congress. Catron accomplished l i t t l e  
in  the  Senate, but he had introduced several b i l l s  to  ra is e  the  t a r i f f  
on wool. Harvey Fergusson, on the  o'Urer hand, had worked vigorously fo r
^Q jbid.. June 20, 1914, p. 2, Ju ly  6, 1914. p. 2, August 24, 1914, 
p. 1 and August 26, 1914, p . 1.
^ I b i d . .  October 30, 1914, p. 6 and November 1914, p . 5.
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t a r i f f  reduction. These fa c ts  convinced v o te rs  from th e  wool industry  
th a t  t h e i r  p lace was in  th e  Republican party .
Cutting was disappointed because o f  Hernandez* v ic to ry . The 
Republicans soon n u l l i f ie d  i i ie ir  gains, however, tqr passing a b i l l  during 
the  ensuing le g is la t iv e  session to  increase  s a la r ie s  o f  county o f f ic ia ls .  
Realizing th e  b i l l  would arouse opposition, they nevertheless pushed i t  
th ro u ^ ,  fo r  t h e i r  power in  s ta te  government depended upon con tro l of 
the  le g is la tu re , and in  tu rn  upon continued support from county leaders 
^ o  kept th e  lower c la ss  in  l in e .  Thou^ th e  sa la ry  b i l l  d id  strengthen 
th e i r  hold on county o f f ic ia ls ,  many v o te rs  considered i t  an u n ju s tif ia b le  
ra id  on pub lic  funds.
Cutting gained confidence from th i s  d is sa tis fa c tio n , and as he 
began p r^ a ra t io n s  fo r  th e  e lec tio n  o f  1916, even Theodore Roosevelt could 
not convince him th a t  h is  Progressive following had diminished o r  th a t  he 
should lead  i t  back in to  th e  Republican p a rty . In  th e  summer o f  1916 
he grew s t i l l  bo lder because n early  every newspaper e d ito r  in  New Mexico 
was d is tra c te d  f im  p o l i t ic s  and lin e d  up behind him to  f l ^ t  against 
encroachment upon th e  freedom o f  the  p ress  by Old Quard Republican lead ers .
The Old Quard intended only to  q u ie t Cutting and Johnson when
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. August 23, 1913 to  November 21, 1914, 
passim; Armstrong: P o r tra i t  o f  Bronson C utting, p . 12.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. February 23. 191 S. pp. 1, 4, Pebruary 23,
1915f p . 6, February 26, 1913, P« 1» February 27, 1915» P» 6 and March 
30, 1915, p* 5* The running b a t t le  between Governor McDonald and th e  le g is ­
la tu re  i s  re la te d  in  th e  Santa Fe New Mexican. 1912 to  1915» passim.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican, March 22, 1916, p . 2, March 27, 1916, p.
4, Ju ly  11, 19I 6 , p. 4, Ju iy  25, 1916, p. 4, October I 3 , 1916. p . 1; 
Armstrong: P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, pp. 20-24. In  I 916 Theodore 
Roosevelt urged Q itting  to  jo in  fo rces with th e  New Mexican Old Quard to
prevent Wsodrow vaison from winning th e  state* s e le c to ra l vote.
1#
Frank Eubbéll b ro u ^ t  s u i t  against th e  New Moxican Publishing Company fo r 
alleged damage to  h is  career back in  1905» seven years before Cutting 
became i t s  owner. But a l l  newsmen f e l t  endangered. They were even more 
alazmed when Old Guard lead ers  h ired  one o f  Holm Bursum's friends, Henry 
Dr^rfhs, to  i n i t i a t e  another s u i t  a f te r  Hubball’ s had fa ile d . Presumably, 
sometime before Cutting came to  the  Southwest a New Meadcan e d ito r  had 
aeoused D r^ fu s  o f abusing Ijie Anerican flag . Handpicked jurymen from 
Valencia County found Gutting—as owner o f  th e  New Mexican—g u ilty . 
Republican Judge M erritt Mechem ordered him to  pay more than $10,000 fo r  
damage he could not possib ly  have done to  Drsyfus' repu tation .
These cases fa ile d  to  accomplish th e i r  purpose. I t  was w ell- 
known th a t  i f  anyone was g u ilty  i t  was the  owner o f  the  New Meccan in  
t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es. Old Guard spokesman Max F rost, now deceased. By 
attacking  the  New Mexican in  th e  courts, the  Old Guard only aroused sympathy 
fo r  Cutting, a liena ted  th e i r  own newsmen, and diminished th e i r  already 
s lig h t chances fo r  v ic to ry  in  th e  forthcoming e lec tio n . In  1916 they  
faced an in tra -p a r ty  c r i s i s  even worse than th a t  o f  two years e a r l ie r .
This time a group o f  moderate Republicans, le d  by Central Committee 
Chairman Ralph C. Ely, warned th a t  t h ^  would b o lt i f  Bursum, F a ll, Frank 
Hubbell, Charles %)iess and Charles %)ringer d id  not l e t  them p a rtic ip a te  
in  the  se lec tion  o f  a t ic k e t .  INhen the  Republican nominating convention 
met i t  was obvious to  Ely and h is  friends th a t  th e i r  demand would no t be 
heard. Consequently, Ely ca lled  the  convention to  order and announced 
h is  re fu sa l to  submit to  fu r th e r  machine domination. He then led  a
^^Santa Fe New MeodLcan. September 4, 1916, p. ,3 and March 12, I 917, 
p. 3; Armstrong: P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, pp. 18, 26.
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contingent o f delegates out of the  h a l l  and in to  th e  Progressive convene 
tio n , «here he delivered th e  k ^ o t e  address on th e  e v ils  o f bossian 
before f in a l ly  ca llin g  h is  owa convention and forming a fourth party— 
the Republican Ind^enden ts.
Hean^âiile, th e  b a t t le  continued a t  th e  Republican convention*
W* H. G illenvater succeeded Ely in  th e  Chairmanship, thereupon Frank Hubbell 
threatened to  b o lt. Aspiring to  th e  sen a to ria l nomination, Rubbell 
needed a friend  in  th e  Chaimanship and G illenwater was one o f  h is  worst 
enemies. The two men had disagreed bad: in  1911, and since then th sy  . 
frequently  had exchanged in s u l ts .  For a tijme i t  seemed th a t  Hubbell would 
follow Ely in to  th e  Independent p a rty . His p rice  to  remain loya l was the  
sen a to ria l nomination. No one knew A e th e r  Catron would r e l in q i i i^  i t ,  
and i f  so, whether d lle n w a te r  would support Hubbell as h is  r^ lacem ent.^^
Stripped o f p ra c tic a lly  a l l  newq>aper support, accused o f  lo o tin g  
th e  pulxLic trea su ry , and uprooted by fac tio n a l feuds, the  Old Guard 
rap id ly  lo s t  ground. In  almost every issu e  o f  th e  New Mexican E. Dana 
Johnson g lee fu lly  predicted  the  rapid  demise o f  the  Republican p a rty . 
Suddenly Republican leaders r a l l ie d  to  stave o f f  impending d is a s te r  by 
promising Frank Hubbell th a t  he could rep lace Catron as sa n a to ria l nominee. 
This proved a wise move, fo r  p ra c tic a lly  everyone in  the  p a rty  agreed th a t  
the  old  Ring lead e r had outlived  h is  u se ih lness anyway. S enatorial candL- 
dates now had to  face popular S e c tio n , and Catron represented everything 
the  vo ters had come to  d e i^ lse . Also, he had been sick  most o f  h is  stay
^^Santa Fe Nw Mexican. August 11, 1916, p . 3, August 23, 1916, 
p. 1, August 24, 19I 6 , p . 1, August 31, 1916, p . 1, October 3, 1916, p . 1 
and March 2, I 917, p. 5.
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in  Washington and iinahle to  represen t the  s ta te  properly . Catron vas even 
more a l i a b i l i t y  because o f  h is  deteznination  to  lead  th e  s ta te  in to  th e  
camp o f  O iarles Evens H u^es. A lbert F a ll ,  on th e  o th er hand, in s is te d  
th a t New Mexico support Roosevelt fo r  th e  Republican nomination fo r  P re s i­
dent in  1916. The r i f t  between th e  two Senators forced Republicans to  
choose between them, and a f te r  nearly  a h a lf  century o f  p a rty  serv ice , 
C atron's caree r came to  an end.^^
Once Hubbell received th e  sen a to ria l nomination th e  convention 
faced no fu r th e r  upheaval. Selection o f  a gubem atoA al candidate passed 
without in c id en t. Holm Bursum, ^ o  demanded a chance to  erase  th e  hum ilia­
tio n  o f  h is  defeat f iv e  years e a r l ie r ,  was unanimously nominated fo r  
Govexnor. likew ise , Hexnandez received renomination to  Congress without 
d if f ic u lty ,  fo r  th e  p a rty  needed support from Republican barons in  th e  
northexn counties. Choosing a candidate fo r  th e  lie u ten a n t governorship, 
though i t  provoked no controversy, d id  e n ta il  lengtlqr d e lib e ra tio n . The 
Old Guard suddenly rea liz ed  th e  need to  appease moderates who had not 
bolted  with Ely, and they want to  considerable troub le  to  find  someone 
a c c ^ ta b le . This group was f l i r t i n g  with Progressivian, àad th e re  was 
add itional danger th a t  some would defect tb  th e  Democratic camp because o f  
Miguel Otero. The " l i t t l e  Governor" had l e f t  th e  Progressives tdien Cutting 
replaced him as Central Committee Chaixman, and now appeared on th e  Demo­
c ra tic  s la te  as nominee fo r  S ta ts  jb id itor. He s t i l l  possessed th e  personal 
magnetism fo r  which he was famous and threatened to  draw many moderate 
votes away fxom the  RepuWicans. To prevent him from doing so, th e  Old
^^Sluga: "The P o l i t ic a l  l i f e  o f  Thomas Benton Catron," pp. I 27,
149-50; Curry; Aa Autobiography, p . 281.
14?
Qaaxd chose e%.Progressive Washington lAndsey to  run fo r  th e  lieu ten an t
T O
governorship.
Republicans hoped th i s  s tra teg y  w u ld  hold th e i r  p a rty  together. 
Perhaps l i n d s ^ 's  presence on' th e  t ic k e t  would even lu re  back Independents 
and a t t r a c t  Progressives. I t  m i^ t  have, had th e  Republicans enjoyed 
e d ito r ia l  support. But many newsmen fa i le d  to  re tu rn  to  Republican ranks 
th a t  year, so th is  change in  ta c t ic s  received l i t t l e  p u b lic ity . Most 
R ^ub lican  e d ito rs  e i th e r  remained q u ie t o r  supported th e  o th er t ic k e t .  
They could do so with a c le a r  conscience, fo r  th e  Democrats presented the  
best s la te  in  th e  h is to ry  o f th e i r  p a rty , one idiich appealed to  a l l  vo ters 
except Old Guard supporters. For th e  two top s ta te  o ff ic e s  they simply 
reversed th e  t ic k e t  o f 1911 and nominated Ezequiel Cabeza de Baca fo r  
Governor and VHLlliam McDonald fo r  Lieutenant Governor. McDonald had  been 
chosen o r ig in a lly  as th e  r ich  man's candidate, 'edaile lieu ten an t Governor 
Cabeza da Baca also had been acceptable to  moderates. In  add ition , the  
l a t t e r  had g rea t p re s tig e  among "native" v o te rs  because he claimed d ire c t 
descent from ea^ lo rer Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Baca.
The Democrats then added b a it  fo r  Progressives. To run against 
Frank Hubbell in  th e  se n a to ria l race they  chose Anson A. Jones, b est 
remembered as a  Fergusson " irre c o n c ila b le ."  He also  was an object of 
p ride  to  a l l  New Mexicans because he had served as A ssistan t Secretary o f 
th e  In te r io r  in  Woodrow W ilson's adm inistration .
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. March 6 , 1916, p . 3. # r i l  10, 1916, p. 4, 
August 22, 1916, p . 1, August 24, 1916, p. 4, S^tem ber 19. 1916, p . 4 
and October 4, 1916, p . 1.
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. September 1, 1916, p . 1, S^tem ber 2,
1916, p. 4 and October 9» 191^, p . 4; Armstrong: P o r tra i t  o f  Bronson 
Cutting, p . 25.
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Considering a l l  th e  troub le  the  Old Guard brought on themselves 
in  1916, i t  would have been miraculous had they defeated th is  excellen t 
t ic k e t .  They made a d e ^ e ra te  e ffo r t  because winning seemed th e  l a s t  
chance to  ju s t i f y  th e i r  con tro l over the  p arty . Defeated in  1911, embar­
rassed in  1912 and v ic to rio us by accident in  1914, they had to  show sig n i­
f ic a n t isqprovement o r  give way to  more moderate leaders . But d e b i t s  th e i r  
e ffo r ts , and th e  popu larity  o f jü.bert P a ll and Washington Zdndsey, the  
e lec to ra te  would not l is te n .  Independents, moderate Republicans, Progres­
sives anri Dsaocrats combined a t  the  p o lls  and sent Jones to  th e  Senate, 
Cabeza de Baca to  1die Governor’s o ff ic e  and Democrat Wi l l i am Walton to  
Congress. The Democrats also won th e i r  share of the  top dozen adminis­
t r a t iv e  posts and picked up some sea ts  in  the  s ta te  le g is la tu re . The 
only Republican v ic to ry  o f  importance was ex-Progressive Washington
Lindsey’ s narrow win over Democratic nominee William McDonald fo r  th e
20lieu ten an t governorship.
The e lec tion  o f I 916 underscored th e  decline o f Old Guard Repub­
licanism  and the  growth o f  Progressivism in  New Mexico a f te r  statehood.
In  the  absence o f  outside in fluence, v o te rs  made a c le a r  choice "Between 
machine ru le  and the Progressive id e a ls  o f  Cutting. When Cabeza de Baca 
died a short time a f te r  tak ing  o ff ic e  and lAnds^r moved up to  th e  governor- 
ship,^^ some Republicans hoped th is  might revive th e i r  fo rtunes. But
^ S a n ta  Fe Hew Mexican, November 23, 1916, p. 1 and November 24,
1916, p. 4; Ooant A Hletorv o f New Mexico. I ,  p . 49?; T heili "New
Mexico’ s B ilingual P o li t ie s  and F actional D i c t e s , "  p . 23.
^ S a n ta  Fe New MeacLcan. February 14, 1917» P» 5 and February 19,
1917, pp. 1 , 3; TheilV "New Mexico* s B ilingual P o li t ic s  and Factional 
D isputes," p . 23.
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Old Guard leaders rea lized  th a t  Id n d s^  had been e lec ted  only because he 
fo iae rly  was a Progressive. Moreover, he now was a problem to  than 
because he proved in e ffe c tiv e  as Governor. Hence they  had no in ten tio n  
o f  awarding him f i r s t  p lace on th e  s ta te  Republican t ic k e t  in  the  next 
e lec tion .
The only th ing  about >hich the  Old Guard was ce rta in  regarding 
the  next e lec tio n  was th a t Albert F a ll would be irenominated fo r  the  United 
S ta tes Senate. As fo r  the  gubernatorial nomination in  1918, both Lindsey 
and Bursum wanted i t ,  hut i t  seemed u n lik e ly  th a t  e ith e r  could win. Per­
haps Old Guard leaders would have considered Bursum, desp ite  h is  previous, 
de fea ts , had they  known what the  Progressives would do. Indeed, Cutting’ s 
follow ers demonstrated in  th e  next e lec tio n  th a t  while they could a ffe c t 
Republican defeat, they likew ise could assure Republican victory» With 
l i t t l e  warning Bronson Cutting l e f t  fo r  England to  serve as m ili ta ry  
attaché in  the  American embassy. In  h is  absence Ju s tin e  Ward, h is  s i s te r ,  
handled h is  personal a f f a i r s ,  supervised e d ito r ia l  po licy  fo r th e  Hew 
Mexican, and acted as exi-offlcio head o f  th e  Progressive p a rty . Surpris­
ing ly , he r admiration fo r  handsome Albert F a ll  prompted h e r  to  b ring  th e
Hew Mexican behind th e  Republican t ic k e t ,  and desp ite  vehement p ro te s ts
22from B. Dana Johnson, h e r b ro ther refhsed to  in te r fe re .
Perhaps Bursum could have won due to  t h i s  tu rn  o f events, but 
i t  i s  doubtful. The Progressives were h e s ita n t to  accept Ju s tin e ’s dictai- 
t io n , and m i^ t  have refused had th e re  not been ra d ic a l change in  both 
the  Democratic and Republican t ic k e ts .  Democratic candidates in  1918,
22Santa Fe Hew Mexican. October 10, 1918, p. 4 and October 12, 
1918, p. 4; Armstrong: P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, p . 28.
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on th e  one hand, were rmch le s s  a t t r a c t iv e  than prev iously . Harvey 
Fex^sson had r e t i r e d  from leadersh ip , and as th e  p a rty  reorganized, a 
group o f  young Democrats seized choice p o sitio n s on the  t ic k e t .  The only 
a tt ra c t iv e  candidate among them was F e lix  Garcia, idiose principâh asse t 
was general acquaintance among th e  "natives. More im portant to  the 
Progressives, th e  Republican p a rty  nominated Octaviano Larrasolo fo r  Gover­
nor th a t  year, ixho by in c lin a tio n  belonged in  Cutting* s p a rty . ̂
W.thout Larrazolo on th e  Republican t ic k e t ,  i t  i s  doubtful the  
Progressives would have backed the  Republican t ic k e t ,  bu t h is  nomination 
made i t  easy fo r  them to  obey Ju s tin e . A lbert F a ll, t h r c u ^  h is  outspoken 
opposition to  Woodrow % lson , also eased th e i r  consciences once they had 
made th e  change. In  a vigorous campaign against th e  P re s id e n t's  domination 
o f Congress, he convinced numerous New Mexican v o te rs  th a t  Republicans 
had inaugurated America's p a rtic ip a tio n  in  World War I  and th e re fo re  they  
should be allowed to  d ire c t  war po licy . This created  reaction  against 
th e  Democratic p a rty  in  the  s ta te , and an e ffe c tiv e  excuse fo r  Progressives 
to  support Republican candidates.
The Republicans could hard ly  have lo s t ,  Tôiat with th e  Progressives 
supporting them. They also  received support from E ly 's  Independents, -sôio 
had returned to  regu lar Republican ranks by 1918. Senator F a ll  and Repub­
lic a n  congressional nominee Begnigno Hernandez won, Larrazolo defeated
Ẑ Santa Fe_ New Mexican. ^ l i l  11, 1918, p. 3, Ju ly  26, 1918, p . 3, 
Ju ly  31. 1918, p . 3. September 19, 1918, p . 3 and September 28, 1918,
p. 1.
April 10, 1918, p. 3. 19, 1918, p . 4, Ju ly  13,
1918, p . 2, August 10, 1918, p . 3, September 30, 1918, p. 3 and October 3, 
1918, p . 1.
^% bid. , September to  November, 1918, passim.
15L
Garcia fo r  th e  govemorship and Republicans took a l l  s ta te  le g is la t iv e  and 
adm inistrative  con tests comfortable margins. The Democrats were to ta l ly  
defeated. They re ta ined  nothing o f importance but one sea t on th e  s ta te
gZ
Corporation Commission, held  over from th e  previous e lec tio n .
N evertheless, Old Guard lead ers  knew i^ie S e c tio n  did not in d i­
cate  a rev iv a l o f  th e i r  popu larity . Without th e  war issu e  and Progressive 
support i t  i s  probable th a t  only Albert F a ll would have been successful 
a t th e  b a llo t  box. Obviously th e  Republican p a rty  was a t  th e  merqr o f 
Bronson Cutting. This fa c t  ^ r e a d  gloom through th e  ranks vhen th e  publish­
er u ltim ate ly  returned from England. T heir only hope now was th a t  he would 
pursue h is  s is te r*  s po licy  out o f respect fo r  Larrazolo. But Cutting 
soon was busy defending Spanish-American veterans against d iscrim ination 
in  th e  American Legion and thereby challenging Larrazolo* s leadersh ip  o f 
the  "native" b l o c .^
Doubt th a t  Bronson Cutting would pursue Justine* s po licy  kept 
Old Guard lead ers  on edge fo r  more than a year. At f i r s t  they  worked 
harmoniously with Governor Larrazolo because he put down lab o r unionism 
in  the  mines with a  d ec la ra tio n  o f  m artia l law in  1919» But t h ^  drew 
away from him when he subsequrntly proposed some co stly  educational reforms. 
He shocked them fu r th e r  with a suggestion th a t  New Mexico adopt th e  d ire c t 
primary ^stem  and a graduated income tax . Following th e  l a t t e r  proposal 
Old Guard lead e rs  condemned him in  le g is la t iv e  caucus as a dangerous
Santa Fe New Mexican. December 5» 1918, P» 4; Coanx A History 
o f New Mexico. I .  p . 407.
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. January 3» 1919, P» 4; Armstrong: P o r tra it  
o f  Bronson C utting, p p .  H .  v L l S .
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rad ica l and resolved to  get him out o f  the  Govenaor’ s Mansion. ̂
This was a wrecKLess move because i t  broke a l in k  in  the  chain 
th a t  t ie d  them to  the  Progressive party . W-thout Larrazolo on the  t ic k e t  
th ere  was no reason fo r  Cutting o r any o ther Progressive to  vote Republican. 
Realizing th is ,  Albert F a ll hu rried  back from Washington to  t r y  to  keep 
Larrazolo in  th e  p a rty  with the  promise o f th e  congressional nomination. 
Larrazolo refhsed, and since Republican leaders could not accept h is  
fad ica l s ta te  le g is la t iv e  program thqy read him out o f  the  party  completely 
and soumit a new candidate fo r  the  governorship.^^
I f  th i s  was no t d isastro u s enou^, Republicans fù r th e r  weakened 
th e i r  chances in  the  next e lec tion  by choosing Judge M erritt Mechem as 
th e i r  new candidate fo r  Governor. Indeed, the  Judge was anathema to  
everyone but Old Guard Republicans; moreover, h is  nomination again ra ised  
the  issu e  o f  th e  free  p ress . Immediately E. Dana Johnson f i l l e d  New 
Mexican e d ito r ia ls  with warnings th a t  Republican v ic to ry  in  1920 would 
bring back "iron hand" ru le , and th a t  newsmen would lo s e  freedom o f 
expression wi'Ui Mechem in  the  Governor's M ansion.^ T h ro u ^ tu ttth e  campaign 
o f  1920 everything pointed to  another Democratic-Progressive v ic to ry . But 
su rp rising ly , th e  Old Guard defeated th e  combined forces o f th e  Democrats, 
Progressives, and d iss id en t Republicans. Every adm inistrative o ff ic e  went
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mealean. January 5. .1920, p. 4, Ju ly  23, 1920, p.
1, Ju ly  24, 1920, p . 1, Ju ly  26, 1920, p. 4, August 12, 1920, p. 1, August 
13 , 1920, p . 4 and August 21. 1920, p. 1; Judah: Richard 0. D illon, p. 13*
^^Santa Fe New Mexican. August 1, 1920 to  September 9, 1920, passim.
^Oganta Fe New Mexican. October 11, 1918, p . 3, August 26. 1920,
p. 1, September 15, 1920, p . 4 and November 1920, p. 1; Judah: Richard
C. D illon, p . 13.
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to  th e  regular Republicans, and they also* re ta ined  contro l of th e  le g is ­
la tu re . The next year they reaffiim ed th e i r  triumph vhen President Warren 
Harding called  Albert F a ll to  h is  cabinet and HoOm Bursum won th e  vacant 
seat in  th e  United S ta tes Senate.
But l ik e  the  previous e lec tio n , these  v ic to r ie s  did  l i t t l e  to  
resto re  th e  p a r ty 's  p res tig e  because t h ^  were won fo r  th e  wrong reason. 
The re tu rns showed th a t New Mexico simply had voted against Wbodrow VHJ.son, 
and not fo r  Old Guard Republicanism. Due to  Albert F a l l 's  p e rs is te n t 
campaign against Wilson, Warren Harding received a m ajority  o f 11,000 in  
the s ta te ,  \4 iile  Republican candidates fo r  th e  twelve leading adminis­
t r a t iv e  o ffice s  in  Santa Fe won by only approximately 2,000 v o te s .3^ Re­
publican leaders recognized th e  sign ificance  o f these  fig u res, and in  
addition th%r soon discovered Mechem had been a poor choice. While in  
o ffice  he supported in te r s ta te  water compacts, ta x  exemptions fo r  veterans 
and widows, and p roh ib ition  o f a lien  land ownership in  New Mexico. Others 
wise h is  adm inistration had l i t t l e  to  recommend i t .
While Republicans had won successive v ic to r ie s , both were smae- 
what accidental and offered  small cause fo r  optimism. Cutting and B,
Dana Johnson quickly recognized th is  And in  the  columns o f  the  New Mexican 
they heaped r id ic u le  upon Mechem th ro u ^ o u t h is  term. Meamdiile, the 
Democrats were f a r  from discouraged. Although th e i r  p a rty  had no t ib l ly  
recovered from th e  lo ss  o f Hailey Fergusson, reconstruction  was in  pro­
gress. Daring th e  early  1920's Arthur T. Hannett emerged as th e  p a r ty 's  
new lead er snd was build ing a machine based on mine workers' support.
^Coan: A H istory o f New Mexico. I ,  pp. 497-500.
^ S a n ta  Fe New tfexlcan. November 23, 1930, p . 1.
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Realizing how vulnerable the  Republicans were, he cooperated with Cutting 
and Johnson in  repeated a ttacks against th e  cu rren t adm in istra tion .33 
Throu^out 1921 and the  ^ r in g  o f  1922 these  th ree  l ib e r a l  
leaders wozked re le n tle s s ly  to  prevent th e  Republicans from id e a t in g  
th e i r  victoxy o f  I 920. Democrats James F. Hinkle and Arthur T. Hannett 
did win th e  govemorship respec tive ly  in  1922 and 1924, thanks to  Progres­
sive  support. Moreover# Democrats were e lected  to  th e  United S ta tes 
Senate and House o f R epresentatives. - In  addij^on they won nine o f  the  
twelve h ighest s ta te  adm in istrative  o ff ic e s , and con tro l o f  th e  lower 
house o f the  s ta te  le g is la tu re  fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e. 3^
A fter 1922 th e  power o f  th e  Old Guard rap id ly  diminished. The 
Democrats tem porarily lo s t  con tro l o f th e  s ta te  in  1926, when Bronson 
Cutting returned to  th e  Republican camp fo r  the  l a s t  tim e. KLs defection  
was caused by Governor Hannett *s re fu sa l to  carry  out campaign promises, 
espec ia lly  in  re la tio n  to  fo ste rin g  ch ild  lab o r laws, o ld  age a ssistance , 
workman's compensation, banking regu la tions and equ itab le  tax a tio n . The 
Governor's in ac tio n  proved embarrassing to  Cutting, since i t  was common 
knowledge th a t  he alone was responsible fo r  H annett's  nomination. In  the
33Azm8trong) P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, p . 34; Robert Thompson 
and Charles Judah: Arthur T» Hannett: Governor o f  New Mexico (Albuquerque:
Division o f  Researdi, Department o f  Government, U niversity  o f  New Meadoo; 
1950)» p. 4; For an app ra isa l o f  Governor M erritt Mechem's achievements 
see Edwin L. Mechem fo ld e r. Hurley Papers, D ivision o f  M anuscripts, Univer­
s i ty  o f  Oklahoma L ibrary.
34ganta Fe New M eccan. November 7 , 1920, p . 2; Judah: Richard C, 
D illon, pp. 13 , 15 , 28, 38 and The Republican Party  in  New Mexico 
(Albuquerque: D ivision o f  Research, Department o f  Government, U niversity  
o f  New Mexico; 1949), p. 7; W ncher: "Spanieh-Americans as a P o l i t ic a l  
Factor in  New Mexico, " p. 104; Ooan: A HlÉtorv o f  New Mexico. I ,  pp. 497- 
98, 500-01; T heil: Hew Mexico's B ilingual P o li t ic s  and Factional"D is­
p u tes ,"  p . 24; Thompson and Judah: Arthur T. Hannett. pp. 5, 6, 8, 12, 13.
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Democratic convention o f  1924 he manipulated proceedings in  such a way as 
to  prevent Hinkle’s renomination and a ffe c t  the  nomination o f  Hannett.
C utting’s coolness toward Hannett may also  have stemmed from 
s u ^ lc lo n  th a t  th e  Governor was not as popular as th e  re tu rn s suggested; 
ra th e r  he won because o f A lbert F a ll’ s Infamy. ïbrtherm ore, th e  two men 
quarreled over patronage. Cutting wished only to  reward good l ib e ra ls ,  
Tàiile Hannett wanted to  use h is  appointive power to  bu ild  up a following 
among moderates, regard less o f th e i r  p a rty  a f f i l ia t io n .
In  th e  spring o f  I 925 Cutting announced h is  break with Hannett 
by resigning from th e  o ff ic e  o f  Commissioner o f  th e  S ta te  P en iten tia ry .^^  
From th a t  day forward i t  became increasing ly  obvious th a t  th e  Democrats 
could no t win in  1926.  Cutting e ffe c tiv e ly  attacked th e  Governor through 
the  pages o f th e  Hew Mexican with the  charge ih a t  th e  so -ca lled  Hannett 
E lection Code was designed to  d isfranch ise  "n a tiv e s ." This was untrue, 
fo r th e  Code ac tu a lly  was designed to  reduce corruption by maWng i t  
i l l e g a l  fo r  p a rty  workers to  a s s is t  i l l i t e r a t e  Spanish-M ericans in  war^rfvtg 
th e i r  b a llo ts . As Cutting described i t ,  however, Hannett’ s ob jec tive  was 
to  prevent "natives" from voting in  o rder th a t  he might diminish th e i r  
power and somehow win re -e le c tio n  by support o f  mine workers. ̂
Enough vo ters believed C utting’ s in te rp re ta tio n  o f  th e  Code to  
defeat th e  Democrats in  1926. Hannett not only lo s t  to  Republican KLchard
^^loopson and Judah; Arthur T. Hannett. pp. 7-9; Armstrong; 
P o r tra it  o f  Bronson Cutting, pp. 36-37.
^ Judah ; RLehard c. m n o n . p. 15. R a s s ^ ;  "Racial Group» In  
th e  New Mexico L eg isla tu re ,"  p . 68; T heil; "New Mexico’s m ung ita i p o li­
t i c s  and Factional D isputes, " p . 24; Armstrong; P o r tra it  o f  Bronson 
Getting, pp. 37-38.
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C. DLLlon, but Republicans captured a l l  bu t th ree  o f  th e  top dozen admin­
i s t r a t iv e  posts . Purbhemore, t h ^  re ta ined  contro l o f  th e  s ta te  Senate 
and w n  back the  House o f  R epresentatives. The only important Democratic 
v ic to ry  in  1926 was th e  e lec tion  o f  a Congressman, but even so, th e  Demo­
c ra ts  were not demoralized. % th  f u l l  support from the  Progressives,
Dillon led  h is  t ic k e t  by a margin o f  only 4,000 vo tes. ̂
Doubtless th i s  also influenced Cutting’s th inking as he kept the  
Republicans in  power during the  succeeding four years. A ll the  while 
New Mexican e d ito r ia ls  implied th a t  th e  Progressive leader considered 
h is  sojourn in to  the Republican camp 6 temporary one. Attacks upon the  
Democratic party  were conspicuously absent. At the  same tim e he never 
l e t  Republicans forget th a t  they enjoyed power a t  th e  grace of h is  support. 
Aiother fa c t vdiich bothered Cutting was th a t  a lth o u ^  the  Republicans won 
again in  1928, i t  was generally  believed th e  combined force o f  th e  Repub­
lic a n  and Progressive p a r tie s  would not have been su ff ic ie n t had i t  not 
been fo r  the  popularity  o f Governor D illon. Accordingly, he saw a c le a r  
danger to  h is  own fortunes, knowing th a t  by c o n s titu tio n a l provision D illon 
could succeed him self in  o ff ic e  but once. ̂
Cutting stood by the  Republicans th ro u ^  th e  e lec tion  o f  1928, 
however, ch ie fly  because o f h is  admiration fo r  D illon. In  many ways the  
Governor was as "progressive” as he was. More iaç)ortant, i t  was Dillon
^Thompson and Judah: Arthur Hannett. p. 33; Judah: Richard
C. D illon, p. 17; Jennie Fortune, Secretary o f S ta te : The New Meadco Blué 
Book o r  S ta te  O ffic ia l R egister. 1926-27 (Santa Fe: n .p .;  n .d .) ,  pp.
51- 52.
3®Thcmpson and Judah: Arthur T. Hamnett, pp. 30-24; Judah:
Richard C. D illon, pp. 16-17; Theil: "New Mexico’s B ilingual P o lit ic s  
and Factional D iqm tes, " p. 24.
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vbo s ta r te d  him on th e  road to  n a tio n a l fame \dien United S ta tes Senator 
Anson JU Jones died in  192?* and the  Governor appointed him to  the  vacant 
sea t. These fac to rs  made Catting agreeable to  th e  po in t a f  acceding 
to  anyttidng I&llon suggested. He even campaigned in  1928 beside u l t r a -  
conservative Republicans l ik e  Charles l^ rin g e r to  help Old Guard candidates 
■win th e i r  s ta te  le g is la t iv e  con tests . WLth Progressive support and "the 
popular D illon running fo r  re -e lec tio n , th e  Republicans d id  no t lo se  a 
sing le  important race th a t  y e a r .^
But since D illon could no t head -the t ic k e t  again. Gutting became 
highly c r i t ic a l  o f 'the Republican party  following "the e le c tio n , and ca lled  
fo r sweeping reforms. How much he was influenced by personal ambition 
and how much by re a liz a tio n  th a t  th e  Republican party  might tu rn  reaction­
ary vhen Dillon re tire d  in  1930 i s  impossible to  a sce rta in . Whatever h is  
reasons, he broke wi-th the  p a rty  in  1929, and ih i l e  so doing he th ru s t 
a wedge between i t s  moderate and conservative wings to  make sure  i t  could 
not win the  next e lec tio n . He achieved th is  by asking h is  friends in  
the  s ta te  le g is la tu re  to  introduce a b i l l  to  c rea te  th e  o ff ic e  o f  S ta te  
Labor Commissioner. Obviously the  Old Guard could nbt submit, fo r  im p lic it 
in  "the b i l l  -was recognition o f th e  r ig h t o f  workers to  bargain co llec tiv e ­
ly . Charles Springer quickly organized res is tan ce  in  th e  s ta te  Senate and 
stopped i t s  passage. Immediately a l l  Progressives broke with th e  Repub­
lic an  party  and took many moderate Republicans with than.
Inev itab ly , th e  feud carried  over in to  th é  campaign o f  1930
^^Fortunet The New Mexico Blue Book o r  Stat e  Off ic i a l  R eg iste r. 
1926-2?. p. 51.
Santa Fe Mew Mexican. S ^ tan b e r  12, 1928, p . 1 and November 19, 
1928, p. 3; Judah: Richard C. D illon, pp. 13, 28; R ussell: "New Mexico:
A Problem o f Parochialism in  T ransition , " p . 28?.
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and afforded th e  New Mexioan the  opportunity to  condemn the  Bepabllcan 
Old Guard fo r  keeping th e  lower c la ss  in  a s ta te  o f serfdom. ̂  Meamdiile, 
Cutting Progressives and moderate Republicans a l l ie d  with th e  Democrats 
to  d rive  Springer Republicans from th e  s ta te  le g is la tu re . Ihe re s u lt  was 
not only th e  de fea t o f  a l l  Republicans, but a lso  th e  t o ta l  a lién a tio n  
o f th e  Old Guard and moderate wings o f th e i r  party .
The e lec tio n  o f  1930 was a tu rn ing  po in t in  New Mexican p a rtisa n  
h is to ry , fo r  th e  Republicans would never again re tu rn  en masse to  Santa 
Fe. There was more to  th e i r  demise than the  influence o f  Gutting and th e  
Progressives. One was almost perpetual intram party w arfare, \diich had 
been going on since t e r r i t o r i a l  days. Republicans had s e t  aside th e i r  
d ifferences to  w rite  th e  C onstitu tion, but had begun to  £ L ^ t each o ther 
again a t  th e  f i r s t  opportunity. Also, Charles B. Judah, a Professor o f 
Government a t  th e  U niversity  o f  New Mexico, be lieves th a t  th e  seeds o f 
destruction  had ex isted  in  the  Republican p a rty  since th e  rap id  in f lu x  o f 
J&nglos began back in  th e  1880*s . These new s e t t l e r s  furnished th e  basis  
fo r  u ltim ate  in d u s tr ia liz a tio n  and u rbanization  and a l l  t h e i r  re la te d  
problems, no t to  mention th e  impulse fo r  reform. Anong th e i r  leaders was 
Harvey Fergusson, who was determined to  change New Mexico's soc ie ty  as i t  
had ex isted  since  i^anish  co lon ization . Hence, the  reb e llio n  against Old 
Guard Republicanism in  the  l a t e  1920's  was re a l ly  a culmination o f  a move­
ment against machine ru le  which had bean long in  the  making.
^ S a n ta  Fe New Mexican. February throu^gb March, 1929» passim.
^^^Theil: "New Mexico's B iliig u a l P o li t ic s  and Factional D isputes,"
pp. 25, 27; Judah: Rj-rfiairi (L pp. 14, 37.
^%üchard C. D illon, p. 38.
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But Cutting and h is  Hew Mexican had carried  on th e  reform crusade 
begun ty  Fergusson l ib e r a ls  a t  th e  C onstitu tional Convention. He kept the  
Republican p ress on th e  verge o f  defection  much o f  th e  tim e with reminders 
o f  Republican a ttack s upon e d ito r ia l  freedom In  I 916. Md since h is  Pro­
gressives h ^ d  th e  balance o f  power a t  th e  p o l ls ,  he co n sis ten tly  prevented 
th e  Republicans from becoming pem anently  entrenched in  o ff ic e . Their 
acciden tal v ic to r ie s  in  1914 and 1920 brought them l i t t l e  p re s tig e , and 
th e i r  v ic to r ie s  in  1918; 1926 and 1928 obviously re su lted  from Progres­
sive  support. Thus, C u tting 's  ro le  was paramount in  th e  reduction o f 
the  power o f th e  Republicans between statehood and the  e lec tio n  o f  1930, 
and in  t u »  he was p a r t ly  responsible fo r  the  a rid  years which lay  ahead 
fo r  th e i r  party .
-
CHAPTER IX
REPUBLICAN STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1930-1952
When Governor Dillon r e t i r e d  in  1930 th e  p a rty  "was no t merely 
beaten, i t  was shattered**^
Most New Mexican Republicans were unconvinced o f th e  g rav ity  o f 
th e i r  circumstance following the  e lec tion  o f 1930. Richard D illon eqje- 
c ia lly  did not re a liz e  how thoroughly h is  party  was sh a tte red . Though a 
capable adm inistrator, he knew l i t t l e  about p a rtisan  a f f a i r s  because he 
always had refused to  p a r tic ip a te  fo r  fe a r  h is  repu tation  would su ffe r.
Nor did he th ink  th e  e lec tion  re tu rns o f 1930 lessened h is  own daances 
in  the  next governor's race. Since h is  adm inistration had been a pro­
ductive one and he generally  had remained aloof from th e  G u ttin g -^ rin g e r 
f i ^ t ,  he reasoned th a t  he could lead  the  p a rty  to  v ic to ry . Accordingly, 
he agreed to  th e  request by Republican leaders th a t  he head th e  t ic k e t  a 
th ird  time in  193%.^
D illo n 's  candidacy awakened th e  Republicans to  the  hopelessness 
o f th e i r  condition because he lo s t  th e  e lec tion  by a su b s ta n tia l margin.
I f  th e i r  most popular candidate could not come close to  v ic to ry , there  
seemed l i t t l e  chance fo r  any o f  them to  win in  th e  foreseeable A iture.
^Judah: Richard G. D illon , p . 38.




Soon o ther developments in te n s if ie d  th is  fee lin g , and made i t  appear 
almost p o in tle ss  to  k e ^  th e  Eepublican p a rty  in  operation . One was the  
rea liz a tio n  th a t  lower income Republicans, th e  bulwaxk o f  th e  p a rty ’s 
strength  from i t s  incep tion , had defected because o f  the  depression. Many 
o f  these vo ters l i t e r a l l y  faced s ta rv a tio n , because they  had no reserves 
to  f a l l  back on. Lacking a b e t te r  explanation, they blamed p o l i t ic a l  
leaders in  power p r io r  to  th e  depression fo r  th e i r  misexy, and now turned 
en masse to  th e  o th er p a rty  fo r  help .
Since i t  was im possible to  win without support from th e  lower 
c la ss , and th e  Republicans con tro lled  no patronage, th e i r  only chance la y  
in  the  hope th a t  th e  depression soon would end and defecto rs would re tu rn  
to  th e i r  t ra d i t io n a l  p a rty . But th e  depression grew worse and economic 
recovery was no t forthcoming. Not only did d is tre sse d  New Mexicans draw 
c lo se r to  Democratic leaders a t  home, they also  turned more and more to  
the  new Democratic adm inistration in  Washington as i t  became evident th a t  
lo c a l o f f ic ia ls  lacked th e  resources to  help  them.
This was no t a su rp ris in g ' development, because New Mexicans had 
always m aintained d o s e  t i e s  w ith Washington. During t e r r i t o r i a l  days 
the  ro le  o f  the  federa l government was evident in  almost every fa c e t o f  
th e i r  existence, a s itu a tio n  th a t  ca rried  over in to  statehood. % th  the  
federa l government owning considerable land in  the  s ta te ,  ranchers had 
depended upon th e  Forest Service fo r  cheap grazing lands. The federa l 
government had saved many farmers along th e  Rio Grande from bankrupt<^ by 
i t s  l ib e ra l  expenditures on reclam ation. Roads b u i l t  with fed era l funds 
likew ise were c ru c ia l to  th e  s t a t e 's  to u r is t  business. Even in  t r i v i a l  
m atters, such as th e  k i l l in g  o f  coyotes and o th er predatory  animals.
162
n a tio n a l agencies had been exceedingly h ^ p fo l .  Indeed, as Harvey 
Fergnsson observed, New Mexicans had grown up with th e  a tt i tu d e  th a t  th e i r  
rep resen ta tives in  Washington were "no more than dairymaids to  milk th e  
treasu ry  cow,
By 19^  average farm income around Albuquerque approximated 
$117 p e r year. At th e  same time incomes o f  New Mexican A eep-ranchers
r
declined by more than f i f t y  percen t, and many were forced on r e l i e f .
C attle  p rice s  a lso  dropped sharply and small operators, Tho so ld  out to  
corporations, were l e f t  without means o f  live lihood . O il workers in  Sddy 
and Lea Counties and mine workers in  Colfax, McKinley and Santa Fe Counties 
joined th e  unemployed by th e  hundreds. Businessmen dependent upon th e  
to u r is t  trad e  went broke a l l  over th e  s ta te  as everything continued to  
decline except debts and r e l i e f  r o l l s .  By 1935 a t  le a s t  one-th ird  o f  th e  
to ta l  population o f  th e  s ta te  was receiving some form o f  fed era l a s s is ­
tan ce .^
Since Boosevelt appeared to  stand between lower inccme New 
Mexicans and s ta rv a tio n , they  continued to  vote fo r  him, and fo r  a l l  th e  
candidates o f  h is  p a rty . Accordingly, Republicans saw th e i r  chances o f  
return ing  to  power grow increasing ly  more remote. Their hopes were fu r th e r  
dashed by a new wave o f  immigration in to  the  eastern  counties during th e  
early  1930's. Scores o f  poverty-ridden o u tsid ers , most o f  i6@m were Demo­
c ra ts , s o u ^ t  unused lands in  New Ifoxico upon which to  eke out a l iv in g .  ̂
3«0ut Where Bureaucracy Begins, " pp. 113-14.
^nneO ly*  Rockv Mountain P o l i t ic s , pp. 223-27, 243-44? Fincher: 
"Spaniah-ümericans as a P o l i t ic a l  Factor in  New Mexico, " p . 105*
P e rso n a l in terv iew  with E arl S tu ll , June 19, I 965; Donnelly:
Rocky Mountain P o l i t ie s , p. 14? R ussell: "New Mexico: A Problma o f
Parochialism in  T ransition ,"  pp. 286-8?.
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In add ition , s ta te  Democratic adm inistrations enlarged th e i r  em plo ien t 
ro l ls  during th e  depression to  more than 5,000, and thus con tro lled  an 
estim ated 25,000 votes» Accentuating th e  impact o f a l l  these  fac to rs , 
unprecedented numbers o f  New Mexicans went to  th e  p o l ls  to  9xpres8 g r a t i ­
tude fo r  Democratic benevolence. In  th e  e lec tion  &f 1936, fo r  example,
£
a record eighty percent o f  a l l  e lig ib le  vo ters turned out.
Understandably, Republicans grew increasing ly  apa thetic  ih i l e  
th e i r  sha tte red  p a rty  la y  dormant. Since i t  was nearly  impossible fo r  
any member o f th e  p a rty  to  win e lec tio n , ih e th e r  he ran fo r  lo c a l, s ta te , 
o r n a tio n a l o ff ic e , conventions became r i tu a l  and seldom even produced a 
f a l l  s la te  o f  candidates. The most ta le n te d  leaders d isassoc ia ted  them, 
salves from p o l i t ic s  completely fo r  fe a r  t h ^  would ru in  t h e i r  chances in  
th e  fu tu re . Usually those iho ran fo r  o ff ic e  were unknowns iho d r if te d  
back in to  obscurity  a f te r  one defeat. For example, in  1938 Albert M. 
M itchell ran fo r  Governor and Pearce Bodey ran fo r  Congress, n e ith e r  o f  
whom would play a  s i g n i f i e n t  ro le  in  p o l i t ie s  again. ̂
As th e  Republicans p a rty  continued to  decline , i t  p ra c tic a lly  
went unnoticed by the  predominant Democrats. More capable lead ers  re ­
entered p o l i t ic s  in  th e  l a t e .1930*s, bu t even then they posed l i t t l e  
th re a t because t h e i r  p a rty  operated as two an tagon istic  wings. Moderates, 
who had remained lo y a l to  Bronson Cutting u n t i l  h is  death in  1935* operated 
as a s ^ a r a te  group under th e  name "Cutting Republicans. " Likewise, the  
Old Guard went i t s  own way under the  name "an ti.C u tting  Republicans. " No
^Fincher: "Spanish.Americans as a P o li t ic a l  Factor in  New
Mexico," p . 105; Donnelly: Rockv Mountain P o l i t ic s , p . 230.
^Donnelly: Rockv Mountain P o l i t ie s , pp. 244-45, 248-49.
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Republican candidate could hope to  win as long as these two fac tio n s refused 
to  cooperate with each o ther.
N evertheless, the  feud between them resto red  in te re s t  in  the  
party . During the  l a t e  1930*s and early  1940*s, when th ere  seemed small 
hope o f  winning e lec tio n s, "Cutting" and •fenti?-Cutting Republicans" 
f o u ^ t  fo r  p a rty  contro l in  an tic ip a tio n  o f b e t te r  days. Tdhen Maurice 
Miera, qjokesman fo r  the  pro-Gutting fac tion , claimed leadership  o f  Repub­
lican s  in  1939 he was vigorously challenged by A lbert G. Simms. Amid 
th ireats, charges, and counterdiarges Miera won th e  gubernatorial nomina­
tio n  in  1940 and fo r  the  f i r s t  time in  several years R ^ b l ic a n s  showed
o
signs o f  recovery from th e i r  apathy.
Their in te r e s t  also was enhanced because by th is  time th e  New 
Deal had lo s t  momentum, memories o f  the  depression had faded, and in te r ­
n a tional a f f a i r s  had become paramount. Meanwhile, Anglo Democratic leaders 
o f  southern and eastern  New Mexico had grown jea lous o f  the  power o f 
"native" Democratic leaders along the  Rio Grande. In  1938 they pushed a 
law through the  le g is la tu re  lAich provided fo r  the  d ire c t primary, and 
th e  next year they corrected abuses in  vo ter re g is tra tio n . These two 
reforms were promising fo r Republicans because they made p o l i t ic s  more 
responsive to  popular d e s ire s . Hence, they reduced th e  e ffectiveness o f 
the  whole Democratic machine.
Even more s ig n ific an t were th e  feuds w ithin high councils o f  
the  Democratic p a rty . A fter th e  Democrats had gained predominance in  1930,
^Judah: Riehard G. D illon, p . 14-; Albuquerque Journal. A pril 12, 
1940; Santa Fe New Meodcan. November 4-, 1931» Newspaper c ita tio n s  appearu 
ing without page numbers are taken from the news clipping f i l e s  o f  the  
Hurley Papers.
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th e i r  leaders had fought each o ther fo r  con tro l o f  th e  state* Jbnong them 
were Congressman John J* Dempsey (193^40), Qoveznor John B. Miles 
(1938-40), and Senator Dennis Qiavez (1936-40)* The ]^ p u la r  Chavez, i t  
w ill  be remembered, was a former Gongreseman who had been «^pointed to  
f i l l  C u tting 's  unfinished term in  th e  United S ta tes  Senate* By 1940 each 
o f th e  th ree  men seemed determined to  ruin th e  o th ers , and when Dempsey 
opposed Chavez* re -e lec tio n , th e  Senator formed a p o l i t i c a l  a llian c e  with 
Republican Miera* ̂
Thou^ Miera fa ile d  to  win the  govemorship as a re s u l t ,  th e  
Democratic s p l i t  enhanced th e  enthusiasm o f  Republicans* They went un­
rewarded th ro tt^ o u t Tiforld War H ,  fo r  th e  Democrats gaihed fu r th e r  advantage 
in  those years from federa l spending on atomic research and dev^opment in  
New Mexico* S t i l l ,  most Republicans reasoned th a t  th e  divided Democratic 
party  could be beaten once peace was resto red  and fed e ra l spending was 
reduced* All they needed was one good candidate i&o could draw "Cutting" 
and "anti-C utting" Republicans together and recapture some o f  th e  lower 
income support lo s t  back in  1932*
EfcdiBiggaa candidate tdio could accomplish these  aims was d i f f i ­
c u lt, fo r  ex is ting  leaders such as Miera and Simms were too much id e n tif ie d  
with one fac tion  o r th e  other* The ind iv idual to  reu n ite  th e  p a rty  needed 
to  be an outsider* Yet he had to  be known across th e  s ta te  because lower 
income New Mexicans m i^ t  w je c t  anyone with whom they  were unfam iliar*
These fac to rs  excluded most possib le  candidates, bu t near th e  end o f  th e
^Donnelly: Rockv Moun ta in  Po l i t i c s * pp* 219, 240-41; Ralph Trigg: 
"The Progrm  o f  the  S ta te  M erit System Ommmission, " The New Mexico 
Quawterly Review. XX (May, 1941), p* 186; R ussell: "Racial Groups in  th e
New Mexico Legislature;», " pp* 68-69; The New York Times* May 2, 1946, m ,  p* 
l6  and June 6, 1946, I I I ,  p* 15; Santa Fé New Mexican. November 4-, 1951*
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war RepuKLican lead ers  believed they had th e  r i ^ t  man in  P atrick  J .
H a r l^ .  His n e u tra l i ty  between th e  two fac tio n s was unquestioned. H u r l^  
adm ittedly had l i t t l e  in te r e s t  in  s ta te  p o l i t ic s  because he envisaged him­
s e l f  an e:qperienced n a tio n a l leader. The main reason he took specia l 
in te re s t  in  th e  Ne?; Mexican Republican party  was th a t  he m aintained re s id ­
ence in  Santa Fe and considered i t  h is  b est avenue to  a h i ^  o ff ic e  in  
Washington. At th e  same tim e, he was generally  acquainted across th e  
s ta te  because he had campaigned b r ie f ly  in  behalf o f  i t s  R ^ub liean  candi­
dates in  19^0. Moreover, p a rty  leaders f e l t  him a ttr a c t iv e  because lower 
income groups could id e n tify  with him. Though now a m illio n a ire , he had 
been a poverty -stricken  covhand, o i l  f ie ld  wozker and coal miner in  h is  
youth in  the  Choctaw Nation o f  Indian T erritoxy.
]h  add ition , Harley showed promise o f  general appeal because o f  
h is  record o f  public  se rv ice . He f i r s t  gained n a tio n a l prominence as 
Secretary o f  War udder P resident Herbert Hoover, and since th a t  tim e he 
frequently  had made n a tio n a l head lines. During the  p re s id e n tia l  canqpaigns 
o f  1932 and 1936 he trav e led  from coast to  coast as a spokesman fo r  con­
servative  R ^ b lic a n ism . His name again appeared in  headlines in  1938 
when he represented American companies during th e  Mexican o i l  expropriation 
controversy. F in a lly , during World War H  he rose to  th e  rank o f Major 
General in  th e  United S ta tes Amy and served as M inister to  New Zealand 
and as United S ta tes Ambassador to  China.
S a tis f ie d  th a t  he was fu lly  q u a lif ie d , s ta te  RepuÙLican leaders
^®Bchaand L. Souder: P a trick  J>. Hurley (Santa Fe: Santa Fe Press; 
1948). p . 7; Las Cruces Sun-News. Januarv 30. 1992: Ghicaeo Dallv Tribune. 
October 5. 1948, p . 18. ------- :—
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chose Hurley as th e  man to  reunify  the  p a rty  and win back th e  lower income 
vote, and to  defeat Dennis Chavez in  th e  se n a to ria l race in  1 9 4 6 .^  For 
a time H u r l^  h e s ita te d  because a senatorship was not exactly  what he 
had in  mind. A fter Vibrld War U  he was obsessed with a personal mission 
to  waxn th e  M erican public  o f th e  th re a t  o f  in te rn a tio n a l Communism.
The presidency would b e t te r  serve h is  purpose, and he hoped th a t  i t  some­
how m i^ t  become availab le  to  him. Back in  19W numerous "Hurley fo r  
President" clubs had grown up in  th e  Southwest and several o f  h is  friends 
now offered  to  revive them. More promising "üian th a t  was a possib le  dead­
lock a t  the  Republican N ational Convention o f  19^8 between Thomas E.
Dewey and Robert A. T aft. Both wanted th e  p re s id e n tia l noaination , and 
i f  n e ith e r  y ie lded , perhaps B irley  could win as a "dadc horse candidate. "
He avoided a  decision  u n t i l  i t  f in a l ly  became obvious th a t  both D w i^t 
Elsenhower and D outas HacAxthur stood a b e t te r  chance fo r  th e  nomination. 
He then r^ u c ta n t ly  agreed to  accept th e  nomination fo r  the  Senate from 
New Mexico. At l e a s t  he would have a public  forum from which to  denounce 
th e  "Crime a t  Yalta" and to  expose subversives in  th e  S ta te  Department. 
Perhaps the  p r e s id e n t  would become ava ilab le  a t  some fh tu re  date .^^
Thus, th e  Republicans found th e i r  candidate and th e  two wings o f  
th e  p a rty  got behind him with unqualified  support. At th e  tim e th e  p a rty  
consisted  c h ie fly  o f  people from middle and upper income groups, who re ­
garded the  General as some kind o f  a messiah. Cattleman lik e d  h is  devotion 
to  "free  e n te rp rise ,"  as w ell as h is  stand against foreign cànpetition  on
^V arious l e t t e r s ,  March 12, 1946, Personal Correspondence, H u r l^
Papers.
^% erald  Tribune. J ^ r l l  25, 194O; P a trick  J .  Hurley to  Frederick 
H. B a r t le t t ,  October 7, 194?, Personal Correspondence, Hurley Papers.
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th e  domestic beef m a r k e t P h y s i c i a n s  and Jdbntists were enraptured over 
h is  statements denouncing "socialized  medicine, " and upholding th e  "sacred 
character" o f  th e  "personal re la tio n s  o f  physician and p a tie n t . Roman 
Catholic dlergymen p raised  him from the  p u lp it  as a p a rtn e r o f . th e  uiurch 
in  i t s  crusade against Oommuniem. Businessmen across th e  s ta te  gave him 
support because he seemed to  personify  th e  v ir tu e s  o f  "rugged ind iv idual­
ism" and econmnic conservatism.
jfiU Hurlsy needed to  win was support from th e  common people, and 
fo r  a time Republican leaders  ezpeoted to  c a p ita liz e  upon th e i r  candidate* s 
humble o rig in . They were to  be g rea tly  disappointed, however, fo r  Hurley 
p referred  th e  m illionaire-statesm an image. Also, s to r ie s  o f h is  eaper- 
iences back in  Choctaw T errito ry  appearing in  Republican campaign l i te r a tu r e  
did not compare to  ta le s  o f personal hardship rec ite d  ty  Detrnds Chavez.
Most important o f a l l ,  Earley refused to  o f fe r  th e  common people anything 
in  h is  campaign ^^eechas except "free  e n te rp r is e ." In  most o f h is  addresses 
he ta lked  about "secre t diplomacy" and "stamping out subversion" in  th e  
na tional c ap ito l, subjects th a t  held  l i t t l e  in te re s t  fo r  "native" farmers 
along the  Rio Grande o r  mine workers in  th e  western counties. Instead , 
they p referred  th e  "bread and b u tte r"  promises o f  Dennis Chavez.
H u r l^  f in a l ly  recognized th is  before th e  e lec tio n . Thou^ he 
would not bend to  making " s o c ia l is t ic "  promises, he did rev ise  h is  platform
^% »etition fron Snail Stock Growers Association to  Senrretary o f 
Agriculture Clinton P. Anderson, December l6 ,  194?, Hurley Papers.
^̂ *Tucumoari. Hews. November 2, 1946; Patrick  J . H urler to  Doctor 
John Conway, September 20, 1948, Personal Correspondence, Hurley Papers.
^^Reverend J .  P. linnane to  P a trick  J . Hurley, S^tem ber 22, 1948 
and Reverend %rron J .  Murphy to  P a trick  J . Hurley, September 24, 1948, 
Personal Oorrespondenco, Hurley Papers.
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to  appeal more to  the  average vo ter. Anong o ther th in g s , he latmched a 
anear campaign against Chavez. He to ld  h is  audlenceé th a t  th e  Senator -«as 
a disgrace to  h is  o ff ic e  because the  only q u a lif ic a tio n  he possessed was 
the  a b i l i ty  to  win a t  th e  "public p ie  counter. " Moreover, he charged 
Chavez with being "red ," as evidenced by h is  support o f  th e  P o l i t ic a l  
Action Committee, "■«diich everyone knew to  be in  d ire c t contact with Moscow. "
But h is  l is te n e r s  had known Chavez too long to  believe  him subversive,
ïhrtheim ore, K u r i l 's  a ttack s backfired , fo r  Chavez answered in  kind.
At p o l i t ic a l  r a l l i e s  across th e  s ta te  he now characterized  Hurley as a 
self-seeking  "Oklahoma carpetbagger" idiose only claim to  fame was h is  
"money bags," ^feich he had f i l l e d  a t  th e  eapense o f th e  poor.^^
H u rl^ * s  s tra teg y  and Chavez* countercharges cost him th e  
e lection  and th e  Republican p a rty  a chance to  re tu rn  to  power. Riou^i 
u t te r ly  disappointed, he and th e  party* s lead ers  nevertheless could take  
solace in~ the  fa c t  th a t  thqy had lo s t  to  th e  powerful Chavez machine by 
only 4,000 vo tes . Accordingly, Hurley* s supporters looked with enthusiasm 
to  two years hence ^ e n  th e re  would be another con test fo r  a Senate sea t
in  New Mexico. In  th e  meantime, they t r ie d  to  educate him on lo c a l needs
and d esires . One advised him th a t  th e  case against caree r men in  th e  foreign  
service was now a "dead duck, " and asked Wiy i t  was necessazy to  give a 
^eech  on American foreign po licy  a t a l l .^ ^  Another wrote th a t  "the v o te r 
i s  in  lo c a l and s ta te  e lec tio n s  fo r something f re e . Platfozms whidi
^^The New Mexican. October 14, 1946; Port a le s  News. October 11,
1946; S ilv e r C ity P ress. November 1, 1946; Press re leases by P a trick  J . 
Hurley, September 29, 1946 and October 14, 1946, H u r l^  Papers.
^^uotes by J . V. Muxphy on ^ ee ch  by P a trick  J . Hurley to  th e  
Maryland Bar A ssociation, January 26, 1946, Hurley Papers.
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promise b e n e fits  to  groups as a i&ole are  the  vote g e tte rs . " He suggested 
th a t  the  l^an ish-M ericans might be appealed to  n ith  promises o f  peznanent 
f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  t h ^ r  friends and re la tiv e s  iidio came annually to  the  s ta te  
as migrant woikers.^^ S t i l l  another suggested an a ttack  upon Truman* s 
c iv i l  r ig h ts  proposals. This, he argued, -would g ra tify  "the DLxiecrats 
in  southem  and eastern  counties without a lien a tin g  those ^om  he could 
a t t r a c t  anyway.
Throughout 19^7 R^mblican lead ers  continued to  provide Hurley 
with s im ila r profusions o f good advice, but by th e  year* s end they had 
become d is illu s io n e d . Hurley seemed to  ^ow  l i t t l e  in te r e s t  in  l is te n in g , 
and remained too occupied with h is  anti-Oommunist crusade to  consider 
lo c a l problems. Furthermore, he thought he knew what aided the  average 
New Mexican, as w ell as -the panacea fo r  h is  recovery. The d isease  was 
too many governmental b e n e fits . He had been spoiled  by New Deal "so c ia l­
i s t s ” to  -the po in t \diere he had lo s t  h is  " in i t ia t iv e ."  The good l i f e  
could only come to  those who saved themselves th ro u ^  " se lf- re lia n c e ,"  
"com petition," and "free  e n te rp rise ."  No one had the  r ig h t to  in te r ru p t 
these  fo rces, but only to  c rea te  a clim ate in  which they  could operate.
I f  e lected . Hurley could b est serve th e  farm lab o re r by supporting federa l 
le g is la t io n  which would bar Mexican n a tio n a ls  from American f ie ld s .  This 
would allow New Mexican f i ^ d  workers to  compete f re e ly  with each o ther, 
e levate  themselves f a r  above the  standard inqposed ty  New Deal oppressors, 
and enjoy th e  s a t is fa c tio n  o f  having b e tte red  th e i r  l o t  th ro u ^  th e i r
^ a u ^  C. Daniel to  P a trick  J . Hurley, Ju ly  27, 1948, Personal 
Correspondence, Hurley Papers.
^^Edwin L. Mechem to  P atrick  J .  Hurley, August l4 ,  1948, Personal 
Correspondence, B irley  Papers.
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own •’in i t i a t iv e ."
Hinmediately, a l l  o f  th i s  cooled the  enthusiasm o f H u r l^ 's  
advisors considerably, and idien he shared h is  ideas witdi in q u is it iv e  
newanen. Republican leaders were aghast. A fter Edwin L. Mechem read in  
the  EL Paso Ttoes th e  proposal to  bar Mexican n a tio n a ls  he was beside 
him self with anger. In  a curb l e t t e r  t a  th e  candidate he informed him th a t  
he was a mere, offlc&> seeker put on the  t ic k e t  to  help 'Uie whole party  
return  to  power.--As such he was responsible to  i t s  d ic ta te s , and i t  was 
time he lis te n e d  to  advice on lo c a l needs. Had he no t heard th a t  without 
both ’’wet" and con tract Mexican labo r th ree -fo u rth s  o f th e  21 m illion  
d o lla r  cotton crop o f  Dona Ana County would have ro tte d  in  th e  f ie ld s?  
Indeed, without Mexican n a tio n a ls , southem  New Mexican a g ric u ltu ra l 
economy would co llapse, and farmers across the  s ta te  would go out o f 
b u s i n e s s . -
This episode revealed th a t  i t  was p o l i t ic a l ly  dangerous fo r  
o ther Republicans to  assoc ia te  with B irley . Had th e re  been anyone e lse  
to  con^ete with Clinton Anderson in  th e  forthcoming se n a to ria l race, o r 
time to  find  another candidate, i t  i s  u n lik e ly  Idiat Republican leaders 
would have supported h is  renomination. . As i t  was they had no choice but 
to  put him on th é  t ic k e t .  Few h i ^  |>arty council members gave him more 
than h a lf-h earted  support, and th is  time he lo s t  by more than 26,000 votes.
In  h is  own defense. Hurley singled out apathy among Republican 
leM ers  as th e  major cause. In  addition , he accused Anderson o f corrupting 
the  p o lls  with " s o c ia lis t ic "  promises and the  i l l e g a l  employment o f  federal
^®Bdwin L. Medhem to  P atrick  J . Hurley, August 14, 1946, Personal 
Correspondence, Hurley Papers.
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workers in  h is  campaign. Also, he claimed th a t  Drew Pearson’ s " lie s"  and 
Oommunistic :^ander were important fac to rs  in  h is  defea t. Most Repablican 
leaders maintained th a t  h is  defeat resu lted  from h is  own re fh sa l to  l is te n  
to  advice. Harley had cost them th e  best opportunity to  win since D illon 
was e lected  Governor in  1928. Actually, Hurley had several th ings 
wo iking in  h is  favor in  th e  19^8 e lec tio n . The ra c ia l  issu e  was unimpor­
ta n t , since both he and h is  Democratic opponent were Anglos. Too, Chavez 
was h osp ita lized  and unable to  campaign fo r  Anderson, and many New Mexicans 
were disenchanted with Truman’s c iv i l  r ig h ts  program. Yet, H u r l^  n u l l i ­
fied  a l l  these  advantages and led  h is  p a rty  to  d isastrous defeat. ̂
Republican p a rty  leaders seemingly resolved not to  run Hurley 
again. They d id  not go so f a r  as to  abandon him completely th o u ^ , since 
he could not seek e lec tion  again u n t i l  1952. Meanwhile he could be u se fb l, 
espec ia lly  with th e  p a rty  treasu ry  almost emg>ty. Hurley had premised a 
la rg e  contribution  and p a rty  leaders were looking hopefully  to  h is  finan­
c ia l  support in  th e  forthcoming gubernatorial campaign. Also, the  
General s t i l l  commanded lo y a lty  from scores o f cattlemen, clergymen, 
physicians, d e n tis ts , and businesanen. To have discarded him now might 
have shattered  th e  p a rty  and assured defeat fo r  Republican candidates in  
1950.
^Romero : S ta te  o f  New Mexico O ffic ia l Betum s o f  th e  1948 
E lections, pp. 34-50: The New M ^ c a n . November 4. 19^.; Qreeowi^.* Oon- 
n e c tic u t Times. November 15. 1948: The New York Times. October 2o, 1948 
and November 2, 1948; Bob Oau^^ to  Miss P ibkert, September 16, 1948, Peru 
sonal Coratespondenoe, H u r l^  Papers; P a trick  J . Hurleÿ to  Frederick E. 
B a r t le t t ,  June 10, 1948, P a trick  J . H u r l^  to  Doctor H. A. M ille r, Septem­
ber 21, 1948, Personal Oorrespondence, E u r l^  Papers; Wesley Quinn to  
Patrick  J .  iBurley, OtOy JL, 1948, August 26, 1948 and S^tem ber 9» 1948, 
Personal Oorrespondence, Hurleÿ Papers.
22"^^Personal in terv iew  with ax-Govenaor Edwin L. Mechem, June 21, I 965.
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With K u r i l ’s d isp o sitio n  le fb  fo r  th e  fu tu re , a tten tio n  focused 
upon a l ik e ly  candidate fo r  th e  forthcoming gubernatorial race. H u r l^  
had u n ifie d  th e  upper and middle c la ss  members o f  th e  p a rty , bu t he had 
fa ile d  m iserably among lower income groups. In  dioosing a candidate 
party  leaders th ere fo re  concentrated upon finding someone vho might capture 
support from the  l a t t e r .  C&arles B. Judah advised th a t  to  do so they  should 
avoid a candidate—lik e  Hurley—whose major id e n tif ic a tio n  was with •’wealth, 
p riv ileg e , and ' country club*. " No m atter how d istingu ished  he might be 
otherwise, a man vho re fle c te d  such an image was a poor candidate in  New 
Mexico. A m ajority  o f  v o te rs  p referred  someone from th e  middle o r  lower 
income c la ss . Id ea lly  he dkould be a prosperous but not wealthy rancher, 
businessman o r  p ro fessional man. Also, th e  p a rty  ^ o u ld  avoid a candidate 
from th e  nortiaem counties, since th a t  section  o f  th e  s ta te  already was 
over- represented. The man a t  th e  head o f  th e  t ic k e t  should come from 
southem  o r eastern  New Mexico where vo ters were under-represented and 
where th e  Democratic p a rty  con tro lled  th e  la rg e s t  percentage o f  th e  popu­
la t io n . Furthermore, th e  RepulxLicans needed a young man with a progressive 
appearance, and one idio could ta lk  a u th o rita tiv e ly  on cu rren t lo c a l prob­
lems. "The m ajority  o f  th e  people do no t remember th e  good old days, "
Judah observed. Instead , t h ^  wanted to  find  so lu tions to  t h e i r  immediate 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  and to  forget th e  p a s t.
E ith er by design o r  accident. Republican lead ers  found a guber­
n a to r ia l  candidate who f i t t e d  Judah 's descrip tion  p e rfe c tly . He was Edwin 
Mechem, a young, progressive-looking, successful a tto rney  from Las Cruces. 
Having liv ed  in  New Mexico n early  a l l  h is  l i f e ,  he was cognisant o f  lo c a l
^% ie  Republican P arty  in  New Mexico, p . 36.
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needs and could d iscuss them in te l l ig e n t ly .  In  add ition , he possessed 
a d is tin g tti^ e d  p o l i t i c a l  h e ritag e . His uncle was ex-Goveznor M erritt 
Mechem and h is  fa th e r  had been a judge in  Dona Ana County. They also  
found an equally  a t t r a c t iv e  candidate fo r  the  lieu ten an t govexnorship in  
Paul Larrazolo. He likew ise  was a successfu l, young a tto rney  ^ o s e  t i e s  
and in te re s ts  were lo c a l. And h is  name was even more an a sse t than Mechem* s, 
fo r  he was the  son o f  th e  l a t e  Octaviano Larrazolo, whom evezyone remembered 
fo r  h is  Progressive platform  and "native" leadersh ip .
VGLth Hurlsy to  keep upper and middle income R ^ub licans in  l in e , 
and two dyna#c young men to  appeal to  lower income New Mexican v o ters . 
Republican lead ers  f e l t  confident they  had a winning combination. But 
th e re  s t i l l  remained a problem o f  convincing both fav o rite s  to  run.
Larrazolo read ily  accepted, l u t  Mechem h e s ita te d , ev iden tly  because o f 
th e  fe a r  th a t  obscurity  would in ev itab ly  follow  possib le  de fea t. And most 
leading newanen were p red ic ting  th a t  no m atter how q u a lif ie d , iio Repub­
lic a n  could win th e  gubernatorial race.
Mechem eventually  agreed to  a c c ^ t  th e  nomination, a f te r  he 
became convinced th a t  an upset was probable, \ftiat changed h is  mind was 
factionalism  in  th e  Democratic p a rty  which had grown s te a d ily  more in tense  
throughout th e  p a s t decade and by 1950 had s p l i t  i t  in to  two p a r ts . One 
was le d  by Dennis Chavez and the  o ther ty  a c o a litio n  o f Democrats who 
opposed him. Among them were ex-Governor Dempsey, who had enlarged h is  
following considerably during th e  1940* s . Another was the  incumbent 
Governor, Thomas Mabry, tdio was b i t t e r  because Chavez had supported h is  
Republioan opponent, Manuel Lujan, in  th e  1948 e lec tio n . The S enato r's  
motive soemin&ly was fe a r  th a t  i f  Mabry won by a broad margin he might be
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in  position  to  name h is  o\m successor in  1950» This would spo il Chavez* 
scheme to  make New Mexico h is  personal province hy p u tting  h is  b ro ther,
PitDavid Chavez, J r .  in  th e  Governor* s Mansion a t th a t  tim e.
Chavez* actions also  were responsible fo r  th e  a lien a tio n  o f a 
th ird  and even more in f lu e n tia l  Democratic leader, Clinton Anderson. 
Senator Anderson apparently agreed a t  f i r s t  to  support David Chavez in  
1950, t u t  changed h is  mind fo r  fe a r  th a t  h is  sen a to ria l colleague would 
amass too much power. He then jo ined  Mabry in  support o f  ex-Governor John 
B. M iles, iho u ltim ate ly  defeated  David Chavez ty  approximately 9»000 
vote^,^^
This obvious discord in  Democratic ranks was th e  main reason 
th a t  Mechem th o u ^ t  he could win. Also, th e  Democratic p a rty  suffered 
from a long succession o f  complacent and mediocre governors, a s itu a tio n  
vhich afforded Mechem a readymade p la tfo m . F inally , Miles was. by now a 
sick ly , pedestrian-looking o ld  man, vho recen tly  had been d isc red ited  in  
newspapers across the  s ta te  because o f  a domestic scandal.
As th e  campaign opened Mechem became even more o p tim is tic . The 
mere fa c t th a t  he conducted a thorou^going "grass roots" cang)algn b ro u ^ t  
him popu larity  among th e  rank and f i l e .  Since 1932, candidates had worked
^\hcm as Allyn Donnelly: "The 1950 Gubernatorial Campaign in  New
Mexico as In te rp re ted  Through th e  S ta te  Press? " (Master* s Thesis, Univers 
s i ty  o f  New Mexico; 1952)» pp. 2-104; The Hew Meadman. November 4, 1951; 
The New York Times. December 31, 19^9, May 7 , l% ^m nd June 7, 1950; 
P a tr id t  J .  H u r le y  to  Frederick H. B a r t le t t ,  May 5, 19% and June 10, 19% , 
Personal Oorrespondence, Hurley Papers.
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^% )nnelly : "The 1950 Gubernatorial Campaign, " pp. 2, 24, 35-37,
^^The New York Times. November 1, 1950; Donnelly: "The 1950
Q ubem atorial Campaign," pp. 83-88, 93, 104; Personal in terv iew  with James 
E. N e le i^ ,  former Democratic Mayor o f  Las Cruces, June 19 , 1965I
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c h ie fly  through lo c a l p a rty  lead ers , th e  Democrats because they f e l t  t h ^  
would win in  any case, and th e  Republicans because they had grown accus­
tomed to  defeat no m atter what thgy d id . But Mechem toured th ro u ^  every 
hamlet in  th e  s ta te  and made contact with people o f a l l  c lasses . Moreover, 
h is  "house cleaning" platform  had appeal. E very^ere  he went he a ttra c te d  
enthusiasm from those who demanded p o l i t i c a l  reforms. Id le s , bn the  o ther 
hand, was placed on the  defensive, and fo r  reasons o f  health  bare ly  t r ie d  
to  defend him self.
MLth so many th ings woridng in  h is  favor—warfare among Democrats, 
an a tt ra c t iv e  image, vigorous campaign ta c t ic s ,  and a p o s itiv e  platform — 
i t  was not su rp rising  th a t  Mechem won a decisive  v ic to ry . Indeed, i t  would 
seem th a t  h is  13,000 vote margin should have pu lled  o ther Republican candi­
dates th rou^i. But aside from th e  gubernatorial o ff ic e . Democrats won 
nearly  every c ity , county and s ta te  o ff ic e , and e lected  more than two- 
th ird s  o f the  s ta te  le g is la tu re . Democratic candidates also went to  th e  
United S ta tes House o f R epresentatives, T hile  Tibo Chavez defeated Repub­
lic a n  Paul Larrazolo fo r  Lieutenant Governor by a narrow margin. Repub­
lic a n s  were confident th a t Mechem* s a b i l i ty  to  use th e  p res tig e  and power 
o f  th e  governor* s o ff ic e  would bring him continued success in  th e  fu tu re , 
however, and th a t  u ltim ate ly  he would bring th e  Republican p arty  back 
to  pow er.^
But such optimism was short liv e d  and within a short tim e several 
problems appeared. For one th ing , Mechem* s a b i l i ty  to  hold onto th e  govern 
nor ship was by no means a c e rta in ty . Thou^ he had won e a s ily  as a reform
^T he  Mew York Times. November 9, 1950, January 2, 1951 and October 
29, 1952; Thomas A» Donnelly; "The 1950 Gubernatorial Campaign," pp. 30»
107- 08, 110- 11.
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candidate, he was placed in  a defensive po sitio n  once he was e lected .
To stay  in  o ff ice  he would have to  demonstrate honesty and effic iency .
Mlth scores o f patronag».starved Republicans now encamped on h is  door 
step , such a p o s s ib i l i ty  seemed remote. Ælso, h is  personal p o l i t i c a l  
secu rity , and th e  expectation th a t  he could bring th e  p a rty  back to  f u l l  
power, broke down with the  re a liz a tio n  th a t  Rui0.qy had to  be d e a lt w ith. 
The old General d id  not th ink  Machem*s v ic to ry  should preclude a th i r d  
t r y  fo r  the  senatership . Di fa c t , he e je c te d  i t  as reward fo r  h is  ro le  
in  the  1950 e lec tion . R irthem ore, with Senator McCarthy on th e  rampage, 
he f e l t  more determined than ever to  get to  Washington to  h ^ p  save the  
country from Communism. Obviously Harley had th e  f in an c ia l means to  run
independently i f  necessary. And he s t i l l  commanded lo y a lty  from upper and
28middle income groups across th e  s ta te .
Mechem and the  Republican p a rty  stood to  lo se  no m atter ^ a t  they 
d id  about Earley. I f  denied th e  Republican se n a to ria l nomination Hurley 
could b o lt, run independently, and drag a l l  Republican candidates down to  
defeat. On th e  o ther hand, Republioan lead ers  already knew th a t  i t  would 
be p o l i t ic a l  suicide to  endorse him. He was an anathema to  lower income 
groups and he managed to  a lie n a te  some fac tio n  p r a c t i c a l ^  every tim e he 
met the  p ress .
Had i t  not been fo r  Hurley, perhaps Republican hopes would have 
been rea lized  in  1952» Mechem was a popular governor, and might have 
defended h is  adm inistration and ca rried  h is  t ic k e t  to  power against th e  
confused Democratic p a rty . But because the  Governor n e ith e r  dared oppose 
nor endorse Hurley, he Tesorted to  p rac tic e s  th ic h  placed th e  th o le
^T he  New Mexican. December 17, 195L.
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Repfubllcan plan  in  jeopardy. S i r s t ,  he made a sec re t p o l i t i c a l  a llian ce  
^ t h  Dennis Chaves. Then, he p lo tte d  to  dispose o f  H orley--yet hold the  
Repablican p a rty  togethen—by declaring  n e u tra li ty  on th e  R ^ub lican  
sen a to ria l nomination, but a t  the  same time woiidng "bdiincWthe-scenes" 
to  undemine th e  o ld  General. Mechem hoped H a r l^  w o ld  lo se  in  the  Repub­
lic a n  primary e le c tio n , bu t even i f  he won th e  nomination, Chaves probably 
could defeat him in  th e  general e lec tio n  and no one would ever know th a t  
th e  plan o rig ina ted  in  th e  Governor’ s Mansion.
How Mechem th o u ^ t  he could co llabo ra te  with Chaves, m aintain a 
n e u tra l facade, and srbill remove Hurley from the  scene without causing 
defection  in  th e  Republican p a rty  i s  d i f f ic u l t  to  imagine. The d e ta i ls  
o f the  whole in tr ig u e  a re  unclear. Even today. New Mexicans idio were 
p rivy  to  the  arrangement refttse to  comment fo r  fe a r  o f embarrassing o thers 
in  both p a r t ie s .  Out o f  deference fo r  Mechem, i t  should be said  th a t  h is  
in tr ig u e s  were not n ecessa rily  devised fo r  personal reasons. He believed 
th a t  Hurley* s e lec tio n  would h u rt th e  Republican p a rty  more in  th e  long 
run than i t  would have helpedr Rirbheimore, h is  a llia n c e  with Chaves 
supposedly included provision th a t  th e  Senator would support him in  the  
sen a to ria l race against Clinton Aiderson in  195^* Under such an arrang». 
ment, Mechem then  could u ltim ate ly  name h is  own successor to  th e  governor, 
ship. The p a rty  could win two important o ff ic e s  and assure v ic to ry  fo r  
various o ther Republican candidates. N aturally , th e  p r ic e  o f cooperation 
with Chaves and h is  friends would be h i ^ ,  but th e  u ltim ate  b e n e fits  fo r  
th e  Republioan p a rty  would be worth i t^
But Mechem encountered one d i f f i c u l t  problem he should have
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an tic ipa ted . The success o f h is  p lo t depended upon h is  keeping the  Repub­
lic a n  party  in ta c t ,  and to  do so he had to  dupe Hurley in to  believing 
th a t  he was n e u tra l on th e  sen a to ria l race in  1952. In  th is  he inev itab ly  
fa ile d , i f  fo r  no o ther reason than th a t  an a llian ce  with Chavez was 
impossible to  conceal.
At f i r s t  B irley  d id  not suspect a p lo t against h im s^ f , d é b i t é  
anonymous rumors th a t  he probably would not seek renomination. But by 
the end o f  the  summer o f 1951» these  rumors were linked to  th e  o f f ic ia l  
Republican family in  Santa Fe. Newsmen discovered th a t  they were o r ig i­
nating with Revenue Commissioner Manuel Lujan, Prison Warden Joe Tondre, 
l iq u o r Control D irector KLfego Baca and Snplpyment Conmissioner Maurice 
M.era. In September o f  the  same year Governor Mechem ta c i t ly  admitted 
involvement idien he opposed Senator Joseph McCarthy as a w eaker fo r  the  
Republican Rocky Mountain and M.gUwestern s ta te  chairman's  meeting. The 
reason given was th a t  the  "Communist witch hunt" should not be a paramount 
issue  in  th e  next c a m p a i g n . H u r l ^  c le a rly  saw th e  im plications in  
Mechem* s statem ent, as in  s im ila r ones dropped th e re a f te r  with increasing 
frequency. All doubt f in a l ly  vanished idxan a close friend  to  the  Governor 
announced th a t  th e  Republican party  could not accept Hurley again. Though 
the  General spoke "learnedly about such fa r -o f f  p laces and such vague 
issu es as Y alta and Chungking" he never had given any a tten tio n  to  th e  
"economic d e s titu tio n  o f 60 perceht o f our people a t home,
The speaker, Wesley Quinn o f CQLovis, was th e  man Mechem had 
chosen to  support fo r  th e  se n a to ria l nomination a t  th e  forthcoming
^^Albuquerque Tribune. September 22, I 951, 
^ I b id . .  j ^ r l l  20, 1952.
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Republican convention in  Februaiy, 1952* Though the  Governor refused to  
comment upon Quinn’s remarks, b is  commitment to  him soon became general 
knowledge. H u r l^  was no t fooled. A fter he defeated Quinn a t  the  conven­
tio n , and u ltim ate ly  won the  nomination in  th e  Republican primary S e c tio n , 
he vo c ife ro u ^y  id e n tif ie d  Quinn as th e  to o l o f  the  "Chavez Republicans 
o f  Santa F e ." ^
As the  sen a to ria l campaign picked up momentum, th e  g u lf between 
Mechem and Hurley broadened. The Governor continued to  deny th a t  he had 
ever opposed Hurley o r th a t  he had reached any agreement with Chavez. But 
Hurley attacked him on both counts, and f in a l ly  by September he had drawn 
him in to  the  open. At th a t  time th e  two men clashed over ^ o  would o f f i­
c ia l ly  d ire c t the  f a l l  campaign. Mechem eventually  took charge o f  the  
regu lar Republican Machine, while Hurley estab lished  h is  own organization. 
The struggle then boiled  down to  a f ig h t to  th e  f in ish  between Hurley 
Republicans on th e  one hand, and the  Mechem-Oiavez co a litio n  on the  o ther. 
By e lec tion  day p a rty  l in e s  had broken down completely, and Mechem eas ily  
won re -e lec tio n , while Chavez defeated Hurley by approximately 5*000 
votes.
^Don Lohbeck: P a trick  J .  Hurley (Chicago:. Henry Regnery Oompany; 
1956)* pp. 460-61; Albuquerque Journal. Ju ly  26, 1951* October 14, 19^# 
October 25, 1951, April 3* 1952, # r l l  26, 1952, and May 3* 1952; ^ b u o u er. 
que Tribune. February 9* 1952* February 13, I 952, February 19* 1952 and 
February 21, 1952; The New Mexican. December I 7 * 1951 and Mardi 2, 1952;
El Crepusculo. February 14. 1952; Roswell Record. May 7 , 1952; Gmlluo 
Didepehdent. May 7* 1952; S ie rra  Oountv Advocate. March 7* 1952.
^Albuquerque Journal. May 30» 1952, August 6 , 1952 and September 
2* 1952; S ilver S ity  P ress. August 21.-1952: The New Mexican. April 8 , 1952; 
Roswell Record. May 15* 1952; Hew Mexico S ta te  Record. October 9* 1952; 
Qallup Independent. October 20, 1952; Carlsbad Current Argus. October 31* 
1952; The Hew York Times. Hovanber 6 , 1952; United S ta tes , E igh ty-th ird  
Congress, Senate, Second Session 1 Report o f th e  Subcommittee on Rules and
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Both Kecheci and Chavez n a tu ra lly  found the  re tu rn s  g ra tify in g , 
but they g e l l e d  d is a s te r  fo r  the  Republican p arty . As in  1950, Mechaa 
was the  only im portant v ic to r . R irthem ore, th e  Republicans lo s t  idiat 
l i t t l e  u n ity  they  had achieved during th e  previous e lec tio n . Now Hurley 
supporters were enraged by Mechem* s d u p lic ity , and they  soon became fu rth e r  
a liena ted  from th e  Mechem Republicans lâien th e i r  lead e r unsuccessfu lly  
t r ie d  to  wrest th e  senator ship from Chavez ty  a  congressional in v es tig a tio n  
o f fraudulent vo ting . 33
Though Hurley v ir tu a l ly  to re  h is  p a rty  to  p ieces in  th e  process, 
h is  unw illingness to  accept th e  re tu rn s i s  understandable. Indeed, h is  
own in v es tig a tio n  revealed th a t  hundred o f  b a llo ts  were cas t in  behalf o f 
persons who e ith e r  were dead o r  iho had l e f t  th e  s ta te  long before th e  
e lec tion . The evidence amassed by Hurley forced a Democratically contro l­
led  Senate Committee on Rules and Adm inistration to  agree th a t  th e  ih o le  
e lec tion  should be reviewed. S enato ria l in v es tig a tio n s  in  tu rn  v e r if ie d  
H urley 's charges and added some new ones. F ina lly , when New Mexico Demo­
c ra tic  leaders t a c i t l y  admitted g u i l t  by burning the  b a llo ts  in  th ree  
counties before th%r could be examined, th e  congressional commission reccm-
*Ul
mended th a t  th e  ^ o l e  e lec tio n  be n u l l i f ie d .
a tra tio n  R elative  to  th e  Contested E lection  o f  November 4. 1952 
(Washington; Govemment P rin tin g  O ffice; 1 9 ^ 5 , p . 93»
33su .ver Ca.ty Press. ^ l i l  2, 1952; Raton Range. Ju ly  25, 1952; 
Santa Fe News. Ju ly  25, 1952; Albaouerone Journal. September 8 , 1952 and 
September 21/ 1952; Boswell Record. September 11, 1 9 ^ ;  The New Mexican. 
September 23, 1952.
34onited S ta tes, E ig h ty .th ird  Congress, Senate, F ir s t  Session: 
Hearings Before th e  Subcommittee on P riv ileg es  and E lections o f  th e  Gonim 
m lttee  on Rules and Adm inistration on th e  Contest o f  P a trick  J« Harley v . 
Dennis Chavez fo r  a Seat in  th e  United S ta te s  Senate from th e  S ta te  o f  New
182
Even so, th e  United S ta tes  Senate would not re je c t  Chavez, fo r  
th e re  was evidence o f corruption on both sides. Also, th e re  was no proof 
th a t  Chavez him self had committed a law less a c t. Thus, a f te r  several 
weeks o f  d e lib e ra tio n  fiv e  Republicans and one Independent jo ined  with 
the  Democrats in  th e  Senate to  v ind ica te  Chavez and affiim  h is  S e c tio n .
This in v es tig a tio n  only drove the  wedge deeper between Mechem 
and Hurley Republicans. In s u lts  were hurled  by both sides fo r  more than 
a year during th e  in v es tig a tio n . Hurley* s follow ers re jec ted  the  Govemor 
completely fo r  having placed h is  own in te r e s ts  above those o f  th e  p a rty , 
and fo r having made an a llia n c e  with a "corrupt Democratic Senator.
The 1952 e lec tio n  and i t s  a fte m a th  a ffixed  disüsoïd in  p a rty  
ranks ih ich  the  Republicans have been unable to  overcome. Since th a t  time 
they  have fa i le d  to  work together harmoniously. Mediem continued to  win 
fo r  a decade, largaLy through h is  a llia n c e  with Chavez, but o th er Repub­
lic a n s  have had l i t t l e  success. 3? Nor does th e  immediate ftitu re  look 
very promising fo r  the  p a rty , e sp ec ia lly  since Mechem* s hum iliating  defeat
Mexico; A pril 27. May 1. 7. 11. 27 and August 12. 1953 (Washington: Govern.,
ment P rin ting  O ffice; 1953). pp. 1-2, 22-28, 19^99 ; United S ta te s , Eighty- 
th i rd  Congress, Senate, Second Session: Report o f  the  Subcommittee, pp. 1,
42, 83-94; Farmington News. November 5» 1952; Hobbs Son Hews, ApriX 12,
1953; The New York Times. September 22, 1953» January 25, 1954 and March 
14, 1954, IF , p . 5; United S ta te s . E igh ty -th ird  Congress, Senate, Second 
Session: Congressional Record. Vol. 100, P t. 3» PP» 3^24, 3697»
3-%nited S ta te s , E lgh ty -lh ird  Congress, Senate, Second Session, 
Congressional Record. Vol. 100, P t. 3» PP* 3698-3700, 3704, 3732; The New 
York Times. March 14, 195^» IV, p . 5 and March 28, 195^» W» P* 2.
36personal Diterview with James E. Neleigh, June 19» 1965*
37ibid.
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in  the  sen a to ria l race in  1964 by Democrat Joe Montoya. ̂  This, p lu s the  
apparent hamony Tôiich the  Democratic p a rty  apparently has enjoyed since 
Chavez* death, portends continued disappointment fo r  Republican candidates. 
In  the  mi&.1960*s Senator Anderson appears to  work comfortably with Montoya 
and both seemingly are  on good terms with Democratic Govemor **Smiling 
Jack" Campbell. All th ree  men in  tu rn  enjoy support from a group o f 
r is in g  young, wealthy Democratic l e a d e r s .^  Barring a general re tu rn  to  
conservatian o r  an unanticipated  d iv is ion  w ithin Democratic ranks, th e  
p r o j e c t s  fo r New Mexican Republicans to  re tu rn  to  power in  1966, a t l e a s t ,  
seem exceedingly remote.
^T he New Mexloan. November 20, 1964, p . 1. 
P e r s o n a l  in terview  with E arl S tu ll , June 19, I 965.
CHAPTER X 
OONCniSION
The New Mexican Republican party  has l i t t l e  to  show fo r  the  past 
th ir ty - f iv e  years. Only Edwin Mechem has won important con tests, and h is  
defeat in  the  l a s t  e lec tion  portends more dismal years fo r  th e  t ic k e t .  
Recent fa i lu re s  should not obscure the  importance o f  R^publicaniam in  
t e r r i to r i a l  tim es, however, when th e  fortunes o f  th e  two major p a r t ie s  
were reversed.
The reader has seen how th e  Republicans rose to  power immediately 
following th e i r  party* s inception  in  IB67 and continued to  dominate p o li­
t i c s  u n t i l  statehood. At f i r s t  they  won ch ie fly  on th e  strength  o f th e i r  
wartime association  with William Amy's anti-Goppezhead Administration 
party . The “bloody sh ir t"  issu e  k ^ t  them in  o ff ic e  u n t i l  th e  l a t e  I 87O* s, 
when they began to  b en efit frcm th e  emergence o f a superior leadersh ip . 
Republican ch ie fta in s  160 took charge o f th e  p a rty  a t  about th a t  time 
excelled in  adapting i t  to  ex is ting  so c io -p o litic a l conditions. They 
used the  natrdn ^stem  to  g rea te r advantage than th e  Democrats d id , and 
thqy b e tte r  understood the  so c ia l sign ificance o f  p o l i t ic a l  fonctions. 
Republican r a l l ie s  always were gala  a f f a i r s ,  colored by lo f ty  orato ry , 
dancing, din ing and dr inki ng, ih ich  broke th e  monotony o f  an otherwise 
a rid  existence fo r  most peons and th e i r  fam ilies. By th ese  means Repub- 
l ic a n  leaders won acc^ tanoe  among the  "natives" and rap id ly  b u i l t  up th e
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size  of the  rank and f i l e .
Equally important was th e  o rgan izational a b i l i ty  o f  key leaders . 
Republican "father" Wil iam Breeden was the  f i r s t  to  excel in  th i s  respec t. 
While serving as Chairman o f th e  Central Committee he d id  more than any­
one ^ s e  to  hold th e  p a rty  to g e th er by v ir tu e  o f  h i s  being th e  only 
lead er iho remained su f f ic ie n tly  a loo f from qqarre ls  w ithin th e  ranks.
His most notable e f fo r t  came in  I 87I» th e  year th e  p a rty  n early  d is in te ­
grated, but he continued in  th e  ro le  o f  appeaser u n t i l  he resigned as 
Chairman in  1884.
Thomas Catron was th e  next outstanding Republican. Catron often  
provoked d iscord  in  p arty  ranks. Yet 1894, Then he won e le c tio n  as 
t e r r i t o r i a l  Delegate to  Congress, he had created lo c a l  p a rty  machinery 
fo r  northern. New Mexico and had lu red  numerous leaders  from o ther p a r ts  
o f  the  t e r r i to r y  in to  h is  Santa Fe Ring. Accordingly, he brought New 
Mexican Republicans together in to  a loose federation  under one po licy  and 
a single leadersh ip .
Ck>vemor Miguel A. Otero H ,  who succeeded Catron a t  th e  head o f 
the  party , then t ie d  the  Central Committee and lo c a l machinery together. 
Through th e  jud ic ious use o f patronage, th e  m anipulation o f th e  p ress , 
and the  app lica tion  o f  h is  ta le n t  fo r  leadersh ip  he gradually  produced a 
w ell-d isc ip lined  organization. Ry 1904, when h is  power reached i t s  peak, 
th e  Republican p a rty  had achieved i t s  modem form and went p ra c tic a lly  
unchallenged a t the  p o lls .
One more problem arose in  th e  remaining years before statehood.
As O tero 's  power increased, so did th e  animosity o f  various lead e rs  he 
defeated. Their p ro te s ts  soon provoked President Theodore Roosevelt to
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f i r e  Otero as Governor in  hopes o f  res to rin g  peace in  the  p a rty . Die 
re su lt was more d iscord, brought about by le s s e r  lead ers  idio hoped to  
gain from O tero 's  demise. Republican a f f a i r s  were chaotic  fo r  nearly  two 
years, but f in a l ly  order was resto red  with the  appointment o f  George Gurry 
to  the  govomorafiiip in  1907» Curry 's po licy  o f  appeasement brought peace 
and paved the  way fo r  th e  e lec tio n  o f  an overwhelming Republican m ajority  
to  the  C onstitu tional Convention o f  1910.
The success o f  th e  Republican p a rty  in  t e r r i t o r i a l  tim es resu lted  
in  dev^opments o f la s tin g  importance to  New Mexico's p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry .
One was the" d ra ftin g  o f a conservative co n stitu tio n . Even more s ig n ifican t 
was the  p o l i t i c a l  accu ltu ra tion  b r o u ^ t  about by Republican lead ers . The 
acceptance o f Anglo-Saxon p o l i t ic a l  h a b its  ly  New Mexican "natives" 
resu lted  p a r t ly  from th e  inrush  o f  American immigrants and th e  influence 
o f  leading Democrats such as MiUiam Thornton and Harvey Fergusson. But 
most c re d it belongs to  William Breeden, Thomas Catron, I&guel Otero,
George Gurry and th e i r  p a rtisa n  assoc ia tes . Largely th r o u ^  th e i r  e ffo r ts  
Hiqpanic New Mexicans received sdtooling in  tw o-party government and accep­
ted  partisansh ip  as th e  p rin c ip a l guide fo r  t h ^ r  p o l i t ic a l  behavior in  p 
place o f  ra c ia l  t i t s ,  action  groups, and th e  d ic ta te s  o f clergymen and 
fe u d a lis tic  patrones. Although th e  Republican p a rty  o f  New Mexico has 
had l i t t l e  success since the  onset o f  the  d reat Depression, 'Uiese impor- 
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